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ESSAY 1
INTRODUCTION
TO
SPILLOVERS FROM HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
TO WAGE AND PROFIT FORMATION
by
Kristin Dale
21.1 Summary
The aim ofthis introduction is to present the findings ofthis thesis and relate them to labour
economics and human capital theory. The central idea ofthese five essays is that household
production affects wage and profit formation in industries with production processes that are
similar to household production so-called 'substitute household production'. Household skills
raise productivity in household production and are learnt at home through 'in-the-home
training', a new concept I introduce to highlight this process of skill formation. Household
skills are job skills in substitute household production. Household skills play an important
part in these five essays. The influence ofhousehold production on capital costs is addressed
in terms of the low entry costs ofnew firms in Essay Four and the regional distribution of
family-based businesses in Essay Five. Each essay focuses on one aspect of the spillover
process from household skills and real capital into factor supply and remuneration.
Essay Two introduces in-the-home training and models the manner in which household skills
may affect the choice of education and occupation. Essay Three investigates how various
types ofhigher education affect household productivity. I describe a model that shows how an
occupational education, which promotes household skills to a greater degree, ceteris paribus,
increases a graduate's household productivity and creates an occupation with shorter working
hours and a lower wage rate. This is a novel explanation for the low wages of pre-school
teachers and nurses in comparison to engineers and business economists with an equally long
education. Essay Four presents a model demonstrating that industries producing substitutes
for home made goods and services will typically pay lower wage rates and create lower
profits than other industries. The model assumes that entry costs for nascent firms in
household-related industries are lower and that employees with household skills are in
abundant supply. Essay Five presents a model oftwo regions and two industries where rural
areas have a cost disadvantage and the manufacturing industry has a fixed regulated wage rate
in all firms. Under these assumptions family firms become more important to employment in
the rural region because they pay lower wage rates than the industry with regulated pay.
31.2 Motivation
Despite decades oftheoretical and empirical research on wage formation, the economic
literature on wage formation contains substantial discrepancies between enduring empirical
findings on wage differentials and the explanatory power oftheoretical models. One
important research question is: why are hourly wage rates higher in larger firms, in certain
industries and in male dominated occupations (after controlling for other factors)?
Current research on wage formation proceeds on two fronts. Empirical studies have become
refined thanks to new data sources such as panels and better econometric models that help
overcome the problem ofunmeasured variables like worker ability. New theoretical
explanations have been developed for the concepts in the wage equation. My dissertation
belongs to the second line by contributing some new explanations.
My previous research (Titlestad and Rødseth, 1980; Rødseth and Titlestad, 1984) lead to the
following question: Does the 'gender' component of a wage equation measure a 'pure' gender
effect or an effect that has not been disentangled from the different roles ofwomen and men
in the household sector of the total production system? From the estimates ofwage equations
(Dale 1988; 1994) I was surprised by the relatively low hourly wages of car-repairer workers
compared to other workers in the iron and metal industry. The explanation cannot be that car-
repair is dominated by women! Is the hidden explanation a resemblance to household
production? Car mechanics can keep the family-cars running and exchange services with
others. Returns may also stem from income from informal markets for car-repair. Thereby,
car mechanics receive returns on their human capital (acquired through 'in-the-home
training', education, apprenticeship or 'on-the-job training'). However, an alternative
explanation oflower wages is that the car-repair industry is more competitive than, say, the
steel industry, because the lower entry costs of new firms result in more garages.
1.3 Stylised facts: household production and the labour market
Some patterns are common among OECD-countries: occupational sex segregation, gendered
division ofunpaid household production, and the characteristics ofhigh and low wage
occupations and industries. Therefore, these patterns can be exemplified by data from
countries like Norway and the USA. I will use the examples to raise issues and questions that
will subsequently be discussed in these essays.
41.3.1 The magnitude of household production
Aslaksen and Koren (1996) report that the value ofunpaid household work represented a 38
per cent addition to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Norway in 1990, the larger share of
which, 25 per cent, was contributed by women, and 13 percent by men.
Household production constitutes a large part of total production in modern industrialised
countries, and even more so in developing countries. Cloud and Garrett (1996) use a series of
strong assumptions and make approximations of the value ofproduction and maintenance of
human capital- largely corresponding to household production - on a country-by-country
basis for 132 countries in 1990. The smallest percentage gain in Gross National Product
(GNP) was 21 in Finland and the USSR. The largest was 90 per cent in Bangladesh. Sweden
gained 25 per cent, Denmark, Hungary and China 26 per cent and Norway 30 per cent. France
and the US gained 32 per cent, while Australia, the UK and Japan gained 36 per cent.
Portugal, Turkey and Korea gained 42 per cent. Italy and Nepal gained 46 per cent. Indonesia
gained 49 per cent, Brazil 54 per cent and India 57 per cent. Pakistan gained 80 per cent,
Jordan 84 per cent, Egypt 86 per cent and Algeria 87 per cent. Developing countries gain a
high share of GNP by adding household production. Communist countries and Scandinavian
welfare states gain low percentages because female labour force participation is high and
child-care and care for the elderly are publicly funded. The strength of this study is that it
provides comparable, worldwide (132 countries) estimates ofhousehold production that total
approximately $8 trillion or 36 per cent of GNP. These results illustrate that home-made
commodities represent a major contribution to people's consumption and wellbeing.
1.3.2 Occupation, gender and household production
The manager in a catering firm called my attention to household skills as job skills when he
told me: 'Only housewives do a proper cleaning job, but young women are qualifiedfor
catering' (Dale and Eskedal, 1985). This illustrates that various kinds ofhousehold skills may
be useful in obtaining some jobs in the labour market. Is the pattern of gender segregation
similar in household production and the labour market? In the labour market, do women use
female household skills and men use male household skills? Reskin and Padavic (1994) report
the division ofhousehold tasks by gender for full-time workers in the USA for 1987. The
heavily female-dominated tasks are laundry and ironing, house cleaning, and preparing meals.
Washing dishes and shopping are also female-dominated activities. Bills-payment and driving
5are almost gender neutral. Automobile maintenance and outdoor tasks are heavily male-
dominated. Bergmann (1986, Table A-I, p.3l 7-28) ranks 335 occupations by the percentage
of female workers (in the USA in 1984). A total of 19 occupations have more than 90 per cent
women: dental hygienists; child-care workers; pre-kindergarten and kindergarten teachers;
secretaries; receptionists; dental assistants; typists; licensed practical nurses; private
household cleaners and servants; registered nurses; health record technologists and
technicians; teacher aides; dieticians; welfare service aides; textile sewing machine operators;
telephone operators; personnel clerks (except payroll and timekeeping); data-entry workers;
bank tellers. With the exception of secretarial work, the tasks involved in these jobs are
typically part ofhousehold production, particularly where a family has small children or other
dependants. Bergmann includes 28 occupations that have more than 99 per cent men: garbage
collectors; excavating- and loading-machine operators; railroad brake-, signal-, and switch-
operators; power plant operators; water and sewage treatment operators; boilermakers; mine
workers; oil well drillers; structural metal workers; sheet-metal duct installers; roofers;
insulation workers; concrete and terrazzo finishers; plasterers; electrical power installers and
repairers; brickmasons and stonemasons; supervisors of electricians and power plant
installers; farm-equipment mechanics; heavy-equipment mechanics; firefighting-related
occupations; aerospace engineers; heating, air conditioning and refrigeration mechanics; bus,
truck and stationary engine mechanics; supervisors; helpers, construction trade; operating
engineers; automobile mechanics. A few ofthese occupations require tasks involved in
household production, such as garbage collection and car- and home-repair (according to
time-use studies, these tasks are typically performed by men). The conclusion is that there
seems to be a gendered division ofvarious household skills, and these spill over into the
labour market.
1.3.3 Low wage industries and occupations
Results from some ofmy studies of Norwegian manufacturing industries (Dale, 1994 and
Dale et al.1993) illustrate the traditional explanation oflow wages in certain occupations and
industries. In Table 1.1 manufacturing industries are sorted by estimated industry wage
differential, ranging from high to low. The estimated wage differentials by industry in Table
1.1 approximate percentage differentials in reference to the group of low wage industries
(textiles, apparel, leather and footwear). These estimates ofindustry wage differentials have
been controlled for gender as well as firm size, region and the worker's status as skilled, semi-
6skilled or unskilled. Years of education and capital intensity were not controlled for because
this information was not available. Information about years of education and capital intensity
for these industries has been entered from other sources (Tables 8.3 and 8.8). The last column
ofTable 1.1 indicates industries that produce substitute household production to a large
degree according to my assessment.
Table I.l. Differentials by industry from Norway 1986 and 1990
Industry differentials from Norway 1990/1986
.Wage differentials (1986) and female share, education and capital (1990)
Industry (manufact.& ex!rac.) Wage diff. Female % Years of edu.i CapJworker Substitute
! Tab. 5.1 I Tab.B.5 Tab.B.3 Tab.B.B househ.prod.
342 Printing & publishing 0.38 37 11,17 487
353 Petroleum refining 0.34G 16 12,00 14668
354 Man. of other petro.p. 0.34G , 13 10,42 3943
22: Crude petroleum&n.gas 0.32 24 12,68 n.a.
21 Coal rrdning 0.17G 35 10,50 2596
23 lVIetal ore rrdning 0.17G 18 10,57 2438
29 Other mining 0.17G 12 10,02 1822
383 8ectrical apparatus 0.17 30! 11,04 851
371 Iron and steel 0.15 13 10,57 2558
3841 Ship building 0.13 10 10,61 416
382 Machinery 0.12 13 11,04 670
390 Other manufact. indo 0.11 41, 11,21 641
381 Metal products 0.09 161 10,38 588
314 Manufact. of tobacco ! 0.09G 52 10,03 1447
313 Manufacl of beverage 0.09G 201 10,52 1439
311 Other food manufacl O.09G 37 10,44 1194 X
3114 Rsh products 0.000 51 9,85 642 X
352 Other chemicals . 0.08 38' 10,85 1288
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.08 17 10,92 3348
331 Wood O.08G 15: 10,07 1061
332 Furniture and fixtures O.08G 27 10,07 626 X
351 Industrial cherrdcals 0.06 14 11,15 3720,
341 Paper&pulp 0.06 17 10,39 3227'
323 Leather OG 45, 9,70 489
321 Textiles OG 60\ 9,86 862 X
324 Footwear , OG 58! 9,56 310
322 Apparel I OG 841 9,82 306 X
Scuæ: Dale et aI(1993, 1994) G=group estimate. O=basis=lowest wage. Wage diff.=%'
Table 1.1 shows that industries that produce substitutes for household production are low
wage industries. They have many female workers and a short average education length. Are
female household skills relevant in the production of clothes, textiles and food? Are male
household skills relevant in the production offurniture? In addition, capital intensity is
7relatively low in the manufacturing industries that produce substitute household production. Is
this an indication of the low entry costs for new firms? The standard interpretation by
Bergmann (1974) is that employer discrimination towards female workers accounts for low
female wages, while Polachek (1976) argues that low wages are due to shorter female
education. Suggested policy measures have been to tackle employer discrimination by
legislation and educate workers to raise formal skills and wage rates.
1.4 Household production and the household production function
As this thesis contains no literature surveyor essay on household production in itself, this
section explores the reasons that underpin my use of the household production function
proposed by Gronau, together with his division of time into three categories: leisure, wage
work and unpaid household work.
Models ofwage formation and wage equations arise in the extension of consumer theory. In
microeconomic theory a dichotomy is normally assumed to exist between agents. Thus,
individuals consume in households and employees produce in firms. This division neglects
household production and consumer aspects of employment. In recent years, production
theory has also influenced wage equations. Nickell et al. (1994) introduce product market
power and demonstrate that market power has a positive influence on wage rates. Hildreth and
Oswald (1997) show that changes in profitability lead to lasting changes in wages.
Reid (1934) is a seminal work on the economics ofhousehold production. Itwas revived in
the works of Gronau and others. The theory of home production, as surveyed by Gronau
(1986), points to household production as important for five issues: '... the theory [models
with explicit household production], the allocation of time, the allocation of goods, the value
of time and the value ofhome production.' Gronau (1997) highlights the enlarged body of
literature along these lines during the last ten years. The theory ofhousehold production has
had a direct effect on the understanding of female labour force participation and the amount of
hours for household production, paid work and leisure. It has also encouraged work to
estimate the value ofproduced (and consumed) household production. Studies have tried to
assess the magnitude ofhousehold production at a nationallevel (related to paid production
measured by GNP) for many industrialised and developing countries.
8I find it puzzling that current economic thinking treats household production and industrial
production with quite different approaches and concepts. For instance, the production ofbread
is dealt with differentially according to whether or not the loaf is later eaten by the family that
produced it (household production) or by strangers (bakery production, which is analysed by
production and market theories). The association of a household with a consumption unit has
created a theory of the allocation of time and household production that partly hides the
parallel between production processes in firms and in households. A notable exception is
Leibowitz (1974, p.246), who uses time-budget data and household resources like appliances
and schooling to estimate time spent on laundry. 'For example, the housewife who uses a non-
automatic washer spends thirty-nine minutes more in washing than one who uses an
automatic washer. More educated women have more and better quality capital goods, but
even with these factors held constant in the regression, education still serves to decrease time
inputs to laundry work. '
In the household sector, much of the theory has failed to distinguish between market inputs of
raw material and those of production capital (like the flour and the oven in bread production).
Lancaster (1966) introduced a new consumption theory, and Becker (1965) introduced time
and commodities as sources ofutility in a slightly different consumption theory. Gronau
(1986, p.275) comments on the difference in approaches: 'On theface ofit, the difference
between Becker and Lancaster (ignoring the one between the nature ofinputs) may seem
merely semantic. But as pointed out by Pollak and Wachter (1975) and Atkinson and Stern
(1979), the differences go much further; they relate to the nature of the production process
converting market inputs into characteristics of commodities. The focus is on the degree of
'jointness' in production: whereas Lancaster assumes perfect 'jointness', Becker rules out
'jointness' in production. While the characteristics approach regards goods as 'public
inputs', whose marginal productivity in the production of any given characteristic is not
affected by its serving as inputs in the production of another characteristic, Becker 's
approach derives much of its analytical power from the assumption that goods serving as
inputs in the production of one commodity cannot be utilised in the production of another.
These two extreme assumptions on 'jointness' in production lead to two completely different
sets of conclusions.' Blaug (1992, p.149) concludes for Lancaster's theory of consumer
behaviour: 'There is little doubt that the Lancaster theory is richer in content than the old,
which is hardly surprising since it includes the old as a special case, but it isfar from clear
that this increase in generality is accompanied by new substantive results of a testable kind. '
9Becker (1965) has inspired various researchers. For example, Michael (1970) models how
education shifts the production function of consumption (also mentioned by Becker, 1975,
p.67), but Gronau (1986, p.67) criticises Michael's empirical testing. Cigno (1990) starts from
Becker (1965) and makes one-person and two-person models of the allocation of time. In the
intuitive introduction, Cigno (1990, p.7) considers time for household production and
consumption: 'For example, a meal at home requires various ingredients and appliances to
prepare it, and time in which to prepare and consume it. ' Cigno divides total time into two
categories, market labour and home time. However, he concludes on p.16: 'In a two person
household, however, it is possible that one member will have a wage rate higher than the
shadow-wage rate (common to both members of the household) and will thus specialise
completely in paid work. Leaving all the domestic chores to the other. ' Considering that home
time contains time spent in household production and leisure (in Gronau's division of time), I
think the implication ofCigno's result is more severe than simply leaving household
production to the spouse. It also seems to imply that the person has no home time in the sense
of consumer time (leisure). Starting from the standard model of consumer theory, where time
is divided into paid work and leisure, Rupert et.al. (2000, p.576) concludes: 'Our results
suggest that life cycle studies that ignore home production can lead to biased parameter
estimates. Estimates of the intertemporal labour supply elasticity based on models that take
home production explicitly into account are significantly larger than those from models that
ignore home production. ' Rupert et.al. (2000, p.560) explicitly mentions that the dichotomous
characterisation of time use masks some important features of how time is allocated across
activities, and therefore they explicitly include time spent in home production. Neither Cigno
(1990) nor Rupet et al. (2000) references any work by Gronau. I consider the approach of
Gronau (1973, 1977) to be very efficient. He categorises time into wage work, leisure and
'home' production, and introduces production functions ofhousehold production, where time
spent in household production is the only argument. Gronau (1986, footnote 13), using H to
denote the time in 'home' production and XH for output in such production, mentions: 'It is
often argued that an increase in home productivity always increases work at home [Chiswick,
1982]. This is true if the productivity coefficient k is multiplicative [i.e. ... X H = kf (H)]. It
need not necessarily be true ifthe productivity change is resource saving [i.e. X H = f(kH)]. '
Therefore I use Gronau's approach with a multiplicative coefficient that produces unique
theoretical results.
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1.5 The scope of the thesis
An enormous amount of capital and working hours contribute towards household production
on a world scale. I intend to show that this has important implications for equilibrium wage
rates of different types of competence. Household skills influence wage formation for the so-
called unskilled and educational choices of individuals. Occupational wage formation depends
upon the degree to which education raises household productivity. Increased competitiveness
from an abundant supply ofhousehold skills and low entry costs for new firms willlower
wages and profits in industries producing substitutes for household production. Family-based
industries using household skills and household capital become relatively more important to
rural areas when (i) those rural areas face cost disadvantages and (ii) wages in large-scale
industry are regulated. Below is a brief outline of the four essays of the thesis.
1.5.1 In-the-home training, household skills and low wages
'Learning by doing', in the context ofhousehold skills, takes place in the household sector. In
some models, learning by doing inhousehold production increases productivity in household
production, and intensifies the division ofunpaid and paid work between spouses, as in
Lommerud (1989). Essay Two goes one step further and formulates that learning by doing in
household production is a kind of 'in-the-home' training that fosters household skills.
Household skills raise productivity in tasks in household production and in similar tasks in
paid work. Thereby 'in-the-home' training and household skills 'spill over' into labour supply
and wage formation. 'In-the-home' training consists of activities that involve either
participation in household production or watching it. Everybody has a degree ofthese
household skills. When Oulton (1996) uses 'no qualifications' for people with compulsory
schooling, he underestimates the basic skills acquired from upbringing, compulsory schooling
and household production. Because Schultz (1961) defined human capital by returns and not
by expenditure, in-the-home training escaped the theory of human capital formation.
Bowman's (1966) criticism that this position failed to account for 'the capacity to do it
yourself had little impact.
Essay Two contains a formal model of how in-the-home training and household skills may
influence educational choice, ceteris paribus. Itmodels both long run labour supply and
labour demand, and shows how the wages for labour services with household skills and higher
education influence the choice of education and occupation. This model predicts that
Il
individuals with much in-the-home training and household skills will not proceed into higher
education because of the job opportunities from household skills, and the loss oflow wage
earnings and own household production. Itpredicts that individuals with little in-the-home
training and household skills will proceed into higher education. It also predicts greater hourly
wage differences between individuals with advanced household skills and those with higher
education than standard human capital theory. This is due to the loss ofhousehold production
during higher education and later. For example, this means that girls who have spent a lot of
time taking care of children during childhood and youth will tend to drop higher education
and take on jobs as a child-care workers, while girls who have spent less time caring for
children will enter a teacher programme in higher education. Boys who spent a lot of time
repairing bikes and cars during childhood and youth will start to work in a garage or look for
an apprenticeship as a car-mechanic. Boys with less household skills will enter programmes
in higher education, such as economics. Ifthese new explanations hold, male-dominated
occupations that employ household skills are also predicted to offer low wages. While Essay
Two concerns the influence ofhousehold skills on entering a job or a programme ofhigher
education, Essay Three is concerned with how various types ofhigher education develop
household skills to various degrees, and examines the implications for occupational wage
differentials between, for instance, nurses and engineers.
1.5.2 Lower wages when occupational education increases household productivity
The aim of this essay is to discuss variation in wage rates and labour supply among
occupations that employ individuals with higher education of equallengths. The new idea is
that variation in wage rates can be partially explained by the observation that
educational programmes raise household productivity to various degrees.
There is no doubt that home economics education raises household productivity. However,
other kinds of education can have an influence too: (Becker, 1991, p.27): '.... the incentive to
invest in {human} capital that mainly raises household productivity is greater when more time
is spent in the household sector, and the incentive to invest in {human} capital that mainly
raises marlæt productivity is greater when more time is spent at work. Some investments, such
as on-the-job training, mainly raise the productivity of marlæt time; others, like classes in
child care, cooking, or art history, mainly raise the productivity ofhousehold time. '
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However, educational programmes with the aim of producing nurses or pre-school teachers
also increase household productivity, and more so than many other kinds of education.
A formal model shows how variation in raising household productivity, ceteris paribus,
influences recruitment of students, labour supply and wage formation by occupation. The
model indicates that occupational education that yields higher household productivity, leads
to lower occupational equilibrium wage rate and, consequently, more hours are spent in
unpaid household production and fewer hours in the labour market. This is a new explanation
of the phenomenon that female-dominated occupations such as nursing and pre-school
teaching offer lower wages and supply fewer hours than other occupations with equally long
periods of education. Homes can be regarded as demanders for unpaid work and more so the
higher the household productivity of the family members. These results have implications for
public policy measures concemed with the size of educational programmes. Educational
programmes that raise household productivity to a large extent should be dimensioned so as to
cover both the demands from the labour market and from household production.
1.5.3 Lower wages in industries producing substitutes for household production
How do firms and employees get compensated when they produce market substitutes for
household production? That is the concern of Essay Three. Lately, production theory has
influenced estimations ofwage equations. Nickell et al. (1994) demonstrate that market power
has a positive influence on wage rates. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) show that changes in
profitability lead to lasting changes in wages. Going from concentration to entry cost is a
small step within industrial organisation. When a specific kind of production takes place in
many households, the necessary appliances for household production must have a rather low
price for most households to afford them. Small firms that produce substitutes for household
production may also be established with household appliances. This would, in tum, lead to
cheap capital equipment and low entry costs. Many kinds ofhousehold production (food
preparation, clothing, laundry, child-care) are common throughout the world and technologies
are widespread. Essay Four introduces substitute household production as a contributing
factor towards low entry costs and employees with well-developed household skills.
Restaurants are good examples ofthis. But can low wages be explained by low entry costs
alone, so that the notion ofhousehold skills is redundant? If so, it could be argued that
lawyers who start a business from a flat with phone and a PC (household real capital) should
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earn low wages. This example illustrates that high wages can be earned even if entry costs are
low, and indicates that household skills play apart.
Essay Fourpresents a formal modelofthe effects of different entry costs and different
availability oflabour on profit and wage formation. It introduces a three-stage model where a
finn's entry costs become sunk upon entry and monopoly unions set wages. This theoretical
model is the core of the essay. The following results are obtained from a three-stage game: In
a given industry, high entry costs ofnew firms lead to few large firms, high profits and high
wages in that industry. Ifindustries with substitute household production have low entry
costs, they have more and smaller firms than other industries, obtain lower profits and pay
lower wages. Essay Four refers to empirical results from the USA, Japan and Norway, in
particular those presented in Krueger and Summers (1988) and Dickens and Katz (1987).
These estimates are reorganised according to wage level and indicators of entry costs for all
industries or manufacturing industries. It transpires that many low wage industries have low
entry costs and produce substitutes for household production. These findings support the
theoretical model and raise the question: Is degree of substitute household production a
hidden dimension of the 'dual economy'? Policy issues include self-employment programmes
and minimum wages.
1.5.4 Lower rural wages and profits from home-based entrepreneurs
Rural areas have an industry mix that differs in comparison to urban areas. Shops, restaurants,
inns, farms, and so on, are often family-run businesses. Essay Five analyses the mix ofwage
employment and family self-employment in rural and urban areas. The model has two sectors
(wage employment and family self-employment) and two regions (rural areas with a cost
disadvantage and urban areas). The model predicts an increased importance of family-run
employment in rural areas when manufacturing wages are regulated nation-wide and, in
addition, rural capital intensity is maintained trough investment subsidies. Empirical results
from Norway support these results to some extent.
Regional policies that subsidise capital, together with policies that treat family-members and
other employees differently, may reinforce rural self-employment and reduce the demand for
regular employees. This conforms to a mobility pattern where people move from rural to
urban areas for wage employment and return to rural areas for retirement. Discussions in
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regional economics mostly concern demand phenomena. For example, urban areas give more
alternatives to individuals with specific occupational skills and can centralise the supply of,
say, two-career couples. In the literature discussions do not address the rural bias towards
self-employment (both in primary and other industries), which means that a person may have
to invest not only human capital but also physical capital to acquire a rural job. Formally, this
implies that the division between the capitalist and the worker is not evidenced in rural areas.
To have a job with a shadow price similar to the market wage, you must be your own
capitalist and receive low profits. This relates to the argument that regional wage differentials
may be too small. Unemployment policies and rural development policies that encourage
entrepreneurs may reinforce the lack ofwage employment opportunities in rural areas in the
longrun.
1.6 Applications to an industry: tourism
The aim of this section is to illustrate how the findings of the thesis can be applied to one
particular household related industry. I will use tourism. Do similarities between tasks in
household production and tourism enhance labour supply, the number offirms and
competition in tourism? Can we apply the models ofthese essays to explain how household
skills and household capital influence production for tourist markets, and reduce wages and
profits in tourism-related industries producing accommodation and meals? The
accommodation industry, and the tourism segment in particular, has low entry costs for new
firms and utilises household skills as job skills. Bed-and-breakfast establishments constitute
the segment that incorporates substitute household production using household skills as job
skills and household real capital as a basis for income generation.
In Essay Two I argue that in-the-home training begins in childhood. Some youths with a large
amount of in-the-home training and good household skills may choose a job that utilises these
household skills instead of entering additional occupational education. According to Baum
(1995, p.124-5) many people have had part-time, casual or seasonal work in sectors of the
tourism and hospitality industries during their school or college years. Some firms build their
human resource policies upon young, transitory staff. Moreover, Lucas (1995) concludes that
the hotel and catering industry employ, for the most part, young people. According to Stringer
(1981) it is an implicit assumption that the occupation as a bed-and-breakfast landlady
requires no training or specific education. In Essay Two, the model concludes that the supply
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oflabour with household skills, such as chambermaids, depends upon the relative wages of
the various jobs that require different types of qualification. These relative wages are also
influenced by the demand for different types of skill by various industries. The model shows
that jobs with household skills earn relatively low wage rates and supply shorter hours in
waged work. More unpaid household production is undertaken by people in order to
compensate for the lower earnings in household skilled jobs. As a modelling component
'household skills' provides a novel alternative to the standard 'lack of skills' explanation for
the low wage-rate in tourismjobs. According to Riley (1991), the labour force in the hotel and
catering sectors consists of 14 per cent managerial and supervisory staff, 22 per cent skilled
crafts workers, and 64 per cent semiskilled and unskilled operatives. As indicated by Hammes
(1994), real wages did not rise during the development of a large-scale tourism resort in
Hawaii because of an elastic labour supply. According to Maher (1995), management rhetoric
in the British hospitality industry concerns the value ofhuman resources while the British
hospitality industry has high turnover of employees. Studies of the use ofhousehold skills as
job skills in the tourism and hospitality industries may help to determine the degree to which a
lack ofhousehold skills is responsible for such high turnover, and whether or not improved
screening ofhousehold skills or additional on-the-job training are relevant measures.
Consider restaurants as an example offirms with low entry costs. Household food production
makes entry costs of real capitallow, both to settle down and to establish oneselfin business.
If it is possible to start a small restaurant with no more equipment than one uses at home for
preparing and serving food, the condition for low entry cost is met by the restaurant industry.
Low entry costs of real capital for a new restaurant, and the use of employees with household
skills, increase the number of new entries and the total number of restaurants. In keeping with
the model in Essay Four, competition is therefore high within the industry, and profits and
wages are low. Some industries belong to the so-called 'dual' economy and some jobs to the
so-called 'secondary' labour market. For firms in the accommodation industry, entry costs
may be low for the same reason. This is especially true for small units with fewer facilities,
where entry costs are reduced because they are sunk cost to the family in the form oftheir
dwelling or farm. Stringer (1981) reports that the majority ofbed-and-breakfast landladies had
started business primarily for economic reasons, and that it was chosen because it enabled
thern to continue living in a large house and because they enjoyed the advantages ofbeing
able to work at home. Baum (1995) remarks that it is fair to say the European tourism and
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hospitality industry is characterised by small businesses, generally family-owned and
managed.
Essay Four presents a three-stage game model that utilises the assumptions of a varying entry
costs offirms in different industries and a varying alternative value ofworkers. This model
shows that a lower entry cost for new firms, along with low alternative value of workers, lead
to an equilibrium with a higher number offirms in the specific industry, less concentration,
lower profits and lower wage rate compared to industries with higher entry cost. If catering
and accommodation have relatively low entry costs for new firms, the model predicts that
these industries will be less concentrated than other industries, have lower profits, and pay
lower wages. The study of the wages and profits of different segments of the tourism and
hospitality industry may provide some interesting insights. One could try to measure the
degree to which the wage level and profits are related to (i) the entry costs of new firms in
each segment and (ii) the share of employees that only require compulsory education and
household skills. According to SkaIpe and Nysveen (1996), the Norwegian tourism industry
experienced four years of growth both in earnings and sales volume in 1991-94 (particularly
in the accommodation and catering industries) while profits in the tourism industry were
lower than in other private businesses.
The urban-rural dimension is useful because firms in many industries, including tourism, have
lower productivity in rural than urban areas. The reasons underlying this difference may be
the higher transport costs for rural areas or regional differences in the functioning of the
labour and the capital markets. To increase profitability in rural economic activities, and
increase rural employment, many countries have regional programmes that subsidize regions
and industries. Raising collateral and obtaining a loan may prove particularly difficult for new
investments in rural areas. This problem is one of the reasons for capital subsidies in rural
areas. Higher transport costs for production from rural areas, or a lack of employees with the
necessary skills from vocational and higher education, may be other underlying factors in the
rural disadvantage. There are signs that family self-employment in agriculture and other
industries such as tourism are more frequent in rural areas than urban areas. One explanation
is that wages in manufacturing, and some other industries, are regulated on a national basis,
preventing rural labour costs from compensating for other rural cost disadvantages. In this
way, regulated wage employment is reduced in rural areas.
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InEssay Five, I address the situation where rural areas have a different industrial mix than
urban areas. Farms, bed-and-breakfast establishments, inns, restaurants, and so on, are often
family-based businesses. The model in Essay Five analyses the mix ofwage employment and
family-based self-employment in rural and urban areas. The model has two sectors (one with
wage employment, the other representing family-based employment) and two regions (rural
areas with a cost disadvantage for transport and urban areas). Introducing regulated wages in
wage employment while maintaining the rural capital intensity by public capital subsidies, the
model predicts increased importance of family-based employment in rural areas. This implies
that family-based tourism should be of particular importance to rural areas.
1.7 Methodological aspects
The essays contain formal models where I hold that some assumptions are fulfilled; the
mathematical model deduces a statement about an event whose explanation I seek. Such
events are 'lower wage rates for some groups' and 'lower profits for some industries'. These
essays are written within the hypothetical-deductive model of explanation (see Blaug, 1992,
p.4). The propositions ofthese four essays are, in principle, intersubjectively testable and may
be falsified, which is the key criterion for scientific work according to Popper (1965).
However, these essays contain no econometric work that can be tested in such a manner. This
is because the data sets do not contain the necessary longitudinal information about individual
activities at home, in education and in the labour market. Time budget surveys are available.
They report the amount ofhours spent in various tasks in household production by adults.
But, apart from this, data on household production are scarce. However, measurement
problems also influence empirical studies of on-the-job training. Blaug (1992, p. 211)
discusses training and concludes that 'All in all, it can hardly be said that the human capital
approach to training has yet been put to a decisive empirical test.' He points to the inherent
difficulty in empirical work of distinguishing costless on-the-job learning from both informal
and formal off-the-job but in-the-plant training. Social scientists collect data sets for studies of
regional development, touristic development and so on. By relating the concept of in-the-
home training to tourism as discussed in Section 1.6, these new proposals may be evaluated in
studies with individual data from interviews and questionnaires. This may start the ex post,
ordinal comparison of a theory to assess its qualitative 'degrees of corroboration' (popper,
1965).
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The phenomena modelled in these essays have alternative explanations in the economic
literature: 'unskilled' for Essay Two, 'compensating wage differentials' for Essay Three and
'efficiency wages' for Essay Four. Therefore, these essays do not reflect the irrelevance-of-
assumptions thesis of Friedman (1953), which states that the only relevant test of the validity
of a hypothesis is a comparison of its predictions with experience. Still, the assumption 'as if
the firm maximises profits' is used in Essay Four's model. In this thesis, I differentiate
household skills, entry costs, and so on, to explain the extent oflow wages and profits more
precisely than the alternative theories.
Blaug (1992, p. 206-219) treats human capital theory as a cluster ofinterconnected theories or
as a scientific research programme in the sense ofLakatos (1978). Blaug (p. 217-8) criticises
human capital theory and points to five issues, two ofwhich are addressed by my essays:
,There are certainly grounds for thinking that the human capital research program is now in
something of a 'crisis ': ... ; its account of post-school training continues to underemphasize
the role of costless learning-by-doing as a simple function of time, ... ; its rate-of-return
calculations repeatedly turn up significant difforences in the yields of investment in different
types of human capital but its explanation of the distribution of earnings nevertheless goes on
blithely assuming that all rates of return to human capital formation are equalized at the
margin.' Essay Two addresses aspects of costless learning-by-doing by introducing in-the-
home training and household skills. Essay Three addresses wage differential with different
kinds of equally-long education. The five essays in my thesis yield novel hypotheses
concerning how wage and profit formation are influenced by household production, and shed
light on some old stylised facts of wage differentials, thereby making this programme
theoretically progressive. Ifthe new empirical content is corroborated at a later stage, the
human capital and household production programmes are empirically progressive in the sense
ofLakatos (1978).
These essays contain partial equilibrium models in the positive, not normative, tradition.
However, research output feeds into societal debate ofpolicy measures. For instance, many
job vacancies for nurses over a long period make the public sector interested in measures that
increase labour supply by nurses. The results of available studies enter the public debate and
the decision process for policy measures. If research models do not address the considerations
that influence labour supply ofnurses, the suggested policy measures are probably not the
most effective and efficient.
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1.8 Topics outside the thesis
There are various spillovers from household production to wage and profit formation. To
concentrate I exclude several issues. I do not address the question ofhousehold skills
screening, how household production influences demand for market commodities, how the tax
system raises household production, the spillovers from household production in developing
countries, and arguments that concern the division of consumption, work and leisure within
the family. Below I explain why I have chosen to exclude these issues, and point to economic
literature where such issues are treated.
Household skills are a type of human capital. As with other kinds ofhuman capital, skills
enhancement and the screening ofhousehold skills are hard to separate. It cannot be stated a
priori whether a problem stems from lack of skills or a lack of recognition. Schools take on
skills enhancement and screening tasks. Students get marks in various subjects; these are
signals of productivity and useful screening devices for employers according to Spence
(1973). Firms screenjob skills and on-the-job training and use such information in hiring and
promotion decisions. Household skills and in-the-home training have no similar screening.
Why trust a paper from a parent stating a high level ofhousehold skills ofherself or her
youngster? This is probably why parental certificates ofhousehold skills do not exist. The
failure to recognise in-the-home training and household skills (indicated by the term
'unskilled' for jobs and employees) in the economic literature, may be a reason why
household skills have not been acknowledged. Lack ofrecognition ofhousehold skills may
help explain low wages in substitute household production. Though the issue ofhousehold
skills screening is highly relevant and interesting, I address the human capital aspect, not the
screening ofhousehold skills, in this thesis. Therefore I assume that household skills are
correctly assessed.
The role ofhousehold production is to reduce monetary spending and demand for market
commodities at the expense of increased time-use. Families that consume their own bread do
not buy loaves from the shop, but flour. Household production is a substitute for market
products that reduce potential demand for finished products and raise demand for raw
materials and energy. Aslaksen and Koren (1996) report that an uneven distribution of
disposable income among groups will often turn into a more even distribution of extended
income when the value ofunpaid household work is added. They discuss how consumption
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expenditures can be allocated to various kinds ofhousehold activities, using data from time-
budget analyses and consumer expenditure surveys. Since most families may produce a loaf
ofbread or take care oftheir own children but are not able to build a television set, demand
for products and services are influenced to various degree by household production. However,
the influence ofhousehold production on this product-specific demand is not an issue in this
thesis.
Because unpaid household work and home made commodities are not taxed, while production
in firms is subject to pay-roll and value-added taxes, and wage earnings are reduced by
income tax, the tax system is crucial to the economic trade off in households between 'make'
or 'buy'. The economic literature contains several contributions on the tax wedge between
paid and unpaid work. Examples are Boskin (1975), Sandmo (1990), Apps and Rees (1999a,
1999b, 1999c) and Kolm (2000). In Dale (1984) I illustrate the magnitude by which the
Norwegian tax system raises returns to 'doing-it-yourself' and contributes to the high level of
household production in Norway. In the discussion of the allocation of time in Essays Two
and Three, the relevant wage rate is the wage rate after deduction of income tax and the
product price includes value-added tax. Still, I have excluded taxes as an issue in this thesis.
Presumably, spillovers from household production to wage and profit formation are more
important in developing countries. This is because in-the-home training becomes more
important for adults and working children when education is non-universal. A lack of credit
systems will reinforce entry into household related businesses where entry costs are small.
Family and other businesses escape various kinds of labour regulations. Family businesses
like farming, tourism, retailing, homeworking, and so on, constitute a larger share of
production. Modern economies typically have higher GNP per capita and wealth per capita.
Therefore, the formalisation of the household production function in this thesis, omitting
appliances and housing, assume a condition that is more often binding in developing
economies. Discussions in several of my essays rely on the assumptions that perfect
substitutes for household production are available in the markets for commodities, and that all
adults can acquire some kind of job in the labour markets. In an absolute sense, these
assumptions are probably not fulfilled anywhere, but the functioning of modern economies
comes closer to fulfilling these assumptions than those of most developing countries. Lack of
money for basic necessities and, thus, starvation are more frequent in developing countries.
Therefore, the formalisation of the household production function used in this thesis, omitting
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expenditures for raw materials, is better suited for a modem economy with effective labour
markets and social security. The combination offarming and household production is the
primary way ofliving for a larger share of the population in developing countries. Because of
the wider scope of 'household production' when farming is added, and realities like child
labour and starvation, there is a large supplementary literature that would have to be
considered to address spillovers. There is also likely to be a difference in the type of
technology used in household production. I have therefore decided to omit findings from
developing countries. However, I think that concepts like in-the-home training, household
skills and low entry costs for new firms in substitute household production are most important
in the understanding ofwage and profit formation in developing countries.
The thesis focuses on different kinds of spillovers between unpaid and paid work in individual
human capital and household real capital. I address human capital formation by children
where the childhood family is central. To this end, I include an appendix to justify that Iomit
the broad literature on the intra-family allocation of consumption, leisure, wage work and
household production; see, for example, the survey by Agarwal (1997). The appendix, which
contains my paper, 'A model for the allocation of time within the family,' in its original
version (Titlestad, 1983)1 starts by assuming that all products from household production have
perfect substitutes in commodity markets. The paper integrates the models of Gronau (1973
and 1977). The model uses a family utility function and shows that the spouses' allocations of
household production and market work are not influenced by the productive characteristics of
the partner, but by the individual's own wage rate and productivity in household production.
Chiappori (1997, p.194) states that a crucial issue is whether the goods produced in household
production can be bought and sold on the market or is household specific. Public and private
provisioning of substitutes for household production have increased over time in
industrialised countries. Inmy opinion, the assumption of perfect market substitutes for
household production seems increasingly realistic in many industrialised countries.
1.9 Gender equality
At first glance, the propositions ofthis thesis may seem counter to the general policy of 'equal
pay for jobs of equal worth'. To the extent that productivity is raised in household production,
the notion of equal wages become less important. These essays illustrate that there is probably
a greater correspondence between unequal pay by gender and the gendered segregation of
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household skills, household tasks and occupational segregation. Jonung (1997) discusses the
approaches in economic studies towards occupational segregation and wage differentials by
gender. To achieve equal wage rates between men and women, equalIeveIs ofhousehold
skills and equal participation in industries producing substitute household production may be
a necessary condition. One way to maintain the importance of equal wage rates, and fulfil it,
can be illustrated in a science fiction scenario by transferring all household production into
substitute household production. If children and adults learn no household skills and do no
household production, demand for market substitutes for household production will increase.
Moreover, firms will wish to recruit employees with domestic science education or firms will
supply household skills as 'on-the-job' training. Firms will be eager to pay higher wages to
reduce turnover. In this way, household skilled labour will no longer be in abundant supply,
and domestic science education will have transformed into an occupational education!
Industrialised economies may already be heading towards this scenario by reducing in-the-
home training and household production, but some new kinds of in-the-home training are
emerging - like computer science, which is male-dominated. The optimistic message to
parents is that a lack ofhousehold skills teaching for children (especially girls), with
household services bought-in, may help towards long-term gender equality in the labour
market.
These essays model one-person households. They do not model households with two adults
and dependent children, nor the sharing of consumption. Consumption and production differ
for an individual because of the differential treatment of paid and unpaid work by tax and
social security systems. Therefore, conclusions from the formal models in this thesis do not
answer the complex question of equality by gender. Ifwomen have more household skills, on
average, than men, it may outweigh men's advantage in on-the-job training. Gender equality
in amount ofhuman capital seems to be greater than perceived in labour economics and
feminist economics. Economic justice between women and men ultimately depends on the
lifetime division of outputs like consumption and leisure.
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ESSAY2
IN-THE-HOME TRAINING, HOUSEHOLD SKILLS AND LOW WAGES
by
Kristin Dale!
Abstract
This essay presents a new, supplementary explanation of occupational choice and
occupational wage differences. In-the-home training creates household skills that increase
productivity in both the household and occupations with tasks similar to household
production. A model shows that individuals with more household skills do not to enter higher
education, choose household skilled jobs in the labour market that pay lower wages and work
shorter hours than predicted by human capital theory. This stems from the effect that the
future earnings of higher-educated employees must not only compensate for costs and
foregone earnings during education, but also absorb the indirect costs of lower household
production while studying and later in life. Empirical findings from industrialised countries
are presented that highlight the gender-biased pattern ofhousehold production and of similar
low wage occupations. Finally, I argue that household skilled jobs constitute the 'secondary
labour market' in the 'dual labour market' theory.
I I would like to thank Geir B. Asheirn, Rolf J. Brunstad, Steinar Holden, Grecia Marrufo, Agnar Sandmo and
participants of the Labour economics workshop in Rosendal, May 1999, the ESPE Conference in Torino, June
1999 and the IAFFE Conference in Oslo, June 200 l for helpful comments.
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2.1 Introduction
When a mother teaches her daughter to make a bed or clean a bathroom, it is probably to
create a 'helping hand' while the daughter lives at home, and train a potential wife. In-the-
home training encourages skills that make a girl independent of hiring a maid in the future.
However, the unintentional effect of in-the-home training may be to influence the choice of
education and occupation and to lower wage rates for room-maids in the hotel industry and in
other dual labour market jobs. This illustrates the new idea in labour economics presented in
this paper. The idea is that in-the-home training creates household skills that also qualify for
some occupations, thereby influencing labour supply and wage formation in occupations that
utilise household skills. Individuals with more household skills have smaller incentives to
enter education for other occupations, since the future earnings ofhigher-educated employees
must not only compensate for costs and foregone earnings during education, but in addition
absorb the indirect costs of lower household production while studying and later in life.
The field oflabour economics explains the low wage rate of, for instance, room-maids as a
result ofunskilled labour and female crowding. Is there a demand dimension offemale
crowding in occupations? According to Rathbone (1917) and Edgeworth (1922) female wage
rates were kept low by monopsonistic discrimination because women were excluded from
'male' professions by unions and employers. Thereby women were crowded into very few
occupations. Bergmann (1974) argues that monopsony power still is important to women in
locallabour markets. Despite modern equal opportunity legislation, Rosen (1997) models how
fewer job-offers to women yields discrimination. Is there a supply dimension to gendered
crowding? Treiman and Hartman (1981) address individual choice of occupation under social
and economic constraints and point to how socialisation creates gendered crowding in
occupations.
Here I will study such a process by the concepts of 'in-the-home training' and 'household
skills'. The child's gender, the farnily and the community influence a child's activities during
up bringing. Therefore, in-the-home training and household skills vary according to gender
and other factors. Individuals with gendered in-the-home training and household skills create
supply side gendered crowding towards certain occupations. For example, many women apply
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for jobs caring for children and few apply for jobs in car repair. The opposite is true for men.
This reflects gendered tastes and in-the-home training during upbringing and adolescence. Not
only will there be female crowding in jobs that utilise female-dominated kinds ofhousehold
skills. There will also be male crowding in jobs that utilise the kinds ofhousehold skills where
men are over-represented and, according to my model, these jobs will also have low wage
rates compared to other male jobs. This essay addresses the paradox that household skills may
result in low wages due to supply and demand circumstances.
Introducing in-the-home training creates a bridge between two parallel traditions in economic
literature of explaining variation in individual earnings. Mincer (1958) started the earnings
function tradition when he related individual wage rate to individual employee characteristics.
The alternative approach stems from the study of income immobility across generations.
Solon (1992), for example, reported a high positive correlation between the incomes of sons
and fathers. However, there is a missing link between the independent variables in the two
alternative explanations: the characteristics of the parenting family and of the individual.
Biologists call the missing link genes. Sociologists call them socialisation. In economics,
ability and learning-by-doing capture some ofthese aspects. The term in-the-home training
captures a skill formation process influenced by the parenting family and thereby links
children's skill formation to parents' skills.
This essay contains seven sections. Section 2.2 introduces the concepts in-the-home training
and household skills and relate them to the human capitalliterature. Section 2.3 presents a
formal model that shows that youth with more in-the-home training and higher levels of
household skills are less inclined to attend higher education because ofloss ofhousehold
production. They are willing to accept lower wage rates in household skilled jobs than
predicted by standard human capital theory. The analysis shows how wages and labour
services are determined in a general equilibrium model. Since household production varies
among individuals, Section 2.4 addresses the variation in in-the-home training and household
skills among women and men, and among girls and boys. Section 2.5 presents empirical
support for the link from household skills to low wage occupations. Section 2.6 discusses
some dynamic effects of changing household skills. Section 2.7 contains concluding remarks.
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2.2 In-the-home training and household skills
2.2.1 Definitions
In-the-home training refers to the learning of different kinds ofhousehold skills that increase
productivity in various household tasks. In-the-home training is achieved through observation,
teaching or doing household production. A parent's teaching or a child's trial-and-error
learning both raise the productivity and quality of home made products and services. The
kinds of skills that are acquired through in-the-home training depend on the kind of economy
(century, country, and so on). This paper focuses on modem, industrialised economies and
such types ofhousehold production as caring for babies and dependants, cleaning, cooking,
driving, gardening, laundry, car maintenance, house maintenance, shopping, production and
repair of clothes. In economics the home is the primary site of consumption and leisure but
not production. Instead, I follow the distinction made by Reid (1934, p.6-7): household
production is what you would like somebodyelse to do for you (i.e. cleaning) as opposed to
consumption and leisure activities that you prefer to do yourself (i.e. reading the newspaper).
Table 2.1 Productive activities ofhouseholds in the VS in the 1930s
A. Management:
I. Choice-making.
2. Income apportionment, or budgeting.
3. Task, time, and energy apportionment.
4. Planning ways and means of carrying on tasks.
5. Actual direction of the tasks including supervision.
B. Performance:
1. Clerical work in connection with management, e.g., the checking and paying of bills,
preparing instructions for workers, the keeping of accounts, and making of other records.
2. Purchasing of food, clothing, equipment, furnishings, and other goods required by the household or by
the individual members of the household group.
3. 'Housework':
a. Preparation, serving, care and preservation of food, and clearing away of meals.
b. Construction and repair of clothing and furnishings, including such tasks as sewing, mending,
darning, and 'fancy work' .
c. Cleaning and care of the house, furnishings, clothing, and equipment, including laundering, daily,
weekly, and special cleaning, care of the fires, disposal ofwaste, repair work ofvarious kinds, care of
pets.
4. Work outside the house, e.g., care of the house surroundings, gardening, dairy and poultry work,
operation and care of car.
5. Care of the members of the family not included above:
a. Physical care of children and the sick.
b. Child training and education, including supervision of play.
6. Going and coming on household business, answering the telephone, the door, receiving packages,
being on call or present in case ofneed, e.g., remaining in the house because of a sleeping child.
Source: Reid (1934), pp. 75-76.
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Within one country household skills vary over time, for instance from the beginning to the
end of the twentieth century. Reid (1934) is an elaborate book on the economics ofhousehold
production using the USA of the early 1930s as an example. In Table 2.1, Reid lists child
training and education under point BSb among household tasks. According to Reid (1934,
p.149), there has to be more-or-Iess direct contact between producer and consumer, e.g., a
mother bathing or teaching a child. The personal care and training of children and care of the
sick and aged are the principal types of service production carried out by family members.
Reid (1934, p.128) also speaks oftasks added for training purposes: 'Tasks may also be
included in household production because of the opportunity afforded for child training and
education. Gardening, poultry raising, cleaning, and other tasks are frequently assigned to
the members not primarily because of the money they saved, but because of the educational
opportunities afforded.' Child training aims at household and farming skills. Reid does not
emphasise the usefulness of these skills for paid employment.
Education and in-the-home training are different sources for skills. Musicians exemplify the
combination of education and in-the-home training. Children who rush their homework to
baby-sit or repair a bike show that household skills may be acquired at the expense of school
achievements. How different sources of skills interplay is an empirical question. Becker
(1991, p.2?) discusses the incentive to choose classes during compulsory education: ' the
incentive to invest in [human} capital that mainly raises household productivity is greater
when more time is spent in the household sector, and the incentive to invest in [human}
capital that mainly raises market productivity is greater when more time is spent at work.
Some investments, such as on-the-job-training, mainly raises the productivity of market time;
others, such as classes in child care, cooking, or art history, mainly raise the productivity of
household time. ' However, classes in cooking increase household skills and thereby
productivity in jobs as a kitchen help, whereas classes in child-care also increase productivity
in jobs as a nursery assistant.
32
2.2.2 Theoretical precursors: human capital and household production
Smith (1776, chapter 10) suggests that the expense and difficulty of training and education
influence wages for various occupations. Human capital theory also recognises foregone
earnings as part of the human capital investment. According to Mincer (1958) and Schultz
(1961), education is acquisition ofhuman capital that raises productivity and returns in the
labour market. It remains unresolved the extent to which higher wage rates of more educated
individuals are due to increased labour market productivity consistent with human capital
theory (Schultz, 1961) or to the signalling effects of education (Spence, 1973). Both theories
argue that it is rational for the student to acquire schooling to the point where the present
value of additional education equals its cost. Education and training often include some
evaluation of the skills acquired. The evaluation is undertaken by teachers and exams, and by
supervisors in the workplace for on-the-job training. Ifworkers are screened according to their
actual skills, the signalling effect of education is less important. Work experience (Mincer,
1974; Mincer and Polachek, 1974) and on-the-job training also tend to increase wages. Becker
(1975) refined the understanding of on-the-job training by dividing it into firm specific and
general on-the-job training. Lynch (1991) used the term off-the-job training for work-related
courses that employees attend outside work to enhance skills. Education, on- and off-the-job
training represent formalised human capital acquisition. On-the-job training is a central
concept in labour economics despite serious measurement problems, see Baron et al. (1997).
Experience represents informallearning. Marsick and Watkins (1990) introduce informal and
incidentallearning in the workplace and employees' dysfunctionallearning from growing up
with parents abusing alcohol. Reid (1934, p.l24) suggests that the same skills are useful both
in market work and household production: 'The man who is skilled in 'manual training' is
more likely to do the general repairing of the house and furnishings, and the woman who can
construct a garment with ease to do the home sewing, than they would if their ability in such
productive processes were undeveloped. '
Schultz (1961) discusses the concepts of human capital and investment in human capital.
Because it is problematic to distinguish expenditure for consumption and investment, he
estimates investment in human capital by its yield, not like real capital by investment
expenditure. Bowman (1966, p.114) criticises human capital theory for limiting the returns to
labour earnings by excluding the increased income in kind from household production such as
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home carpentry, completing the income-tax form and subsistence farming. Inspired by Becker
(1965) and referred to by Becker (1975, p.67), Michael (1970) develops a model where
education influences consumption and acts as an environmental factor that shifts the
production function of consumption. Gronau (1973, 1976 and 1977) pioneered studies of
household production to understand female labour supply. Later Gronau (1986 and 1997)
surveyed the economic literature on household production. It focuses upon household skills
for adults within the household sector. According to Chiswick (1982), the productivity of
individuals engaged in home-production activities varies. High productivity may lead to
complete specialisation as a housewife. Lommerud (1989) shows that learning by doing in
household production and market work increases work specialisation between spouses over
time. As indicated by Vagstad (2001) the spouse who does not specialise in household
production has strong disincentives for household skill acquisition. Neither mentions that
learning by doing in household production qualifies for some paid jobs. However, the social
science literature on entrepreneurs mentions various kinds ofhousehold skills as resources for
women starting a business. Kaur and Hayden (1993, p.l02) affirm: 'Women are therefore
attracted to businesses which utilize their skills (many of which have been learnt in the
context of domestic and voluntary work; for example, sewing, cleaning, cooking), and which
draw on their existing social contacts and moreover can take place from a home base. '
According to Johnson and Storey (1993), female entrepreneurs perform as well as men,
despite women having less on-the-job training and experience. Female entrepreneurs are over-
represented in retailing, lodging, catering, repair and other services, i.e. in businesses selling
substitutes for household production where household skills are relevant job skills.
Ifhuman capital had been identified through investment costs in the first place, time-use by
family members might also have been studied. Leibowitz (1974 and 1977) shows that
investment by mothers in reading and pre-school activities improves a child's ability to learn
in school. However, I have found no studies ofhow other skills children learn at home
influence their schooling or work career. Does in-the-home training influence occupational
and educational choice? My model deals with this question.
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2.3 A model of occupational choice
I begin by modelling how the level ofhousehold skills achieved during childhood prior to
entering an occupation may influence a person's decisions concerning occupation and
education, ceteris paribus. I assume that home-made products and market products (which
price is normalised to one) are perfect substitutes for one another. I want to study the
conditions under which the person is indifferent between two occupations, one for which
household skills matters and another for which they do not. For the purpose ofillustration,
these occupations will be referred to as 'chambermaids' and 'economists'. This indifference
condition for occupational choice departs from the standard result ofhuman capital theory by
taking account of differences in household production. Secondly, to model the equilibrium
wage rate, the labour supply is characterised by variation in household skills - captured by
introducing a distribution ofhousehold skills into Roy's (1951) model for occupational
choice. Labour demand is modelled using an aggregate production function. Supply and
demand determine the wage rates of economists and chambermaids and the allocation of
individuals to the two occupations.
In the model investigated here, a person decides upon further education and occupation at the
age of eighteen. Apart from all the other occupations in the real world, in this simplified
model an individual can choose between two altematives. Either she can use her household
skills to obtain a job as a chambermaid, or she can attend a five-year programme and become
an economist. Assume that the chambermaid will work from age 18 to 60 and the economist
from age 23 to age 60. To evaluate the economic situation in a lifetime perspective in these
two cases, I assume access to perfect capital markets so that the alternatives can be compared
by discounting. To simplify the modelling, I make the following assumptions:
• For schooling, costs for fees and books are zero.
• Students live in dormitories and do no household tasks and have no jobs while studying.
• In real terms, the pay rates are constant over time for each profession.
• Household productivity does not increase from leaming-by-doing as an adult.
• The number ofworking days per year is constant.
• The interest rate is constant.
These simplifying assumptions enable us to transfer the analysis from a lifetime perspective to
a representative period.
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2.3.1 The chambermaid case
Firstly, assume that the person chooses to capitalise on her in-the-home training and become a
chambermaid. I have analysed the maximisation ofutility and the allocation of time to paid
work, household production and leisure in Essay 3. Here I simplify the problem with the
assumption that the total working hours available for paid and unpaid work are fixed at a
certain number ofhours independent of occupation (for example, 12 hours per workday). The
chambermaid's choice is then the allocation of time between paid work in a hotel and
household production to maximise lifetime consumption. Further, assume that household
production, a;!(l!), consists oftwo elements, an individual productivity coefficient (ai) and a
general household production function, equal for everybody. The household production
functionf(l!) increases with the number ofhours (l!) spent at household tasks, but at a
decreasing rate because everyone starts with the tasks where the productivity is the highest.
However, individuals have different in-the-home training, which implies different individual
levels ofhousehold skills (ai).For simplicity, the modelling assumes an interior solution
where the number ofhours in household production and in wage work both are positive.
Assume further that chambermaids sell room-cleaning services in a competitive labour market
at the piece rate (v). Then the wage rate as a chambermaid is determined according to actual
household productivity in a piece-rate system. Generally, correct assessment ofhousehold
skills is unrealistic, but this assumption keeps the analysis on the human capital track, by
abstracting from screening aspects.
In this one-person model, an individual with only in-the-home training seeks to maximise
lifetime consumption. According to the above assumptions this implies maximising total
output from household production and wage work per working day:
Max.; [aJ(H) + (12 - H)a;v], where
aj = household productivity of person i, through her household skills and in-the-home training
f(l!) = the household production function,j(O) =O, f' >Oandf' < O
H = the number ofhours in unpaid household production
(I2-l!) = the number hours spent in paid work
v = the piece rate per cleaned room in the labour market for chambermaids
k= the number ofworking days per year (constant)
r = the interest rate (constant)
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Figure 2.1 The chambermaid: allocation of time to household production and paid work
Consumption Cm
ai f(flrrJ ------------------------
ai f(fl..) + (12-flm) rv------------------------------------------------
12 Working hours
To maximise total output that the chambermaid can consume, she works unpaid at home for
Hm hours to generate household production, aJ(Hm). She works (12- Hm) hours in the labour
market as chambermaid. For these hours, the real wage rate, aiv, is higher than the marginal
productivity in additional household production. Total output is maximised by combining
household production and paid work because the decreasing marginal productivity of
household production makes the first unpaid tasks more productive than the later ones. Note
that the optimal number ofhours spent in household production (Hm) is independent of the
level ofhousehold skills when the employer pays a piece rate per cleaned room.
Formally, the results can be established as follows. Given the assumptions, the chambermaid
maximises lifetime consumption:
(1)
flere A,denotes the present value at the age of eighteen of $1 every year (from age 18 to 60).
For a chambermaid the first order condition for maximum consumption is:
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This means that Hm satisfies
(3) j'(H..)=v
or Hm =H(v) where H is the inverse function off', implying that H'<O. The optimal number
ofhours in household production and in wage work for chambermaids depends only on the
piece rate per cleaned room, and is notably independent of individual household productivity.
2.3.2 The economist case
As an economist, the person has had some in-the-home training and five years ofhigher
education in economics. We assume that all people that enter higher education graduates
according to schedule. Having graduated she wants to maximise consumption and total output
from household production and labour income in this one-person model:
MaxH[aJ(H)+ (12 - H)w]
where w equals the wage rate of economists in the labour market.
Figure 2.2 The economist: allocation of time to household production and paid work
Consumption C,
li; f(He) + (12-He)w --------------------------------------------------- I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
li; f(He)
12 Working hours
As economist, the optimal allocation ofhours to household production and wage work
depends on the wage rate of economists and on the individual household productivity (ai).
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Given the assumptions, the formal results can be established as follows. The economist
maximises lifetime consumption:
60 {[aJ(H)+(12-H)W]k} 60 I
(4) Max/{Ce =MaxHL (rS =MaxAaJ(H)+(12-H)w]kL( Y 18
'~23 l+r ,~23 l+r
=Max., [aJ(H)+ (12 - H)W]kA2
Here A, denotes the present value at the age of eighteen years of $1 every year (from age 23 to
60) for an economist. The first order condition for maximum consumption is:
(5) dCe = [aJ'(H)- w]kA2= OdH
This implies that
or He=H(wlai).At the optimal hours ofhousehold work for the economist, the slope of the
household production function equals the market wage rate divided by the person's household
productivity. For economists the optimal number ofhours spent in household production
decreases with the increasing wage rate and increases with increasing household productivity
of economists.
2.3.3 Chambermaid or economist?
At the age of 18, the individual must decide whether to start in a job as a chambermaid or to
attend an economics programme. Comparing the future outcomes for the chambermaid and
the economist, the economist faces delayed earnings and fewer income years. Due to the
simplifying assumptions, we can transfer the analysis from a lifetime perspective to a
representative period model by using the factor Jwhere J = A2IAI•
f-J---
(7) J =:42 = 1",~3_~-l-__,.tIS < I
A 60 1
I L---------
,~18 (1+ rY-Is
The ratio J captures the different number ofyears and the delays ofhousehold production and
earnings, due to education and the influence ofthe discount rate, r. Because the economist has
fewer years of production, these years start later, and the discount rate is positive, J is less
than l. Therefore, the economist must have higher yearly total production and earnings for a
person to be indifferent between becoming a chambermaid and an economist. The factor J
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captures this. Therefore, we multiply the output of a workday for the economist by {j to
compare to the output of a workday for the chambermaid. Let a * denote the household
productivity of a person that is indifferent between the two occupations for a given v and w.
To be indifferent between becoming a chambermaid and an economist, the following must
hold:
(8) MaxH[a* j(H)+(12-H)a*v] = MaxH[a* j(H)+(12-H)w]t5}
Figure 2.3 Indifference between two occupations: chambermaid and economist
Consumption
I> --------------------------------------------------.
B
ai f(12)
s ~ f(12)
A
o 12 Working hours
Figure 2.3 illustrates the comparison of the optimal workday of the indifferent person as a
chambermaid and as an economist. To be indifferent between the two occupations, the
adjusted workday output representing consumption must be equal for both occupations (D).
Both spend some hours in household production and some in the labour market.
Consider the ratio of discounted value ofhousehold production in the chambermaid and the
economist alternatives:
OC OA+AB+BC(9) . = _..----._--- > 1
OA OA
In this equation, OC represents the optimal household production by the chambermaid. OA
represents the optimal adjusted household production by the economist. AB is the
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chambermaid's additional household production, due to higher productivity and longer hours,
and BC represents more years in household production by the chambermaid. Hence, for an
individual that is indifferent between becoming a chambermaid or an economist it follows that
the discounted lifetime value ofhousehold production is higher if she chooses to become a
chambermaid. It is higher because of the longer daily hours in household production and
because of the value of the household production during years when she did not study.
Consider the ratio of discounted lifetime earnings between the two occupations in the case of
an indifferent individual. From Figure 2.3, we see that the ratio of discounted lifetime
earnings between the chambermaid and the economist is less than one:
since 1) a *v < 8w, and 2) Hm >He.
The individual is indifferent between the lower lifetime earnings as a chambermaid and the
higher lifetime earnings as an economist because an opposite difference in lifetime household
production compensates for the earnings difference. This violates the standard human capital
result that an individual is indifferent towards jobs with equal discounted lifetime earnings.
These results are formally established from the given assumptions by studying an individual
that is indifferent towards the two occupations. By combining (8) with (3) and (6) it follows
that this individual must satisfy aj = a* where a» is determined by:
(lI) a*.l{Hm)+(12-Hm)a*f'(Hm) = [a*.l{He)+{12-He)a*f'(He)]b"
Now divide by a-
(l2)j(Hm)+(l2-Hm)f'(Hm) = [/(He)+(12-He)f'(He)]b"
and take into account that b"<I,
(13) j(Hm)+(12-Hm)f'(Hm) <j(He)+(12-He)f'(He)
From the property that
(14) _!-- [f(H)+(12 -H)f'(H)]= f'(H)- f'(H) +(12-H)f"(H) = (12-H)I"(H) < O
dH
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it now follows that O< He <Hm < 12. Hence, the indifferent individual works longer hours at
home if she takes on a chambermaid job than if she becomes an economist, and vice versa in
the labour market. The new result about wage rates from this model is that:
(IS) a1'(Hm) = a*v < 8w = oa1'(He)
To show (IS), firstly use (12) to obtain:
(16) 12[3f'(He) - j(Hm)] = [/(Hm) - H"f'(Hm)] - o [/(He) - Hef'(He)]
Since Hm > He, and O< l, and also
(l?) _ti [J(H)-Hf'(H)]== -Hf"(H) > O
dH
it follows that the right-hand-side of (16) is positive. Hence, the left-hand-side of (16) is also
positive, consequently, of'(He) >f'(Hm).
In accordance with human capital theory, the wage rate as an economist is higher than the
lifetime adjusted wage rate as an economist. However, it is not in accordance with human
capital theory that the individual is indifferent between the two occupations when the hourly
pay as chambermaid is lower than this lifetime adjusted wage rate of economists. This result
shows that individuals who utilise their household skills as job skills may be willing to work
for a lower hourly wage rate than previously modelled. To achieve a balance between
occupations the individual works fewer hours as a chambermaid than as an economist and
uses her household skills to a larger degree in household production as chambermaid.
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Figure 2.4 How the level of household skills influences entry into higher education
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Figure 2.4 illustrates how different levels of ex-ante household skills (ai) may influence the
decision to choose further education. At the level ofhousehold skills a- the individual will be
indifferent towards becoming a chambermaid or an economist because the discounted lifetime
consumption is equal for both occupations. If she has a lower level ofhousehold skills, like a"
she will choose the economics education to obtain A, the maximum lifetime consumption. If
she has a higher level ofhousehold skills, like a" she will choose to become a chambermaid to
obtain C. The new idea is that people choose to enter education because they have poor
household skills and therefore few opportunities in the labour market without acquiring
further education. Note that a person with higher household skills (a,) not only has lower
discounted lifetime earnings than a person with lower household skills (a,), but also earns a
much lower wage rate: a, v < Ow < w.
2.3.4 The aggregate production function and demand for inputs
To address demand for economist and chambermaid services, I use an aggregate production
function where the following notation is used:
(18) Y= G (M, N)
Y= output
M = the total number of rooms cleaned per day
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N = the total number of economist hours per day
G is homogenous of degree one; i.e. constant returns to scale, and the usual neo-classical
properties are assumed. Now, assume perfect competition and that Y is a numeraire, i.e. all
prices are measured in terms of Y, and the price of Y is equal to l. Under these assumptions
profit maximisation yields zero profits and implies that costs are minimised given output and
factor prices v and w. Furthermore, for each input, the input price (measured in Y) equals the
input's marginal productivity.
By definition of M, M+N is neither measured in time nor is a constant. Therefore, to address
how factor demand influences wage formation in equilibrium, I analyse how the ratio of
inputs, economist hours per cleaned room, depends on the ratio of input prices, the economist
wage rate to the piece rate ofroom cleaning. For this purpose, write
(19) y= ~ = G(~N) =G(1, :)=g(n)
where usual neo-classical properties imply g(0) = 0, g '(n) > °and s' '(n) < 0, with n = N/M
Now, use this notation to establish that
(20) v = G~(l,n)= g(n)- g'(n)n >°
(21) w = G~(l,n)= g'(n) > °
Note that (20) and (21) imply that the whole production value is paid out in wages, and profits
equal zero. Take the total differential of (20) to see how a small deviation in the ratio of input
factors changes the piece rate per room:
(22) dv = [g'(n)- g'(n) - g"(n)n]dn = -g"(n)ndn
Hence, dv > °when dn > 0, sinceg"(n) < o. This entails that v and n =N/Mmove in the same
direction. Likewise, take the total differential of (21) to see how a small deviation in the ratio
of inputs changes the wage rate of economists:
(23) dw = g"(n)dn
Hence, dw < °when dn > 0, since s' '(n) <O.This entails that w and n move in different
directions. Therefore, when the ratio of factor prices w/v decreases, the ratio of input factors,
n=N/M, increases, and vice versa. This implies that the demand for n as a function of w/v is a
falling function, also depicted as a falling demand curve in Figure 7. From (22) and (23) it
follows that when the input ratio, n, changes, the factor prices move in opposite directions; i.e.
when n = N/M increases, w decreases and v increases. This combination of input prices is
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consistent with the assumptions of perfect competition, constant returns to scale and the use of
Yas a numeraire.
2.3.5 Roy's model and the supply of labour services
How do varying levels ofhousehold skills and amounts ofin-the-home training during
childhood and youth influence the choice of occupation and education of people at the age of
eighteen years, ceteris paribus? Inspired by Roy (1951), who addressed the choice between
two occupations where one occupation has a broader productivity spread, I now introduce a
distribution ofhousehold skills. Individuals have varying household productivity ai according
to the in-the-home training they had during childhood and youth, and the level ofhousehold
skills they acquired. This is used to modellabour supply.
Figure 2.5 a & b. The distribution function and the density function of household skills
2.5a) The density function ofhousehold skills
<I>(a)
a*
2.5b) The distribution function ofhousehold skills
<l>(a)
Share f chambermaids
a* a
The Figure 2.5b) illustrates how the household skills and the resulting household productivity
ai are distributed in the labour force. Figure 2.5a illustrates the density function «'ai), which is
the derivative of the distribution function ofhousehold productivity in the labour force.
Individuals with household productivity a= are indifferent towards the two occupations, as is
the case in Figure 2.3. Chambermaids are recruited among the available individuals with the
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higher household productivity. There are 42 cohorts of chambermaids and 37 of economists in
a steady state. Due to the varying individual productivity and the piece rate system of payment
for cleaned rooms, the counting of inputs is not the number of chambermaid hours, but rather
the number of cleaned rooms. Hence, given that individuals with ap-a» become
chambermaids, the amount of room cleaning supplied by chambermaids is:
00
(24) M =42 J[12-H(v)pØ(a)da
a'
The supply of economist hours is given by:
(25) N = 37 f[12 -H( w)]ø(a)da
-00 a
Figure 2.6 depicts what happens to the household productivity, ao, that make a person
indifferent towards the two occupations, when the compensation ratio, w/v, increases.
Figure 2.6 What happens to a* when the compensation ratio w/v increases?
cl
a*l a*2 a
Consider the case where the compensation ratio w/v increases, i.e. when w increases and v
decreases. Higher w implies that the lifetime consumption of economists increase, depicted in
Figure 2.6 by a positive shift from Cel to c.,. Lower v implies that the lifetime consumption of
chambermaids decrease, shown inFigure 2.6 by the clockwise turn from Cml to Cm,.
To analyse in a formal way how a» changes when the compensation ratio w/v changes, take
the total differential of (11) and use (3) and (6) to obtain:
(26)
da *{f[H(V)]+V[12 -H(V)]-lf[ H(; )]}+dv{a *[12-H(V)]}-dW8[12-HCw*)] = O
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Since./{Hm) + v(l2-Hm) > o ./{He) by (12), it follows that dw > Oand dv < Oimply da- > O.
When the compensation ratio of economists relative to chambermaids increases, the
household productivity increases that is necessary to make an individual indifferent towards
the two occupations when the distribution ofhousehold skills in the population is given. This
means that more individuals become economists and fewer become chambermaids. Also,
when w increases, all economists tend to reduce household production and increase hours
spent in paid employment. These two effects imply that the supply curve of economist hours
is an increasing function of the compensation ratio w/v. For labour supply by chambermaids,
an increased compensation ratio that favours economists implies that some of the individuals
will change their plans for the future occupation and educate to become economist, thereby
reducing the number of future chambermaids. These individuals are those with the lower
household productivity among the potential chambermaids. In addition, a reduction in the
compensation for room cleaning v will reduce the number ofhours that all chambermaids
supply to the labour market because they increase the amount of time spent in household
production. These results are depicted in Figure 2.7.
2.3.6 Market equilibrium and wage determination
Figure 7 compares the demand for economist hours to chambermaids room cleaning as a
decreasing function of the compensation ratio w/v. It also shows the supply of economist
hours relative to chambermaid hours as an increasing function of the compensation ratio w/v.
These two functions determine simultaneously the equilibrium factor ratio n = N/M and the
equilibrium compensation ratio w/v. Finally, (20) and (21) determine v and w. These in turn
determine a», thereby also M and N.
Figure 2.7 Demand and supply in equilibrium
Compo ratio w/v
w/v
S(w/v)
D (w/v)
n n=N/M
Note that the product market is in equilibrium since the quantity produced equals total wages.
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2.4 The pattern of household production and in-the-home training
Household production is a major activity in modern economies. What kind oftasks are
performed and by whom? Is the pattern ofhousehold production and in-the-home training
gendered? What do time-budget studies report? Do countries differ? Reskin and Padavic
(1994) present the division ofhousehold tasks by full-time workers for the USA in 1987. The
heavily female-dominated tasks are washing and ironing, house cleaning and preparing meals.
Women dominated washing dishes and shopping less. Paying bills and driving are the most
gender neutral tasks. Car maintenance and outdoor tasks are heavily male dominated.
Haraldsen and Kitterød (1992) analyse time-budget data from Norway between 1990 and 92.
Household production covers housework plus repair, caring services, purchase and travels.
The tasks are similar to those of Reid in Table 2.1, though fishing is included in Norway and
homework help is the only adult activity indicating the training or education of children.
Women do more hours ofunpaid household production than men: the average is 4.22 hours
for women compared to 2.36 for men. Many activities have an unbalanced gender pattern. For
instance, men dominate maintenance and 'other household work', while women dominate
housework. Jenkins and O'Leary (1997) analysed UK trends for a gender differential in total
work time, market work and domestic work. Total work time barely changed from 1975 to
1987. For women, increases in market work are offset by decreases in domestic work, and the
other way round for men. A decreasing number of children reduces average domestic work by
women, while the decline is partly offset by increased domestic work per child. Jacobs (1989)
and Jacobs et.a1(1995) show that the pattern of occupational segregation by gender is, to a
large extent, stable over time and across countries. Quite possibly, gendered in-the-home
training is the key to the survival of segregation by gender in jobs that require compulsory
schooling only. Are children's tasks in household production also segregated by gender?
2.4.1 Results from a time:-budget study of children
What kinds of in-the-home training do children have? It probably depends on the parenting
household and the gender of the child. However, time-budget studies that cover household
production and paid work by children are scarce. Solberg and Vestby (1987) describe time-use
for a stratified sample of800 10-12 year old Norwegian children in the 1983-84 (see Table
2.2). They report the amount ofhousework, care work and outdoor activities. For each activity
the number indicates boys' average use oftime as a percentage of girls'. 100 per cent
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indicates a gender neutral activity. When boys do half ofthat of girls, 50 (per cent) is
assigned. The number 200 tells us that boys do twice as much as girls on average.
Table 2.2 Housework and other activities, boys' average use oftime as a percentage of
girls'.
Activity %
Housework 68
Cleaning own room 68
Tidying 74
Vacuum cleaning 90
Cleaning 50
Cleaning other rooms 57
Tidying 54
Vacuum cleaning 81
Cleaning 42
Washing windows 57
Washing-up 64
Clearing dishwasher
Washing-up (in the sink)
Preparing food
Setting/clearing the table
Preparing sandwich
Making dinner
Baking cake/pizza
67
60
84
90
82
81
80
Keeping clothes
Washing/banging up clothes
Repairing clothes
25
35
33
Otherwork
Do errands 94
Carry in wood and water
Take out the rubbish
Collect the post
Shop everyday commodities
107
115
91
102
Caring 44
Look after siblings
Nurse siblings
Attend to playing
Care for the elderly
44
20
50
54
Repairs 300
Redecorating
Cleaning bikes
Work with cars
212
1500
187
Outdoor work 160
Gardening
Clear away the snow etc.
Chopwood
84
196
267
95
Walk the dog 91
Attend to pets 78
Attend to farm animals 129
Sources: Housework: Solberg (1994, p.87) Table 3.13. 'Other work': Solberg and Vestby (1987, p.57) Table
3.26.
Animalcare
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Solberg and Vestby report that overall girls do more household production (housework and
other work) than boys at the age oftwelve. Table 2.2 indicates that 11-12 year old girls and
boys already have acquired household skills, and that in-the-home training is gendered. Girls
mostly do female dominated tasks and boys do male dominated tasks. Solberg and Vestby
also observe that children help with their parent' s jobs. They spend most hours helping when
fathers are farmers, fishermen or run retail businesses and when mothers are farmers, cleaners
or day-mothers. Children work more hours in farming and fishing communities than in urban
areas.
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2.5. Do jobs that use household skills earn low wages?
The model in this essay suggests that occupations utilising household skills as job skills may
recruit individuals even when wage rates are lower than the wage rate ofunskilled individuals.
This is due to higher household productivity and household production. In this section I
present some empirical support for the model. The assumptions are presented in Section 2.3.
Bergmann (1986, p.202) voices frustration about the low wage rate and earnings of servants in
household tasks: 'Many of the housewife 's duties are those of the servant, and the servant job
is the one closest to the housewife 's in the money economy.' What do econometric studies tell
us about the influence ofhousehold production on wages in general? Hersch (1991, p.160)
indicates that combining lots ofunpaid household production with wage work is a 'double
burden': 'time allocated to household responsibilities has an independent negative effect on
women 's wages, controllingfor differences in working conditions and human capital.'
Do studies report lower lifetime earning for individuals in household skilled occupations as
predicted by this essay's model? I know ofno study oflifetime earnings by occupation,
whereas educationallength is a focus in studies ofboth wage rates and lifetime earnings.
However, Bjorklund's (1993) Swedish report indicates that the dispersion oflifetime income
is between 35 and 40 per cent lower than typical cross-sections of annual income. According
to the model outlined here, variation in household production may compensate for differences
in lifetime earnings. Jenkins and O'Leary (1996) for the U.K., and Aslaksen and Koren (1996)
for Norway, report that extended income (comprising earnings and the value ofhousehold
production) is more evenly distributed than money income. However, the distribution of
extended income is typically reported by income group or family type, and not by occupation.
An occupation that is protected by a minimum wage indicates a low wage occupation.
Although the stereotypicallow-wage worker is a male teenager, over 60 per cent of low-wage
workers in the USA are women, according to Kniesner (1981). Food service, unskilled
clerical workers, private household workers and retail sales workers are the occupations where
low-wage workers are most frequently over-represented (measured by reported wages), while
private household workers and paid farm workers top the low-wage occupations when the
imputed wage is considered. Kniesner calls for more attention to prime-aged married women
when analysing the winners and losers created by a minimum wage.
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Which occupations have the lowest wage rates according to empirical studies? Do they utilise
household skills as job skills? Arai, Asplund and Barth (1998 Table 8.3 p.l44) present an
analysis of occupational wage differences by gender, education and age in 1991 for three
Nordic countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) entitled: 'Low Pay, A Matter of Occupation':
Seven out oftwenty four occupational groups were below median wage in all three countries.
These seven low wage groups were: cleaners, hotel and restaurant workers, private service
workers, food manufacturing workers, operative workers, shop assistants, secretarial and
clerical workers, and unskilled health and day-care workers. Employees in many ofthese
occupations typically benefit from in-the-home training and use household skills as job skills,
such as cleaners, hotel and restaurants workers, private service workers, food manufacturing
workers, and unskilled health and day-care workers. Cleaning work had the lowest wage in
Sweden, the second lowest in Norway and the third lowest in Finland. According to the model
in this essay, it does not pay to continue your education ifyou have acquired an abundance of
household skills. Measures ofhousehold skills are not available, but the years of formal
education of cleaners can be analysed. Among all occupations, cleaners had the fewest
average years of schooling in both Sweden and Norway, whereas in Finland only chemical
processing workers had shorter education than cleaners. According to Section 2.4, in-the-
home training and household skills are gendered: girls and women acquire more household
cleaning skills than boys and men. Is there any evidence that cleaning work is female-
dominated? In Sweden, 76 percent of cleaners were women, and in Norway and Finland, 95
percent were women. Arai et al. (1998) conclude that low-pay workers are concentrated in the
same occupational categories in all three countries, and young and female workers are over-
represented. These findings concur with the pattern that in-the-home training also takes place
during childhood and youth, and that in-the-home training in cleaning is more frequent for
girls than for boys in Scandinavia.
Arai et al. (1998) also found that age-wage profiles are flatter in low-pay occupations like
cleaners compared to higher-wage occupations. This complements the discussions of
Polachek (1975), England (1982), and Robst and VanGilder (2000) that concern the rate of
skill depreciation during periods of non-employment - the so-called atrophy rate. According to
the this essay, in-the-home training is an early substitute for on-the-job training in some
occupations where job tasks and tasks in household production are similar. This explains the
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flattening of age-wage profiles two ways. First, in-the-home training takes place from
childhood, before individuals enter the labour market. Second, individuals that withdraw for a
period from the labour market back into household production typically use the same
household skills in household production; thus, the real atrophy rate is low in occupations in
substitute household production. Concepts like in-the-home training and household skilled
occupations elicit new explanations for lower atrophy rates in some occupations than others.
2.5.1 The dual labour market: Do household skilled jobs form the secondary labour
market?
Doeringer and Piore (1971) discuss the dual labour market, which consists of the primary and
the secondary labour market. The secondary labour market is described as a segment with low
wage rates, frequent part-time employment, flat age-wage profiles and little or no on-the-job
training. The concepts and model presented in this essay open up a new interpretation of the
secondary labour market as the labour market segment that uses household skills as job skills.
By supplementing a neo-classical model with household production and varying household
skills and household productivity, one reaches the conclusion that occupations using
household skills as job skills may earn lower wages and work shorter hours than predicted by
human capital theory. As mentioned above, these occupations may offer little or no on-the-job
training and produce flat age-wage profiles because in-the-home training substitutes for on-
the-job training. Since Taubman and Wachter (1986) suggest that the dual labour market is
seldom associated with particular occupations but with the so-called secondary sector, I think
that future studies of the secondary labour market should investigate the extent to which
occupations in the secondary labour market utilise household skills as job skills. In the dual
labour market literature, the low wages in secondary market jobs and the prevalence of part
time employment have been considered problematic and a policy concern. Note that,
according to my model, the shorter hours in paid work is compensated by longer hours in
household production, which brings individuals to higher consumption levels. Therefore,
future research should address how individuals in the dual labour market allocate time to
household production, leisure, education and so on, and whether shorter working hours in paid
work are preferred or enforced by restrictions.
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2.5.2 Are the assumptions of the model realistic?
To what extent are the model assumptions ofSection 2.3 realistic? The results in Section 2.4
of Solberg and Vestby (l 987) show that in-the-home training and household skills can
realistically be assumed to vary among children and to be determined prior to the youngster's
choice of education. This gendered pattern ofhousehold tasks among children supports the
idea that household skills influence the gendered division ofhousehold production by adults
and occupational segregation by gender. Rosen and Willis (1979) model the demand for
college attendance. Compared to men entering college, other male high school graduates tend
to score lower in maths and tests of reading comprehension, approximately the same in
manual dexterity and somewhat better in mechanical ability. Eckstein and Wolpin (1999,
p.1326) find that among US white male youths in 1979, high school dropouts in full-time jobs
received the highest wage offers. For high school students, part-time wage offers exceeded
full-time wage offers. Youths who drop out ofhigh school had a comparative advantage at
jobs that are carried out by non-graduates. The two most frequent reasons for dropping out
were 'didn't like school' and 'offered a good job, chose to work'. Eckstein and Wolpin related
job skills to actuallabour market experience but also mentioned endowments, which probably
include household skills and in-the-home training.
The model views oversimplistically the situation where students experience no household
production during higher education, while working youths enjoy regular household
production. The important issue is whether students produce less household production than
young employees. Facts concerning household production for 18-23 year olds are hard to find.
The age of giving birth may be an indicator because the amount ofhousehold production is
typically higher in families with young children. Is there any evidence that students delay
childbirth relative to youths who choose shorter education? Gustafsson (2001) and Gustafsson
and Wetzels (2000) study women's age at first birth for West Germany, Great Britain, the
Netherlands and Sweden and conclude: 'There are some common characteristics for all four
countries. First, in all four countries more highly educated women tend to have their first
child at a later age than less educated women, except Swedish women among whom the
medium educated group have their birth at an earlier age than low educated women do.' In
this study, the less educated group comprises women with less than high school education.
The medium educated group contains individuals who have completed high school or some
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additional education, and the highly educated group comprises individuals who have
completed higher vocational training or university education.
2.5.3 Household skills most important in developing countries
This essay has limited itselfto modem economies. However, the relative importance ofin-the-
home training and household skills as a share ofhuman capital is greater in many developing
countries where (a) regular schooling does not include all children and (b) the market
economy is small in comparison to the household-related informal economy. The extensive
use of child labour both in household production and in the market economy in developing
countries indicates that in-the-home training from childhood may be important for skill
acquisition. In order to address in-the-home training and household skills in developing
economies, a range of additional issues need to be discussed. It is beyond the scope of this
essay to do so here.
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2.6. Changing household skills over time
2.6.1 Have reduced in-the-home training raised enrolment in education?
Reid (1934, p.124) suggests that in-the-home training and vocational education may be
substitutes. According to my model, young individuals choose vocational and higher
education when they have few of the household skills required for a household skilled job.
Presumably household skills are less widespread in modern economies. Traditional
economies, on the other hand, have a large primary sector (e.g. agriculture, fishery and
forestry), which leads to more household production and income-generating activities centred
around the home. Therefore, modernisation will reduce household skills. It is usually
suggested that the large increase in education has been linked to an increase in its availability.
An alternative view is that less in-the-home training and household skills may raise demand
for higher education. In the market equilibrium of the labour market depicted in Figure 7, a
reduction ofhousehold skills, ceteris paribus, leads to an outward shift of the supply curve,
leading to a lower compensation ratio, wlv, and higher NfM in equilibrium. Hence, the model
predicts that a reduction in household skills leads to increased enrolment in higher education.
2.6.2 Taxation and labour demand
In industrialised countries, household production decreases over time while market work
increases. According to Boskin (1975), tax wedges between unpaid household production and
labour market work influence the division ofhours, and, according to Kolm (2000), also
challenges taxation ofservices. Apps and Rees (1999) discuss how individual versusjoint
taxation of couples can affect labour supply and household production. When the housewife
becomes an employee, the utility ofhousehold production by children may increase, whereas
absent parents reduce the opportunities for in-the-home training. Reduced levels ofhousehold
skills may be an important factor in the transfer of production from the household to the
market, stimulating the introduction of labour-saving equipment in both households and
businesses that produce substitutes for home-made goods and services. Reduced levels of
household skills, especially among boys, may be one of the reasons why young men have
higher unemployment rates than young women. According to the model in this essay, low
levels ofhousehold skills induce individuals to opt for further education, but ifindividuals
drop out, job opportunities may be scarce.
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We can divide household production into goods and services. When substitute household
production of goods can be moved to countries with lower wages and similar household skills,
industry composition and labour demand in industrialised countries is affected. Because
women have traditionally undertaken a larger share ofhousehold services, they are probably
less affected by globalisation in both household production and as employees in substitute
household production. However, the moving oftextile and apparel production to developing
countries, where work is also undertaken by household skilled female homeworkers, as
illustrated by Hahn (1995), may well have affected female labour demand.
2.6.3 The recent wave of male dominated in-the-home training in computer science
Lately, home-based PCs have contributed towards information-gathering and recreational
activities. To the extent that children learn to use PC software and hardware, they acquire a
new kind ofhousehold skill in computer science. Hopefully, children operating PCs at the
expense ofhomework or housework will acquire computer science household skills. To the
extent that boys dominate computer in-the-home training, we can expect men to possess more
computer household skills than women. Based on the predictions ofthis model, household
skilled low wage male dominated occupations in computer science will appear. Such workers
will be self-employed iflarger firms demand formal education to certify skills and if no
screening of computer skills is available.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
The literature of social science contains a variety of theories that address the phenomenon of
individual variation in wage earning. Human capital, discrimination and institutions are
keywords. This essay presents an additional and novel explanation that introduces the concept
of in-the-home training and explicitly addresses household skills as part of human capital.
Household skills are human capital that increases household productivity. I introduce the term
'in-the-home training' to characterise the learning of different kinds ofhousehold skills
through observation, teaching or participation in household production. This essay focuses on
modem, industrial economies and such kinds ofhousehold production as childcare, cleaning,
cooking, driving, gardening, laundry, car maintenance, house maintenance, production and
repair of clothes, and shopping. The model in this essay indicates that occupations that use
household skills, such as cleaning, may pay lower wage rates than traditional human capital
theory has predicted. This stems from the observation that future earnings ofhigher educated
employees not only have to compensate for educational costs and foregone wage earnings
during education but also for lower household production while studying and in later life.
Therefore, the model in this essay predicts that the wage differentials are greater than those
predicted by traditional human capital theory between occupations based on household skills,
like chamber-maids and cleaners on the one hand, and individuals with higher education like
economists on the other. The model also predicts that young individuals who acquire a good
deal of in-the-home training and household skills during childhood and youth may often enter
occupations where household skills raise productivity in occupational tasks. However, young
individuals with little in-the-home training and household skills are predicted to choose
occupations that require vocational or higher education, all other things being equal. The
modelling also shows how the demand for different kinds of products influences occupational
choice. Do these jobs that use household skills as job skills constitute the so-called secondary
labour market in the dual labour market theory? Despite the fact that women have had, on
average, more in-the-home training than men, and many of the occupations that use household
skills as a job skill are female-dominated, this is not a gender issue as such. The corroboration
of the household skill explanation lies in studies ofwage formation in male-dominated
occupations relying on household skills. According to this model, people in maintenance,
drivers and gardeners - being male-dominated occupations that use household skills as job
skills - should also earn low wages compared to other occupations.
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ESSAY3
LOWER WAGES WHEN OCCUPATIONAL EDUCATION INCREASES
HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTIVITY
by
Kristin Dale!
Abstract
This essay discusses variation in wage rates among occupations that require an equally long
education. The novel idea is that occupational education also raises household productivity
when tasks in jobs and unpaid household production are similar. A formal model
demonstrates how variation in household productivity influences labour supply and wage
formation by occupation. The main finding is that the more the occupational education
increases household productivity, the lower is the occupational equilibrium wage rate. This is
a new explanation of lower wage rates for female dominated occupations like nurses and pre-
school teachers. These results have policy implications for the dimensioning of educational
programmes.
I A draft of this essay has been printed inWorking paper 200 I :6, Department of Economics and Business
Administration, Agder College.
I would like to thank Agnar Sandmo for helpful suggestions, and Otto Andersen, Clara Åse Arnesen, Geir B.
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3.1 Introduction
Jobs in the labour market and unpaid household production share common tasks. For
example, cooking occurs at home and in the catering industry, and children are cared for at
home and in kindergartens. When specific tasks are carried out both in an occupation and at
home, presumably the occupational education designed to increase occupational productivity
in addition raises household productivity. Examples are culinary education and pre-school
teacher training. Different kinds of education can raise household productivity to varying
degrees, presumably from none to a very high degree. The vocational education required for
iron- and steelworkers contains no element of domestic science and does not increase
household productivity. By contrast, domestic science programmes raise household
productivity considerably. Does higher household productivity make pre-school teachers
supply fewer hours and earn lower wages than other occupations with equally long education?
This essay discusses variation in labour supply and wage rates among occupations. I propose
that such variation can be partially explained by the notion that educational programmes raise
household skills and household productivity to varying degrees. A formal model is used to
show that household productivity influences occupationallabour supply and occupational
wage formation. The main findings are that the more the education increases household
productivity, the lower are the equilibrium wage rate and the labour supply in these
occupations. This new explanation helps understand why occupations dominated by females
(nurses, nursery school teachers and teachers) earn lower wages and supply fewer hours than
other occupations with an equally long education.
This essay is organised as follows: Section 3.2 surveys related work on human capital theories
and home economics. Section 3.3 presents the formal model where different types of
education to varying degrees increase productivity in household production, thereby
influencing schooling decisions and how occupationallabour markets function with respect to
participation and wage formation. Section 3.4 re-interprets empirical results from studies of
labour force participation and wage rates by occupation. Norwegian findings show that,
among five occupations with equally long college education, pre-school teachers have the
lowest wages and business economists have the highest. Section 3.5 presents alternative
explanations. Finally, the conclusion discusses some policy implications ofthis model for
educational programmes.
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3.2 Theoretical precursors: human capital and others
How are benefits from education assessed? Smith (1776, chapter 10) lists five principal
circumstances that influence wages, one ofthem being expenses and difficulties of training
and education. Modem human capital theory explicitly recognises foregone earnings as part
of the student's investment. Mincer (1958) and Schultz (1963) argue that education is the
acquisition of human capital that yields returns in the labour market through higher wages that
compensate foregone earnings. The extent to which higher wage rates are due to increased
labour market productivity as implied by human capital theory (Schultz, 1963), or to the
signalling effects of education (Spence, 1973), is still disputed. Both theories argue that it is
rational for the student to acquire schooling to the point where the present value of additional
education equals its cost. Several authors have been concerned with the consumer benefits of
education. Schultz (1961,1963) addresses the consumer benefits ofbeing a student and the
benefits ofbeing a better-informed consumer. Lazear (1977) quantifies the benefits ofbeing a
student and finds that education is a "bad" because individuals stop short of acquiring the
wealth-maximising level of education. Schultz (1961) discusses the concept ofhuman capital
along with various investments in human capitaL He does not suggest estimating the
magnitude ofhuman capital formation from measuring investment expenditures (as with
investments in real capital) because of the difficulty in distinguishing between expenditures
for consumption and investment. Schultz suggests that human investment should be estimated
from its yield. Numerous studies report the economic returns to education. Card (1999)
surveys the literature on the extent to which length of education affects earnings.
How have researchers accounted for the effects of education on household production?
Bowman (1966, p.114) criticises human capital theory for limiting the returns to labour
market earnings without incorporating the value of increased household production. 'What it
says about education as either a private or a societal investment in the acquisition of afuture
income stream depends upon how we define 'income' and, in applied economics, on what
elements of income get measured - directly or indirectly. In practice what is most easily
measured is money income, but there is also the 'real income' potential of the capacity to 'do
it yourself', whether this is home carpentry orfilling out your own income-tax form.' Cohn
and Geske (1990, p.39) show that filing income tax returns was an early example ofnon-
market benefits from education in economic literature. Becker (1991, p.27) remarks that time
spent in different sectors influences the incentives to invest in different kinds of human
capital: H •• , the incentive to invest in [human} capital that mainly raises household
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productivity is greater when more time is spent in the household sector, and the incentive to
invest in [human} capital that mainly raises market productivity is greater when more time is
spent at work. Some investments, such as on-the-jab training, mainly raise the productivity of
market time; others, such as classes in child care, cooking, or art history, mainly raise the
productivity of household time. 'This essay develops these incentives for different kinds of
occupational education and brings the idea one step further to wage formation by occupation.
Blaug (1992, p.217) criticises human capital theory on the grounds that'., its rate-of-return
calculations repeatedly turn up significant differences in yields of investment in different types
of human capital but its explanation of the distribution of earnings nevertheless goes on
blithely assuming that all rates ofreturn to human capitalformation are equalised at the
margin. ' The model in Section 3.3 addresses this criticism by introducing variation in
household productivity as an explanation ofwage differentials and equalised returns to
different types of education. Inspired by Becker (1965), Michael (1970) develops a model
where consumption is influenced by education as education acts as an environmental factor
that shifts the production functions of consumption. Michael (1970, p.38) argues that
education would, ideally, be a vector of the quality-adjusted formal educational attainment of
each family member, but empirically he uses the number ofyears' schooling completed by the
household head (Michael, 1970, p.46). On the subject of these empirical results, Gronau
(1986, p.291) writes: 'Michael attempts to estimate the elasticity ofrealfull income with
respect to schooling (holding money income constant), and his estimates range between 0.1
and O.75. These estimates are lower than the elasticity of money income with respect to
schooling. Unfortunately, these estimates arejlawed because Michael erroneously uses the
money income elasticities, whereas his theory deals with full income elasticities. The direction
of the bias introduced by this error cannot be ascertained a priori.' Becker (1975, p.67) refers
to Michael (1970) and assumes that investment in additional years of education shifts the
production function of consumption by reducing both the amount oftime and goods inputs.
Whereas Michael studies how the length of education for married men influences household
consumption, the present model analyzes how different kinds of equally long education
influence household production and wage formation, particularly relevant for women. Neither
traditional consumer theory nor the approaches of Becker and Michael distinguish time
allocated to leisure and household production. By contrast, this distinction is the main
argument of Gronau (1977) who demonstrates the importance ofhousehold production for
labour supply decisions, and highlights the substitution between wage work and household
production. The model developed in the subsequent section is in line with Gronau's approach.
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3.3 Amodel of occupational wage formation when occupational education increases
household productivity
In Essay One I model the manner in which the demand for labour with different kinds of skills
influences wage formation. Here I simplify the problem by only modelling how supply factors
determine the relative wage rates of occupations when effects on household production are
accounted for. This model incorporates the idea that different kinds of occupational education
also increase household productivity to varying degrees. With the exception ofthis new
element, I apply the standard human capital approach to investment in education and the
household production function that specifies three kinds of time uses (following Gronau,
1977). The choice of education depends on the benefits that are derived from education. In
this model, I abstract from the pure consumption aspect of an education. According to human
capital and screening theories, the longer the education, the higher the costs and returns. To
disregard how variation in length influences the educational choice, the model considers an
individual who chooses among different types of education of equallength. For instance,
occupations like nursing or engineering may require equally long, but different, kinds of
education in the college sector. With the assumption of equallength of education, I assume
equal money costs and equal time costs of education, and abstract from different economic
lifetimes ofvarious kinds of education. Thus, no dynamic model is needed to capture the
essence. The model is concerned with two kinds of education of equallength. Candidates
from Education l enter into Occupation 1, which implies that candidates from the engineering
programme become engineers. I assume that Education 2 improves household productivity
more than Education l. This implies that Education 2 contains more elements that might be
part of an educational programme in domestic science. The individual maximises its utility
from consumption and leisure, subject to the time and the budget constraints.
I assume that the individual consumes a commodity that can be home made or bought (at the
price of l), and that products from household production and market products are perfect
substitutes. Output from household production is an increasing and concave function ofhours
spent in household production. This is realistic if individuals get tired ofhousework or iftasks
are sorted according to falling productivity. The formulation of the household production
function avoids 'comer solutions' in the division between work in the labour market and in
the household. Note that the household production function includes only time-use and no
specified goods input. The productivity coefficient captures the level of household skills and
is influenced by the person's occupational education. The productivity coefficient enters
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multiplicatively. This formulation differs from Michael (1970) where the increase in
productivity from longer education is resource saving and reduces time-use and commodity
inputs to the same degree according to a (Hicks) neutrality assumption. Gronau (1986, p.285,
Note 13) clarifies that a household production function where the productivity coefficient
enters multiplicatively, as in my model, implies that hours spent in household production
increase with increasing household productivity.
The following notation is used for the person: Education i, i E {1,2}, leads to occupation i.
C; = the consumption in occupation i.
Li = the hours ofleisure in occupation i.
Wi= the hourly wage rate in occupation i.
ai = the household productivity from education i; assume a2 > al ~ O.
Hi = the hours ofhousehold production in occupation i.
Ni = the hours ofwage work in occupation i.
The individual maximises utility U(Ci. LJ from consumption and leisure, subject to the time
and the budget constraints. The utility function U is strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave
for C; > O and Li > O, and satisfies that Ut/Uc ~ w as Li~ O for C,> O.The time constraint
states that all hours of the day, t, are allocated to household production, wage work and
leisure: t =Hi +M +Li .. The amount ofhousehold production, Xi = aif(HJ, depends on
individual household productivity, aj, and on the number ofhours in household production,
Hi, andf(HJ satisfies thatf> O,f' > O, f' --+ was fl; ~ O, 1" < O.The budget constraint
states that consumption equals the extended income that consists ofhousehold production and
real wage earnings: C; = aJ(HJ + WiM.,
Some conditions have to be met for an interior solution where all three activities take place,
From the assumption that Uu'Uc ~ CXJ as Li ~ Ofor C; > O, it follows that leisure is positive.
From the assumption thatf' ~ was Hi ~ O, it follows that household production is positive.
An additional assumption is needed to ensure that wage work is positive'. See Figure 3,1 for
the intuition of the formal modeL
I Assume that Ni = O, and solve max U(Ci, LJ subject to Ci=a/(HJ and t = Hi + Li' By inserting the constraints
this is equivalent to maximising U[a/(HJ, t-HJ over values of Hi. The first order condition is: Ucaf'(HJ -UL=
O. This means that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals the marginal value
ofhousehold production, Uu'Uc = af'(H}. For values of Hi that make this lower than the wage rate, then it is
optimal to wage work.
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Figure 3.1 The equilibrium wage rates and the allocation of time for two occupations
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The horizontal axis represents the hours of a day (t) and the vertical axis consumption in real
terms (C). Ifthe person graduates from Education l into Occupation l with wage rate WI,
point A in Figure 3.1 maximises his utility. He spends LI hours of leisure and consumes Cl,
partly bought by wage earnings (wNJ and partly produced by H, hours in household
production (aj(HI». For the person to be equally well offifhe chooses Education/Occupation
2, he must have the same utility level and chooses point B which represents more leisure (L,)
and less consumption (C,). Consumption is partly produced at home, working H, hours in
household production (aj(H,» with the higher productivity coefficient a" and using less wage
earnings (w,N,) to acquire goods and services. The wage rate ofOccupation 2 is determined
by tangents in E and B. The equilibrium wage rate is relatively lower for the kind of education
that improves household productivity the most, w, <WI. People, who choose an education that
increases household productivity more, spend more hours in household production to reap the
returns to higher productivity as a homemaker. The lower wage rate makes them work fewer
hours in the labour market and spend more hours at leisure, according to Figure 3.1
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Formally, these results can be established as follows. The modelling assumes an interior
solution where li,Noand Li are all positive:
Max U(C,LJ subject to C, = a;f(HJ + w, N, and t = li + No+ Li
!?= U(C" LJ + A( aJ(HJ + Wi No- CJ+ /-f (t - li -No- LJ
Differentiate the Lagrange function, 2,'by each variable c" Li, li,N,:
o2/0 c:
oY/oLi:
oY/oHi:
oY/ONo:
Uc-A=O
~.-/-f = O
Aa;f'-/-f = O
AWi-/-f = O
These equations imply UL = f:!_, a.f' = f:!_ and w, = f:!_ from which it follows that
Ue A A A
UL = Wi and af'(H) = Wi.
Ue
For a person in a specific occupation, the optimal allocation ofhours implies that the marginal
value ofleisure, household production and wage work are equal.
In order for all occupations to recruit newcomers, people must consider various kinds of
education as attractive independent oftheir relation to household production. Ifwe assume
that all individuals are equal, for a labour market equilibrium to be achieved when two kinds
of occupation are alternatives, the representative person must be indifferent towards the two
kinds of education (and occupation), so that U (C, LJ = U (C" L,).
The model has 7 equations and 8 unknowns (WI, w" HI, H" NI, N" Li>L,), provided that al and
a, are exogenously given.
(1) UL (aJ(HI) +wINpLI) = WI
U e(aJ(HI) + wINpLJ
(2) UL (ad(H2) + w2N2,L2) =w
2
Ue(ad(Hz) +w2N2,L2)
(3) a.f'(Hi) = WI
(4) a,j'(H,) = w,
(5) Hl + NI + LI = t
(6) H, + N, + L, = t
(7) U (aJ(HJ + wINI, LI) = U (a,j(H,) + w.N. L,)
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To facilitate the analysis, I assume that the model is closed by labour demand conditions
determining w,. ThenH, is determined by (3), and LI and NI are determined from (1) and (5),
implying that the utility level for Education l is given.
Since the utility level is equal for the two kinds of occupation (and education), we can ask
what happens to the wage rate in Occupation 2 when the household productivity from
attending Education 2 increases slightly, under the assumption that this does not change WI.
Take the total differential for Education 2 (from (7)):
U; [ da.f (H,) + a.f'(Hi) dll, + dw, N, + w, dN,} + UL dl., = O
and divide by Ur to obtain
da,f(H,) + a.f'(Hi) dH, + dw.N, + w,dN, + Ut/U, dl; = O
Use (4) and (2),
da2f(H,) + w,dH, + dw.N, + w,dN, + w, dl., = O
da,f(H,) + dw.N, + w,[dH, + dN, + dl.] = O
Since dH, + dN, + dl., = Oby (6), we have that da.f (H,) + dw, N, = O,and
dW2 = _ f(H2) < O. When Education 2 raises household productivity more, the equilibrium
da2 N2
wage rate in Occupation 2 decreases.
Proposition 1: The more an occupational education increases household productivity, the
lower is the equilibrium wage rate of the occupation.
To see how an increase in household productivity influences hours spent in household
production, take the total differential of (4):
da,j'(H,) + a,j"(H,) dH, = d w,
and divide by da, to obtain
f'(Hi) + j"(H,) dHlda, = dw/da, = -f(H,)/N,
I' '(H,) dHlda, = - [j' (H,) +f(H,)/N, J
dH =_f'(H2)+f(H2)IN2 >0
da; «J:
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When Education 2 raises household productivity more, the optimal number ofhours spent in
household production increases. What happens to leisure when household productivity
increases? Since we have a situation with a given utility level (cf. equation (7)), there is no
income effect. It now follows from equation (2) and the assumption that the utility function is
strictly quasi-concave, that aC2 > O and aL2 < O.
aW2 Ow2
. dC ac dw dL aL dwHence, we obtain __ 2 = __ 2 __ 2 < O and _2 = __ 2 __ 2 > O .
da2 Ow2 da, da2 Ow2 da,
When Education 2 increases household productivity, hours of leisure increase, while
consumption of goods and services is reduced. How is labour supply affected by an increase
ofhousehold productivity from Education 2? Use (6), and obtain dN2 = _ dH2 _ dL2 < O.
da, da, da,
When Education 2 raises household productivity, labour supply in Occupation 2 decreases.
Proposition 2: The more an occupational education increases household productivity, the
more hours the person will allocate to household production and leisure, and the less hours the
person will supply in the occupationallabour market.
This model uses 'the representative person' and assumes that all individuals are equal. This
implies that all individuals choose Education 2 ifthe relative wage ofOccupation 2 is slightly
higher than the equilibrium relative wage, and vice versa. However, in the real world,
individuals are heterogeneous due to variation in personal values, attitudes and household
skills (as in Essay Two). Therefore, the economic terms ofvarious occupations and the effects
of occupational education on household productivity are not the only factors that influence
occupational choice. Some individuals may feel an inclination towards nursing. Some have
taken care ofyounger siblings and wish to become a pre-school teacher, whereas others have
fixed bicycles and pes and fancy engineering. The extent to which occupational education
raises household productivity is one of several factors that may influence occupational choice,
labour supply and wage formation. Propositions One and Two deal with these effects.
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3.4 Comparing wages and working hours for different occupations
The derived propositions from the previous section can be evaluated using data from
Norwegian graduates in 1978 from five different occupational programmes of equallength.
Hoel, Mastekaasa and Arnesen (1990), and Arnesen (1992), present data concerning wages in
1989, labour force participation 1978-89 and information about the number of children. The
five occupational programmes are: pre-school teacher, nurse, teacher, and engineer or
business economist. According to Hoel, Mastekaasa and Arnesen (1990), wage rates vary
systematically with occupation and the public or private sector nature ofthe job.
How may these five kinds of occupational education be ordered according to household
productivity? Do pre-school teachers and primary school teachers have higher productivity in
household production? Leibowitz (1974, 1977) shows that home investment by mothers in
reading and other 'pre-school' activities improve the ability ofyoung children to learn when
starting school. When parents have completed the necessary education to become a pre-school
teacher or a teacher, they have, presumably, increased productivity not only in raising other
people's children, but also in raising their own children. The requisite education to become a
registered nurse includes lectures and practice in taking care of basic needs. This raises
household productivity. In becoming an engineer, an individual improves his mechanical
skills, useful to keep domestic appliances and cars running. Business economists acquire
skills helpful to household budgeting. Occupational education raises household productivity
when there is an overlap between tasks in household production and an occupation. Following
graduation, family formation will influence household production. I therefore expect pre-
school teachers, in this period of the lifecycle, to hold the occupational education that have
increased household productivity the most.
Table 3.1. Occupational wages in 1989 for 1978 graduates (withequallengthofeducation)
Occupation by household productivity Pre-school teacher Nurse Teacher Engineer Bus.econ
Average full-time monthlywages 1989 12930 13310 14020 19210 21320
Av full-time monthly wage, private sec. 13160 14300 18170 20410 22700
Av full-time montly wage, public sector ]2880 13220 13690 15950 16700
Share ofemployees in public sector 79 89 91 26 21
Source: Hoel, Mastekaasa og Arnesen (1990, Table 3, p.3! and Table inVedlegg 3, p.48).
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In Table 3.1 I have ordered the various kinds of occupational education according to my
perception oftheir relevance to household productivity: pre-school teacher, nurse, teacher,
engineer and business economist. Table 3.1 shows that as occupational education increases
household productivity, the lower the occupational wage rate is (and the average full-time
monthly earnings equivalent). This holds within the private and the public sectors. Public
sector monopsony may keep wage rates low for nurses and teachers, but pre-school teachers
do not fit the pattern. The public sector dominates employment to a lesser degree for pre-
school teachers, and the wage rate is even lower. These findings support Proposition l.
Does the allocation of time to household production and paid work fit Proposition 2? Much as
with Table 3.1, the various occupations in Table 3.2 have been ordered according to how
much the occupational education raises household productivity. Female labour force
participation is 10 percentage points lower than that of men and varies considerably with
occupation. Female pre-school teachers have the lowest labour force participation. However,
labour force participation varies less than hours worked because of part-time work and leave.
Women reported less paid work than men during the first ten years following graduation,
which is no surprise considering childbearing and maternity leaves. How do hours ofpaid
work differ among occupations? Table 3.2 shows female occupational variation in paid work.
During the ten-year period, female nurses worked, on average, only 63.7 per cent of a full-
time equivalent. By contrast, female engineers and business economists worked 76.7 per cent
of a full-time equivalent. Ten years after graduation, in February 1989, female nurses merely
worked 60 per cent of full-time, more than pre-school teachers, whereas female teachers
topped the list with 75 per cent, slightly above female business economists and engineers. The
first ten years after graduation is a period offamily formation when women give birth to
children. This raises the demand for household production. In addition, the number of
children varies by occupation. Female nurses have an average of 1.7 children, while female
engineers and business economists on average only had 1.3 children due to postponed family
development. Female part-time work varies among occupations. A total of 59 per cent of
female nurses work part-time, 42 per cent of pre-school teachers, 38 ofteachers and 31 per
cent offemale business economists and engineers work part-time. Among pre-school
teachers, 77 per cent report child-care as the main reason for part-time work, whilst only 59
per cent among administrators and engineers do. The overall pattern of paid work by women
supports Proposition 2 that the more household related the occupation, the fewer hours are
spent in paid work. The allocation ofhours to paid work vary according to occupation as
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stated by Proposition 2, except for female nurses working fewer hours and female teachers
working more hours. However, labour demand may account for this pattern since nurses
frequently work shifts, and teachers spend fewer hours at work than most other occupations.
Table 3.2 Graduates 1978: Paid work and children by occupation (equallength of educatio
Occupation ordered by household productivity Pre-school Nurse Teacher Engineer& Source
teacher Bus.econ",
Share of full-time work by women, 10 years, % 68,3 63,7 71,7 76,7 Tab.12,p.35
Share of full-time work by women, Feb.1989, % 68,1 60,2 74,9 74 Tab.2,p.22
Average number of children in 1989 for women 1,6 1,7 1,6 1,3 Note10,p.47
Share of part-timers among women, Feb.1989, % 41,5 58,6 38,4 30,8 Tab.5,p.26
Childcare is the main reason for part-time, % 77 75 69 59 Tab.6,p.27
Share of homemakers among non-participants,% 74 79 73 52 Tab.3,p.24
Share of non-participants wanting work, % 53 51 73 63 TabA,p.25
Cond: Better/cheaper child care (1=most imp.) 2 Tab.V11,p.61
Cond: Find relevant work (1=most important) 2 3,5 2 Tab.V11,p.61
Share of part-timers among men, Feb.1989, % 13,7 7 5,5 1,5 Tab.5,p.26
Source: Arnesen (1992) .• The few business economists are merged with engineers by Arnesen (1992).
Is the public sector a monopsonist for pre-school teachers, nurses and teachers, as indicated
by Table 3.1? Such monopsony is presumably more limited than is normally assumed because
the public sector is not without competition. The public sector competes with private
households where unpaid household production may be more attractive to individuals with
high household productivity acquired through occupational education. How can unpaid
household production be more attractive than paid work? Boskin (1975) shows how
differential tax treatment of paid work and household production reduces returns from paid
work in relation to untaxed household production, thereby moving hours away from the
labour market towards household production. Even small increases in household productivity
may become more important than bigger increases in job productivity because of this
differential tax treatment. Sandmo (1990) discusses how the choice between buying a service
or producing it at home complicates the optimisation oftax systems and rates. Unpaid
household production may be profitable despite much lower productivity at home when the
choice is affected by value-added tax, payroll tax and income tax.
Is there any support for Proposition 2, which holds that unpaid work at home is longer in
occupations where the occupational education raises household productivity to a greater
extent? The share ofhomemakers among individuals that do not participate in the labour
market is higher for nurses than for the two teacher groups, whereas only half of the non-
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wage-working engineers and business administrators are homemakers. In addition the share of
non-participants wanting paid work is lowest for nurses and pre-school teachers, higher for
engineers and business economists and highest for teachers. Business economists and
engineers report access to relevant jobs as the most important condition for entering paid
work, whilst the other groups mention better or cheaper childcare.
Presumably, education increases household productivity not only for women, but also for
men. Following Proposition 2 we should expect to find that male pre-school teachers take on
more care work for own children than other men, and that male nurses and teachers take on
more household production than male administrators and engineers. This is supported by the
data in Table 3.2, showing that part-time employment varies from 14 per cent for male pre-
school teachers to 1.5 per cent for male administrators and engineers.
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3.5 Alternative explanations
Differences in personal values have been suggested as an explanation of educational choice,
and compensating wage differentials as a reason for wage differentials among education of
equallength. Hoel (1995) suggests that differences in personal values influence what kind of
education and occupation individuals choose. The empirical results she reports show a
tendency towards this. She uses measures like the interest individuals take in helping others,
in having an interestingjob, in earning high wages, and so on. For instance, female nurses
score highest on 'wish to help other persons', while male candidates in business economics
score the highest on 'desire high earnings'. However, the variation in reported personal values
does not explain the variation in wage work among groups, probably because 'having an
interestingjob' is the most important job-characteristic reported byevery group when
subdivided by education and gender. In a study using factor analyses, Edvardsen (199S) found
that, in 1991, different motives influenced the choice of occupation by Norwegian 18-year-
olds. Future engineers typically had a high score for 'wishing to decide and create'. Future
teachers had a high score for 'wishing contact with other people' and 'wishing to help'. Pre-
school teachers and nurses also had high scores for 'wishing to help', but, in addition, they
had high scores for' attachment to the domicile'. Edvardsen' s study also reported the pupils'
favourite subjects. Youths wishing to become an engineer most frequently favoured maths,
teachers and pre-school teachers favoured the mother tongue, and nurses reported home
economics and needlework as their favourite subject. These results illustrate that differences
in values and tastes may play some part in the individual choice of education and occupation.
The influence ofvarious factors, and the importance of the interaction between interests and
skills, have yet to be explained.
Polachek (1978) suggests that gender differences in college major go beyond ability and
intended labour force commitment. The observation that male engineers eam higher wage
rates than female nurses has been explained by compensating wage differentials. Assuming
that male engineers struggle to learn maths, and that female nurses love caring, Polachek and
Siebert (1993, p. 206-207), conclude that engineers have higher wage rates through
compensating wage differentials. Whether engineers face more hardships than nurses do, is an
empirical question. As indicated by Altonji and Blank (1999, p.320S) the sources of gender
differences in test performance in math scores and verbal scores remain an active and
controversial area of study. 'Hardships' during education or work are difficult to evaluate
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because self-selection reduces attendance by individuals thinking that tasks are real hardships.
Willis and Rosen (1979) report that expected gains in life earnings influence the decision to
attend college and that indicators for family-background reflect financial constraints and
tastes. These results accord with a more than one-factor ability consideration where boys
chose to attend college in accordance with the theory of comparative advantage. Furthermore,
Frank (198S) introduces higher status in the job as an element that compensates for a lower
wage rate. To compensate for lower wage rates in my setting, pre-school teachers should have
higher status than engineers and business economists, which seems unlikely.
Polachek (1976) argues that women with a higher priority for their own family and children
and a higher expectancy ofbecoming a housewife choose shorter education and occupations
wherejob skills depreciate slowly. However, according to Altonji and Blank (1999, p.320S),
there is no longer any difference in average years of education between young men and
women in the USA. There are modest differences in the high school curriculum taken by boys
and girls. Boys take more maths and science courses than girls, and fewer courses in foreign
language and commercial arts. Additionally, gender differences in the distribution of college
majors have declined. An alternative explanation for educational choice and occupation may
be derived from my model in Section 3.3: Women with a higher priority for their own family
and children choose equally long occupational education that increases household
productivity to a greater extent. When occupational skills are used in both a job and
household production, withdrawal from the labour market into household production does not
depreciate job skills. Due to increased household productivity such educational programmes
and occupations recruit despite lower wage rates.
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3.6 Concluding remarks
3.6.1 Educational policy
When educational programmes for pre-school teachers are also beneficial for raising children
at home, the number of students that apply for such programmes is higher than the
employment opportunities in isolation would imply. The home economics aspect of the
education raises the number of applicants despite relatively low wage rates in the occupation.
However, this may also be because the traditional home economics education has not been
updated from a focus on production of goods at home towards the need for care-worker
competence in today's households where technology has improved and ready-made products
have increased in availability. Is it efficient to make homemakers attend nursing programmes
. and learn care-work in hospitals? Would it be cheaper for society to upgrade shorter
programmes in home economics to include care-work, and recognise them as professional
programmes for occupations like child-care assistance and nursing assistance? Recognising
that some kinds of occupational education increase household productivity - as ifthey were
kind of home economics programmes - would shed new light on the issue ofrequired
capacity for these educational programmes. Educational programmes that increase household
productivity to the greatest extent need surplus capacity relative to the demand from the
labour market to cover the demand from household production.
3.6.2 Further research
Time-use studies document hours in unpaid household production by groups, but seldom by
occupation. Data that concern output from household production, household productivity and
the shape of the household production function are scarce. Therefore, the assumptions
concerning household production in this essay cannot be confronted with evidence. It is hard
to single out the extent to which the occupational patterns can be explained by differences in
wage rates, values or household productivity. Whereas a desire to help ill individuals should
not make nurses homemakers, a desire to help all individuals - family members included -
should make nurses more likely to choose unpaid household production. Further research is
needed to disentangle the importance of personal values and household productivity for the
choice of education and occupation and the allocation of time.
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ESSAY 4
THE INFLUENCE OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
ON INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
by
Kristin Dale!
Abstract
A new explanation of inter-industry wage differentials addresses household production and
industrial organisation. Entry costs are low for firms that produce substitutes for household
production, and workers in such firms only need household skills. A novel three-stage model
shows that high entry costs for new firms in an industry generate few and large firms, high
profits and wages. If industries with substitute household production have low entry costs,
they consist of more and smaller firms than other industries, have lower profits and pay lower
wages. Are industries with substitute household production the core of the 'secondary sector'
in the 'dual economy'? Illustrations cover Japan, Norway and the USA. Policy issues include
self-employment programmes and minimum wages.
1 A draft ofthis essay has been printed in Working paper 1998:4, Department of Economics and Business
Administration, Agder College.
I would like to thank Geir B. Asheim for helpful suggestions, and Jonathan Baker, Rolf J. Brunstad, Jan Morten
Dyrstad, Paul Frijters, Steinar Holden, Stephen Nickell, Åsa Rosen, Asbjørn Rødseth, Agnar Sandmo and Gary
Solon for helpful comments.
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4.1 Introduction
Studies ofwage differentials across time and space show that the type ofindustry itself
influences the wage rate ofworkers. Lang et aJ. (1987, p.9) conclude from several studies that
significant differences in earnings exist between individuals who appear identical to
economists. While some ofthese differences may be returns to unobservable skills and ability,
a large proportion is probably solely due to the place of employment. What is the pattern of
inter-industry wage differentials? Table 4.1 shows the top ten and bottom ten wage industries
in the USA in 1984 (according to Krueger and Summers, 1988). Contrary to their discussion,
this essay focuses on the low wage industries.
Table 4.1 The US Industries with the highest and lowest wage level in 19842
Industry (two-digit) Estimated coefficient
10 Top wage industries: industry dummy
Petroleum \0.371
Tobacco 0.340
Public Utilities 0.259
Mining 0.241
Chemical 0.221
Transport Equipment 0.191
Machinery, Excl. Elec. [0.185
Communications 0.171
Primary Metals 1°·162
Paper ~;~_._---
10 Bottom Wage industries
---_._---~
Leather -_._~------
Medical Services 4?82-
Apparel 0.127-
Entertainment ~:141--~~-~.
Personal Services 0.154-
Other Retail 10.155-
.-
Eating and Drinking 0.189-
Education Services 1°·194-
Welfare Services '0.246-
Private Household 0.366-
2 Source: Krueger and Summers (1988, pp.26S-6) Table IL
Other explanatory variables are education and its square, 6 age dummies, 8 occupation dummies, 3 region
dummies, sex dummy, race dummy, central city dummy, union member dummy, ever married dummy, veteran
status, marriage x sex interaction, education squared x sex interaction, 6 age x sex interactions, and a constant.
Cross-seclionallog-linear regression weighted by employment shares and reported as deviations from the
weighted mean ofal! industries.
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Table 4.1 presents estimates of industry wage dummy variables for some industries, reported
as deviations from the weighted mean wage of all industries, with individual characteristics
controlled, but no control for establishment and firm characteristics. The estimated coefficient
of an industry in Table 4.1 represents approximately the percentage wage difference from the
mean wage of all industries for similar employees. In the petroleum industry the wage was
approximately 37 per cent above the mean wage of all industries. In the leather industry and in
medical services the wage was 8 per cent lower than the mean. Table 4.1 shows that the
industry 'paid work for private household' had the lowest wage in the USA in 1984 - about 37
per cent lower than the mean of all industries.
What can explain these inter-industry wage differentials? Krueger and Summers (1988)
conclude that the pattern ofhigh wage industries can be explained by efficiency wage theories
whereby employers willingly increase wage rates to obtain reduced turnover and higher
productivity. However, neither Krueger and Summers (1988) nor Arai (1990) provide causal
evidence to support this conclusion. Men who work full time in large establishments in
concentrated, capital intensive, unionised industries dominate the top ten wage industries of
Table 4.1. Women, who work full time or less in smaller establishments in competitive,
labour intensive, non-unionised industries dominate the low wage industries. Another
explanation may be that the share of female workers in the industry has not been controlled.
Female dominated occupations may eam lower wages because a crowding of females leads to
lower wages as Edgeworth (1922) argued. However, many more occupations are now open to
women, though discrimination by employees or by monopsonistic employers (Bergmann,
1974) may still exist. Nevertheless, LOfstrom (1993) reports that female crowding is only part
of the explanation for wage differentials by industry among Swedish employees in 1991.
The purpose ofthis paper is to introduce a new explanation ofwage differences among
industries. Two alternative research strategies - involving disequilibrium models or
equilibrium models with wage differentials - are suggested by Lang et al. (1987, p.7), on the
grounds that the pattern ofhigh and low wage industries have hardly changed during the
twentieth century in the USA. Lang et al. (p.8) recommend searching for an equilibrium
model with particular wage differentials: 'Moreover, the evidence in the paper by Krueger and
Summers (1987) of strong international correlations of inter-industry wage differentials, at
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least among developed capitalist economies, is more easily understood if the economy has a
tendency to converge to particular differentials. 'This essay enlarges the set of equilibrium
models with particular wage differentials among industries.
The new explanation, which I want to focus on here, sterns from an intriguing question: Why
are men in the expanding business of car maintenance paid relatively lower wages than men in
other sectors of iron and metal industry in Norway (after controls for qualifications,
establishment size and region, [Dale 1994])? The relatively low wage rates in car maintenance
cannot be explained by fernale crowding. However, the hidden explanation may lie in a
similarity to household production. Firstly, the car repair business may be much more
competitive than other sectors of the iron and metal industry due to the many actual and
potential entrepreneurs attracted by the low entry costs of new firms. More people will
consider starting a garage than a firm that produces primary metals. Secondly, car mechanics
keep the family car running, and exchange services. Some ofthem probably started to repair
cars as youth at home.
The ten low wage industries in Table 4.1 are: leather, medical services, apparel,
entertainment, personal services, other retail, eating and drinking, education services, welfare
services and paid work for private households. These industries involve production that, to a
large degree, is similar to unpaid household production. In this essay, such industries are
classified as industries with substitute household production. The top ten wage industries in
Table 4.1 seem to have very little substitute household production.
This essay is organised as follows: Section 4.2 characterises industries with substitute
household production. These characteristics are used in a model ofwage formation in section
4.3. Results from the model are related to international ernpirical evidence in section 4.4 and
implications for the 'dual economy' and labour market policies are presented in the final
section.
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4.2 Characteristics of industries with substitute household production
This paper focuses on two novel aspects of industries with substitute household production.
The concept of substitute household production relates to the use of similar production
processes and equipment in firms and homes. Some other aspects are not considered, such as
the potential effects from the tax wedge (discussed by Kolm, 2000), and that of consumer
demand for products. Due to space constraints, I confine this essay to industrialised
economies.
Firstly, common characteristics of industries with substitute household production are that
technology is widespread, well known and used in many households. Given that the specific
production takes place in households, the technology and equipment are also available for
new firms, and entrepreneurs may start a business at a low entry cost - self-employed or a
small firm. Cooking is a part ofhousehold production, and ensures that a restaurant firm can
be established at a small scale with low entry costs for capital equipment. While many people
may consider opening a restaurant, which is a typical example of a firm with substitute
household production, few would consider starting a petroleum company, a chemical firm or a
paper mill because of the high entry costs for capital equipment and lack ofknow-how. The
presence of substitute household production creates a highly competitive industry through low
entry costs.
Secondly, many types ofhousehold production are widespread (cooking, cleaning, child-
rearing, repairing, sewing etc.). People learn household skills from participation, observation
or explicit teaching (the case with cooking, sewing). Everyone in industrialised countries has
some ofthese skills. When tasks in firms and in household production are similar, household
skills are relevant job skills for entrepreneurs and employees. Using the term 'no
qualifications' for people who have not attended occupational training or higher education
programmes, as Oulton (1996) does, is an under-estimation ofhousehold skills acquired from
upbringing, household production and compulsory schooling. In the real world, firms are not
like homes, and jobs in firms are not homogeneous. Thereby firms and industries differ by the
degree to which they utilise household skills as job skills. Typically, paid work in private
households makes extensive use of many household skills. The share of employees who need
more qualifications than household skills may influence wage formation.
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4.3 A model of entry costs and wage formation
The model below focuses on two characteristics and is a novel three-stage game. Manning
(1994) surveyed economic literature of two-stage models that determine production and wage
formation, and Michaelis (1997) also applies a two-stage models for such a purpose. Booth
(1995) surveys the huge economic literature of trade unions, and sets out in a very systematic
manner the assumptions and implications of various (two-stage) models from a comparative
perspective. However, the model in this essay differs from other contributions in various
respects. In particular, the model introduces the entry cost of new firms at an additional first
stage, thus creating a three-stage model. We apply some simplifying assumptions to reduce
the complexity and disentangle the three stages so that the model can be solved through
backward induction.
Stage 1: Firm entry
Many potential firms mayenter a particular industry. Any firm i that enters must pay an entry
costj, which stems from a capital investment that is non-reversible and lost ifthe firm is
driven out of business. The entry cost is specific to a certain line of industry, but varies among
industries. If firm i enters business, its production is a linear function of employment. Without
loss of generality we set q; = L, where qi denotes the quantity produced by firm i and Ii
denotes the employment in firm i. This implies that each worker produces one unit of the
product. In other words, the level ofproduction is proportional to the level of employment.
Stage 2: Wage formation
For simplicity, wage formation is modelled as ifeach firm established in stage I has a
monopoly trade union that unilaterally determines the wage paid to all workers employed by
the firm. Assume that the monopoly union of any firm i is ruled by the wish to raise the
earnings of the workers in the firm. This implies to maximise the 'real wage surplus' that
equals the increase in the real wage bill in the unionised firm compared to the alternative
value ofits workers. Formally, this corresponds to maximising the utility function
ui = (Wi - wo)li'
where Wi denotes the wage set by the monopoly union in firm i, and Wo denotes the
alternative value for the category ofworkers employed in firm i.The alternative value Wo is
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equal for workers of the same category and corresponds to their best alternative (the highest
wage in alternative employment, or unemployment benefit or household production). The
term in the parentheses measures the improved position of a worker from taking on work in
firm i.The monopoly union of the firm takes into account that the employment and
production in the firm will depend on the wage.
Stage 3: Production and employment determination
Assume that each firm exercises its right-to-manage and chooses qj to maximise profit
where II; is profit excluding sunk entry cost, and P denotes price. The product is assumed to
be homogeneous, and the inverse demand function in the market is assumed to be linear:
p = P(Q) = 1-Q ,
where Q denotes the sum of the quantities produced by all the firms that have entered the
specific industry: Q =L q j
j
Solution to the model
The model is solved by finding a subgame-perfect equilibrium, i.e. strategies that constitute a
Nash equilibrium in any subgame. By construction, this model has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium that can be found through backward induction.
Stage 3 solution
A history (subgame) at the beginning of stage 3 is characterised by a number of firms, n, that
entered the specific industry at stage 1, and the wage rates that the firm specific unions have
determined in each ofthose firms (WI , .... ,wJ Hence, finding the Nash-equilibrium in such a
subgame is equivalent to finding the unique Nash equilibrium of the ordinary Cournot
competition model with n firms, where firm ihas the profit function II; = P(Q)q; -w;qi'
Provided that the wage rates are not too unequal (so that all entered firms will produce
positive quantities), this unique Nash-equilibrium is characterised by firm iproducing
1
q. =-(I-nw. +W.), n +1 ,-, where W_i =LWj
I:toi
This is demonstrated in the Appendix in section 4.8.
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Stage 2 solution
A history (subgame) at the beginning of stage 2 is characterised by a number of firms, n, that
entered the specific industry at stage 1. Assume now that the unions expect that the firms in
stage 3 will behave according to the sub-game-perfect equilibrium strategies keeping in mind
that Ii = qi . A Nash equilibrium of a subgame at the beginning of stage 2 will then be a Nash
equilibrium of a static game, where each union sets a wage rate Wo ::;; Wi ::;; 1, and where its
utility is given by
W- - Wo ( )u = 1 l-nw +W ..
1 n+ 1 I-I
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, where union i sets the wage rate
nwo +1w =---
i n+ 1 .
This is shown in the Appendix in section 4.8.
Stage 1 solution
The wage rate for firm i found in the solution of stage 2 implies that the finn's profit,
excluding the sunk entry cost (as calculated in the Appendix in section 4.8) is given by
when n firms have entered. The equilibrium number of firms to enter a specific industry is
denoted by n*, and is found by comparing ITi(n *) to! In equilibrium n* is characterised by
the fact that ex-post none regret having or not having entered this specific industry. This
means that n * is determined so that profit is non-negative when entry cost is deducted:
However, if one more firm had entered in stage 1, this expression would have been non-
positive:
Results
This model shows some interesting results about how the entry costs for a new firm and the
alternative value ofworkers in an industry influence the number offirms, the size offinns, the
equilibrium wage rate and profits.
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Firstly, the model shows that a higher entry cost for firms in a particular industry leads to a
lower optimal number of firms, higher profits and a higher wage rate in equilibrium in the
particular industry. Table 4.2 illustrates these analytical results, i.e. how the entry costs for
new firms in a particular industry affect the optimal number of firms, and - for each firm - the
optimal production, employment, wage rate and profits in the particular industry when the
best alternative for workers is set to zero.
Table 4.2 Numerical example of consequences of different entry costs
To simplify assume that the best alternative for workers is no income, Wo= O.
Entry cost Number of firms Profit in firm i Quantity in firm i Wage rate in firm i
F N IIi qi Wi
1 O
-<I
16
4 1 1-</5,- -
81 16 16 4 2
9 4 2 4 2 1
256 <15, 81 - -81 9 3
16 9 3 9 3
625 </5, 256 256 16 4
25 16 4 16 4
1296 </5, 625 625 25 5
Independently of the value ofwo, the model predicts that n goes to infinity and w approaches
the competitive wage, wo, in the limit as/goes to O.Thus, when the entry cost for a new firm
in an industry is negligible, the model predicts that workers' wages will be fixed at no more
than the competitive wage rate oftheir skill category.
Secondly, the model results show the importance of the alternative value of the worker for the
wage level in an industry. Iftwo specific industries have equal entry costs for firms, then the
industry with the workers who have a higher opportunity value, pays higher wages. This
implies that unions claim higher wages when the best alternative is a good one like another
high wage job.
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Table 4.3 Numerical example of consequences ofvarious alternative values ofworkers
Assume that two industries have the same entry costs, f= 1/32.
Best alternative for workers Wage rate in firm i Number offirms
Wo Wj n
4
O
5
8
3
4
Notice that the wage difference between two industries with equal entry costs may more than
exceed the difference in the alternative value of the workers in the two industries. This result
is demonstrated in Table 4.3 (3/8> 1/4). Therefore, raising the alternative value ofworkers
may raise the wages even more.
4.3.1 Interpretation ofthe model for industries with substitute household production
Up to this point the formulation and solution of the model are applicable to many industries.
Now I interpret the model for industries with substitute household production. Industries with
substitute household production utilise the same production processes as household
production, and their technology is widespread and well-known, and capital equipment is
available both for household production and for a new firm at a low cost. Consequently, one
characteristic of such industries is that new firms' entry costs are low. Furthermore, industries
with substitute household production have at their disposal a large pool of potential workers,
since most people obtain some household skills from observation or participation in
household production. Household skills are the typical job skills ofworkers in the firms with
substitute household production. When employees utilise household skills as job skills and
have no additional qualifications, they do not face labour market options as good as those
faced by other employees who have vocational or higher education or on-the-job training. For
example, if employees with household skills have worked more hours in household
production and fewer hours in paid work at a low wage rate (as is indicated in Essay One),
they tend to obtain lower unemployment benefits than other employees. As a result, another
characteristic of industries with substitute household production is that the opportunity cost of
workers is low.
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Ifit is true that industries with substitute household production have lower entry costs than
other industries, and also true that they have employees with a lower opportunity value than
other workers, then the model in this essay predicts that these industries will be less
concentrated, have lower profits and pay lower wages than other industries.
4.3.2 Discussion of some assumptions in the model
The assumption that wages are set as ifthere is a monopoly union, creates a simple rent-
sharing mechanism for the profit potential of the firm (excluding the sunk entry costs).
Research in industrialised countries suggests that the ability to pay leads to higher wage rates
through some kind of rent-sharing in empirical studies from industrialised countries. Booth
(1995, p.3) remarks that 'these [trade union] models are also relevant for a broader class of
situations than those in which a trade union explicitly represents workers " and she mentions
the insider-outsider and the implicit contract literature. In my model varying entry costs create
a varying ex post ability to pay. The property that wages are set unilaterally by unions is not
essential to the qualitative results. Even ifthe assumption ofunionisation is taken literally,
this model does not imply that all employees should be unionised. It suffices that the wage
fixed by the firm's union applies to both unionised and non-unionised workers. Unionisation
is not a precondition for the results of the model if firms fear unionisation of their own
workers and willingly pay the wages ofunionised firms to avoid unionisation. The firm then
mimics a union and pays the wage in the model. Furthermore, ifthe entry cost of a new firm,
f, is low, the firm's ex- post rents are low, and the wage set in the monopoly union solution
almost converges with the competitive wage of the worker category. Hence, unions do not
influence wage setting in industries with low f, such as industries with substitute household
production. Thereby, workers have small incentives to unionise in such industries. This is
consistent with the low degree ofunionisation observed in industries with substitute
household production.
In the model it is assumed that every industry uses but one category of workers and that their
alternative value, wo' is equal for all individuals in the category because it is an option that is
open to everybody in the particular category. A law firm example may illustrate the
importance of a high alternative value of workers. Because standard office facilities with PC
and fax are sufficient real capital to enter business, entry costs are rather low for a law firm.
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The opportunity value oflawyers is high because they can take high-payingjobs as legal
advisers or administrators. Therefore, it is consistent with this model that lawyers earn high
wages.
How penalised are workers when they get fired? According to the model in this essay they
may be paid a much higher wage than their opportunity value. Bluestone and Harrison (1982,
p.1O)assert that 'automobile workers who lose their jobs in this high productivity industry are
found two years later to be injobs that pay on average 43 percent less. Even six years after
losing their jobs, these workers have recovered only five-sixths of the salaries they would
have been earning had they not been laid off. •This illustrates that workers are paid wages
well above their opportunity value in industries with high entry costs (such as car
manufacture) as predicted by the model in this essay.
If the market size is doubled, so that the inverse demand function in stage 3 is P= l-QI2, and if
fis also doubled, then the equilibrium number offirms and the wage rate would be
unchanged. Hence, it is entry costs relative to market size that matters. For example, when
trade liberalisation increases the size of the market, the model captures this through lower
entry costs, and predicts lower wages in the affected industries, ceteris paribus. However, such
a market integration may also affect the prices of consumer commodities; hence, the argument
above does not necessarily imply that the real wage will decrease.
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4.4 Empirical illustrations
4.4.1 Substitute household production in retrospect
Reid (1934, pA7) has described the changes in the division ofproduction between households
and firms in the USA: 'As factory production increased, tasks left the home. At first goods
were made in both home and factory. Thefamily gave up home production only as they were
able tofind a wider market for the products they had to sell. As time went on, one form of
production after another, spinning, weaving, sewing, tailoring, baking, butchering, soap-
making, candle-making, brewing, preserving, laundering, dyeing, gardening, care of poultry,
and other tasks have wholly or in part been transferred to commercial production. In
addition, child care, education, and care of the sick are now to a large extent carried on by
paid workers .... The change did not occur with equal rapidity in all parts of the country. '
Reid (1934, pA3) also mentions bygone equipment for household production in farms citing
Andrews (1919, p.64): 'The average New England country household was a sort of self-
sustaining unit which depended little on the world beyond its own gates. Its equipment
included not only usual chairs, beds, tables, and kitchen utensils and tableware, but the
shoemakers' tools and shoe leather ... surgeon 's tools and apothecary stuffs, salves and
ointments ... occasionally a still or a cider press and outfits for carpentering and
blacksmithing. 'These lists reveal which industries that had substitute household production
long ago. With the exception of retail and entertainment, these industries are the lowest wage
industries ofTable 4.1. Previously industrial manufacturing offurniture, shoes, leather,
textiles, toys and drinks had substitute household production. Today manufacturing ofvarious
kinds of food and clothing has substitute household production in industrialised countries.
The presence of similar production both in firms and households indicates that economies of
scale are moderate or non-existent. I therefore expect to see a different size distribution of
establishments in industries with and without substitute household production. Statistics
Norway (1997, p.60-7) reports for 1995: 26 per cent of employment in the manufacture of
bread, fresh pastry and cakes stems from establishments with less than 10 individuals, while
13 per cent of employment in clothing concerns such small establishments. Not one
establishment in these industries employed 200 or more individuals. Only 1 per cent of
employment in the manufacture ofbasic metals involves establishments with less than 10
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persons, while 73 per cent of employment stems from large establishments with more than
200 persons. These numbers illustrate that industries with much substitute household
production like baking and sewing consist of smaller establishments than industries with little
or no substitute household production.
4.4.2 Econometric results from Japan and Norway
Tachibanaki (1996) presents estimations of earnings functions from manufacturing industries
in Japan. In Table 4.4 these industries are ordered according to falling average capital
intensity. His study does not contain an ideal measure of entry cost, but capital intensity and
concentration (measured by share ofworkers) are reported and used here as indicators ofentry
costs. Table 4.4 shows that industries with higher capital intensity often are more concentrated
and pay higher gross wages. Petroleum and coal - the most capital-intensive industry - paid a
wage premium of 8 % (after controls for individual characteristics and firm variables
including size, measured as deviance from the weighted mean). On the other hand the least
capital-intensive industry, clothing, had a wage differential of 12 per cent below the average
after similar controls. Wage differentials by industry tend to decline both with decreasing
capital intensity and decreasing concentration. Both capital intensity and concentration
correlate positively with unionisation. Unionisation is low in Japan in the low wage industries.
Clothing manufacture is an industry that has substitute household production. It had the
second lowest capital intensity among the Japanese manufacturing industries in 1978, the
third lowest concentration, the very lowest wage level and wage differential (after controls),
and the forth lowest unionisation (19 per cent), which supports the model in this essay.
Use the manufacturing of precision instruments as an example of an industry where capital
intensity is low despite little substitute household production. For such industries, both
unionisation and concentration are above the average for manufacturing industries. The high
wage level in precision instrument manufacture probably stems from the large amount of
human capital required. However, the pattern of human capital by industry is not available in
Tachibanaki's (1996) study ofwage determination in Japan.
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Table 4.4 Empirical evidence from manufacturing industries iu Japan 1978
~anufacturing inEUstry ! i 1 I-
Line of industry Capital:labour iWorker cone. i Wage/worker iWage diff. IUnionization"!.---t
ITab.9.2.Tab.9.2 [Tab.9.1 jTab.5.2b ,Tab.9.1
yen,1978 I 1 I,
27 Petroleum, coal 40072, 461 342110.071 1 59~-~-~---4--
31 Iron, steel 155871 641 3189:0.024 i 65
26 Chemical products 10113! 551 314610.028 =:»l-r-r-e-r- ..
32 Non-ferrous metal 8099 i 471 2818 -0,005' 63r::----
24 Pulp, paper 6737, 25 2225 -0,03: 35
30 Ceram., stone, clay 43421 21 20660.001 33
4000r-
--,--
36 Transport. equipment 64 2792 -0,016 71
18 Food, tobacco 33951 24 16950.022 31
28 RU-bber-prod-ucts --.- .. - -
_'--- ,-_ ,... ~---_-- .._- - --._- --- .- -
2871 44 2265 -0,02, 57
34 Machinery 2862 32 2561 0.006 46
33 Fabricated metal
.-.-
2813 14 20000.001 25
38 Other manufacturing 2694
1--.
13
-_.-------~-------'-------------:-=-
1795 18
22 Lumber, Wood 25801 4 1593 -0,075 13
25 Publishing, printing 2517' 20 26160.004 29
20 Textile mills 2113 20 1419; -O 096! 39
.._---- -_._-_;'---'_ ... '
23 Furniture 1928 5 1589' -0,044 13
35 Electrical machinery 1907 47 2209 -0,053, 53
37 Precision instruments 1795! 34 21381 -0,008! 50
21 Clothing 7661 5 1162' -0,125! 19
29 Leather 752 3 1522: n.a.l 12
Source: Tachibanaki (1996), referred to as (T) below.
Capital: labour: (T., p.177, footnote b) 'Capital: labour ratio is computed by dividing the total assets at the end
of the year by the total no. of workers. 'Asset' refers to corporate fixed assets including (i) land, (ii) buildings,
(iii) machine and equipment, (iv) transportation equipment. '
Worker cone.: (T., p.175, footnote b) 'Worker concentration is the % ofworkers infirms with 1000 or more
workers. Firms of under than 10 workers are excluded from the survey. '
Wage/worker means (T., p.l77) 'wage payment per worker. '
Wage diff.: (T., p.89) 'Pure industrial advantages (or rents), after control for various qualifications in
employees and firms: two-digit industrial classification. '
Unionisation: (T., p.175, footnote d) 'Each of the unionization rates is computed by dividing the number of
union members by the total number of workers in the industry, including those who work in firms with under
than 10 workers. The unionization ratefor retail andwholesale trade together is 0.143. The average
unionization rate in the competitive sector is 0.217, while that in the non-competitive sector is 0.546.
4.4.3 Education and gender
Oulton (1996) reports that the share of employees with no vocational education is much
higher in the UK than in Germany. The likely causes are a different system of education and
apprenticeships together with genuine differences in qualifications, revealing that industrial
educational requirements are relative. In 1987 the share of employees with only compulsory
education in instrument engineering was 52 per cent in the UK and 26 per cent in Germany.
Sectors with substitute household production tend to have a higher share of employees with
only compulsory education. In the clothing and fur industry this proportion was 83 per cent in
the UK and 35 per cent in Germany. Oulton (1996, p.205, p.207) labels this skill category 'no
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qualification'. Since it is hard to find a precise label except 'compulsory education only', 'no
qualification' indicates that qualifications attained through household production and
compulsory schooling are not considered to be job qualifications in industrialised countries.
Table 4.5 shows results from Norway on inter-industry patterns including education and
gender in 1990. The information includes: capital per employee, average years of education,
percentage offemale employees and inter-industry wage differentials (after standard controls
that include size of establishment). Confirming the international pattern, petroleum refining is
the manufacturing industry most characterised by the highest capital intensity, a male
dominated workforce that has high average education and that receives the highest wage
premium (after controls). In reverse order production of clothes and footwear have the lowest
capital intensity, the lowest educationallevel, are female dominated, and have the lowest
wages (after controls). The clothing industry is a typical example of industries with substitute
household production.
The presence of short education and female domination in industries like manufacturing of
clothes, footwear, fish products, textiles and leather supports the hypothesis that household
skills are important in these jobs. In Japan, high wage industries like printing and publishing,
and production of instruments have low capital intensity, but Norwegian data below in Table
4.5 confirms that such industries are male dominated and contain employees that are better-
educated than industries with substitute household production.
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Table 4.5 Empirical evidence from manufacturing industries in Norway 1990 and 1986
ISIC Une of industry iGapital/v"mker Years of education Female% Wage differentials
'Tab.8.8 Tab.8.3 Tab.8.5 Tab.5.1 Aggr.ind.
22 Crude petroleum&n.ga~ n.a. 12,68 24 0,17
353i Petroleum refining 14668 12,00 16In.a. 0,19
3541Man. of other petro.p. 3943. 10,42 13 n.a. 0,19
351! Industrial chemicals 3720: 11,15 14 -0,07
372 Non-ferrous metals 3348! 10,92 17 -0,07
341 Paper&pulp 3227! 10,39 17 -0,09
21 Coal mining 2596! 10,50 35 n.a. 0,02
371 Iron and steel I 25581 10,57 13 °Ref.ind.
23 Metal ore mining I 24381 10,57 18 n.a. 0,02
29 Other mining I 1822: 10,02 12 n.a. 0,02
369 Other mineral products; 1614! 10,21 14 n.a. -0,02
314 Manufact. of tobacco i 14471 10,03 52 n.a. -0,06
313 Manufact. of beverage i 1439; 10,52 20 n.a. -0,06
355 Rubber products
J
1427, 10,41 18 n.a. -0,07
352 Other chemicals I 1288 10,85 38 0,07
362 Glass and glass pr. I 1224 10,32 26 n.a. -0,02
311 Other food manufact. i 11941 10,44 37 n.a. -0,06
331 Wood i 1061· 10,07 15 n.a. -0,07
356 Aastic products I 999i 10,50 29 n.a. -0,07
321 Textiles 862! 9,86 60 n.a. -0,15
383 8ectrical apparatus 851i 11,04 30 n.a. -0,03
384X Transport equipment x! 765 10,58 12 n.a. -0,03
361 Ceramics , 681
1
10,74 45 n.a. -0,02
382 Machinery ! 670i 11,04 13 -0,02
3114 Fish products : 642i 9,85 51 n.a. -0,06
390 Other manufact. indo
,
6411 11,21 41 -0,041
332 Furniture and fixtures 626: 10,07 27 n.a. -0,07
381 Metal products , 5881 10,38 16 -0,06,
323 Leather I 489 9,70 45 n.a. -0,15!
342 Printing & publishing I 4871 11,17 37 0,23
385 Instruments , 459: 10,86 25 n.a. -0,03
3841 Ship building ! 4161 10,61 10 -0,02
324 Footv.ear I 3101 9,56 58 n.a. -0,15
322 Oothes I 3061 9,82 84 n.a. -0,15
Sources: Capita/lworker (Dale et al., 1993, p.148) stems from data collected by Statistics Norway for
Manufacturing statistics 1990, calculated from the fire insurance value divided by the number of employees.
Numbers represent urban capital intensity estimated from a weighted linear regression with regional controls.
Years of education (Dale et al., 1993, pp.120-7) Educational certificates are assigned the scheduled number of
years to pass. Statistics Norway coupled information from the register of the individuals' highest completed
education with population census data concerning which individuals worked in which industries in 1990.
Numbers represent average years of education in urban regions estimated from a weighted linear regression with
regional controls.
Female % (Dale et al., 1993, p.BI-2) represents female share of the number of employees in urban areas
estimated from a weighted linear regression with regional controls from the population census data I 990.
Wage differentials (Dale, 1994, p.121-4) (not fully an ISIC classification) by industry (second last column) or
more aggregated industries (last column). Coefficients estimated by a log linear weighted regression controlled
for occupation, gender, region and establishment size from a data set ofblue collar workers from the Norwegian
Employer Federation, 1986. Reference group for industries: iron and metal. 'n.a'. means not available.
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4.4.4 Relating the concept of 'entry costs' to firm characteristics in earnings functions
The entry costs of a new firm in the model of this essay is the initial capital necessary to enter
business that is not recoverable if entry fails. While the entry costs of a firm may be important
for wage formation, as this paper illustrates, it seems to play no part in labour economics. To
my knowledge, no study of wage rates uses the entry costs of a firm as an explanatory
variable. However, there are studies that discuss how related concepts like 'barriers to entry'
or 'concentration' may raise wages, for instance Abenoja and Lapid (1987) and Nickell,
Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994). These studies report that more concentrated industries
earn higher profits and pay higher wage rates. This is in line with my model's result that
market concentration, profits and wages correlate positively. Below I relate 'entry costs of a
new firm' to characteristics that are frequently cited by labour economists as independent
variables in empirical studies of eamings functions.
4.4.5 Firm characteristics in earnings functions
Ever since Mincer (1974), the estimated wage equation frequently has a log-linear structure,
implying that the underlying model ofwage differentials consists of the product of the
independent variables. Hildreth and Oswald (1997) show that changes in profitability feed
into lasting changes in wages. They criticise the empiricalliterature on wage formation (based
on individual and household data) for not capturing the proper establishment and company
effects. They argue that company or establishment wage panel data should be used. The
explanatory variables differ among empirical studies and are typically restricted by the data
set. For example, Denny and Machin (1991) report for the UK in 1976-86 that profits per
employee, industry wages and the capital-labour ratio raise firm-level wages. Edin and
Zetterberg (1992) utilise independent variables for firm size, regional unemployment, job
characteristics as shift-work and industry dummies. Tachibanaki (1996) applies independent
variables for capital intensity, establishment size, firm size, industry dummies and 'worker
concentration' to measure product market power.
Lang et aJ. (1987, p.9) conclude about empirical analysis of wage differentials by industry:
'The paper by Dickens and Katz [chapter 3, 1987} investigates whichfactors influence inter-
industry wage differentials. Their unusually careful empirical study demonstrates that most of
the factors are so interrelated that it is impossible to ascertain the relation between key
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variables and inter-industry wage differentials. Instead, the results are highly sensitive to
choice of sample and model specification. Nevertheless, certain variables appear to play an
important role - the average level of education in the industry, the average size of the
establishments, measures of profitability and the capital/labor ratio. '
These findings support the potential importance of concepts in the modelofthis essay. Firstly,
the alternative value ofworkers in the model relates to the level of education. Secondly, the
entry costs of new firms relate to the capital/labour ratio and the size. The product of the
capital/labor ratio and the number of employees correspond to the capital of a firm as a 'going
concern'. The capital/labour ratio multiplied with labour concentration represents the capital
as a going concern per market share. To what degree the concept 'entry costs of a new firm'
correspond to the independent variable 'the capitalofthe going concern', depends upon the
irreversibility and the potentialloss of capital when the firm leaves business. Therefore,
independent variables in earnings equations such as capital intensity, size and concentration
may capture some aspects of the concept of the entry costs of a new firm.
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4.5. Discussion
4.5.1 Why has household production not been related to wages previously?
The most likely answer to this question is that economists and other social scientists tend to
associate consumption with households and production with firms. When Hamermesh (1993)
surveyed economic literature on labour demand, and Tirole (1988) presented the theory of
industrial organization, household production cannot be found in the index ofthese books.
Furthermore, to reduce data collection costs, self-employment and small establishments are
omitted in industrial data sets or reported in summary statistics. In Norway, for example,
when manufacturing establishments have less than five employees, only employment and
sales data are collected. When other characteristics of all firms are later estimated using data
from 'large' establishments, differences between small and large establishment within an
industry may be underestimated. Table 4.4 used data for Japan where information was
excluded for firms with less than ten employees. This may bias the results about the
economies ofscale in industries. Last, but not least, actual and potential intra-industry
competition from both small firms and households are ignored. The international industrial
classification systems order industries according to technology type combined with raw
material type. Lists of industries according to ISIC- and CIC-classifications distribute
industries with substitute household production throughout the list. To make the point of
industries with substitute household production noticeable, regrouping is required.
There are various ways in which household production may influence markets, and thereby
wage formation. Phenomena like tax-wedges influence demand for consumer products and the
supply of labour services by subsidising household production. However, this essay focuses
on the supply side of product markets - taking into account the degree to which production in
firms could take place at home. Empirical studies have to test which mechanisms are the most
important ofthose related to household production. Relevant data sets are not presently
available. They should cover firms and household production, tax data and various kinds of
human capital including household skills.
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4.5.2 The mixed blessings of self-employment schemes to reduce unemployment
Many governments make self-employment schemes an integral part oflabour market
programmes to fight unemployment. Consider the activities of female entrepreneurs.
According to Kaur and Hayden (1993, p.l 02) female entrepreneurs are attracted to businesses
that use their domestic skills, whereas Johnson and Storey (1993) hold that female
entrepreneurs are over-represented in retailing, lodging, catering, repair and other services.
Most of these businesses have some kind of substitute household production. Remember that
the success probability of establishing a new firm or self-employment is less than one, not
least for people who have been unemployed. The results of the modelofthis paper challenge
self-employment policies, not only because of the risk of business failure, but also for the long
run effects of directing more people into firms with low entry costs that face substitute
household production and receive low wage rates and profits.
4.5.3 The minimum wage
Card and Krueger (1995) present empirical studies of the economics of the minimum wage in
the USA. Most empirical evidence is confined to relatively few industries: agriculture,
manufacturing of clothing, textiles, furniture, toys and sporting goods, retail trade, restaurants,
fast-food industry and other household related services. They conclude that enforcement of
moderate minimum wages in USA is neither so harmful to employment and consumer prices,
nor so good for wage earnings as the debate among economists have indicated. Except for
retailing, industries where the minimum wage is an issue have a high degree of substitute
household production in industrialised countries. This is in itself evidence that the presence of
substitute household production reduces wages. Brozen (1962) describes how many
occupations in the USA were gradually covered by minimum wage legislation while paid
household workers - the core occupation in substitute household production - remained
uncovered. Card and Krueger (1995) indicate that, for industrialised countries, enforcing a
minimum wage is an effective means ofraising wages in industries with no international
competition.
4.5.4 Is substitute household production the demarcation line of the 'dual' economy?
The segmented labour market approach, which includes 'the dual economy' and 'the dual
labour market', is identified with social scientists as Doeringer and Piore (1971). Theyargue
that the neo-classical apparatus provides an inadequate description of the labour market and
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leaves unexplained major labour market policy questions, according to Taubman and Wachter
(1986) who emphasise the problem ofdemarcating between sectors. Dickens and Katz (1987,
p.79) comment on empirical findings that concern the dual economy: 'Industry characteristics
are fairly highly correlated with each other. Further, there is a pattern to the correlation
suggesting the existence of one or afew underlyingfactors, which explain the distribution of
industry characteristics. This has been the conclusion from the 'dual-economy' perspective.
Several authors have factor analyzed industry data and have found one dominant factor
corresponding to the view that there is a single dimension along which industries vary. At one
end ofthis spectrum are industries which pay high wages, have substantial market power,
tend to be made up of large firms with large establishments, have a higher union density, have
high capital-to-labor ratios and employ fewer women. At the other end are those with the
opposite characteristics.' The secondary sector ofthe 'dual-economy' consists of industries
that pay low wages, have no market power, tend to be made up of small firms with small
establishments, have a low union density, have low capital-to-labour ratios and employ more
women. This fits well with the description of industries with substitute household production
that employ household skilled workers, especially when we take into account that women
spend more hours in household production than men (see Essays One and Two) and have
more household skills.
The results of the formal model alongside the empirical results presented in this paper, leads
to a new hypothesis: The production of services and goods with substitute household
production takes place in the so-called secondary sector of the dual economy, and employees
use household skills as job skills. Substitute household production links potentially strong
product market competition and strong labour market competition with certain lines of
industry. Industries with substitute household production have two characteristics: low entry
costs of firms and many employees who use household skills as job skills. These two
characteristics result in a 'secondary sector' - a low wage industrial sector as shown by the
model in this paper, that contains industries with substitute household production, and a
corresponding 'secondary labour market' a segment ofhousehold skilled jobs with low
wages. Degree of substitute household production seems to be an underlying cause of
variation in the 'dual economy'. The secondary segment of the 'dual labour market' consists
of the segment ofhousehold skill ed jobs. It seems promising in empirical studies to introduce
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demarcation lines between occupations with household skills and occupation with other skills
and industries with substitute production and other industries. Furthermore, when
classification is made problematic by a mixture ofboth characteristics, this merely
corresponds to the view in the labour market literature (surveyed by Taubman and Wachter,
1986) that classification is a matter of degree; there need not be an absolute divider. When the
concepts ofhousehold skills and industries with substitute household production are
introduced into the neo-classical models ofthis essay and Essay Two, the results reconcile the
gap between the neo-classical and the dual labour market theories. This is not to say that
industries with substitute household production are the only industries in the secondary sector,
nor are household skilled jobs the only jobs in the secondary labour market.
4.6 Concluding remarks
This essay presents a new explanation of inter-industry wage differentials that combines
household production and industrial organisation to address industries with production similar
to households, i.e. industries with substitute household production. Entry costs are low for
firms producing substitutes for household production, and workers in such firms need only
household skills. A novel three-stage model in this essay shows that: High entry costs for new
firms in an industry generate few and large firms, high profits and wages. If industries with
substitute household production have low entry costs, they consist of more and smaller firms
than other industries, and pay low wages to household skilled employees. Illustrations present
empirical results from Japan, Norway and the USA. These results are discussed in relation to
policy issues that include self-employment programmes and minimum wages. Last, but not
least, the discussion suggests that industries with substitute household production are the core
ofthe 'secondary sector' in the 'dual economy'. Thereby, the degree ofsubstitute household
production acts as a line of demarcation between industries in the dual economy, and that
degree ofhousehold skills may be a divider in the 'dual labour market'. In this case, the
introduction of these concepts reconciles neo-classical models and theories of segmented
labour markets.
106
4.7 References
Abenoja, Zeno R.R. and Dennis D. Lapid (1987): Barriers to Entry, Market Concentration, and Wages in the
Philippine Manufacturing Sector, Philippine Review of Economics and Business, 28, 2, 191-217.
Andrews, Charles M. (1919): Colonial Folkways, Reign of the Georges.
Arai, Mahmood (1990): Industry Wage Premiums and Efficiency Wages: A Study of the Industry Wage
Structure in Sweden, in M. Arai: Essays on Non-Competitive Wage Differentials, Swedish Institutefor
Social Research. 15, Stockholm University, 19p.
Bergmann, Barbara R. (1974): Occupational Segregation, Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate by
Race and Sex, Eastern Economic Journal, 1, 2-3, 103- 10.
Bluestone, B. and B. Harrison (1982): The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community
Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industries, Basic Books, New York.
Booth, Alison L. (1995): The economics of the trade union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Brozen, Yale (1962): Minimum Wage Rates and Household Workers, Journal ofLaw and Economics,S,
October, 103-110.
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1995): Myth and Measurement. The New Economics of the Minimum Wage,
Princeton Univ. Press, New Jersey.
Dale, Kristin (1994): Regional and Occupational Wage Differences, in R. Asplund (ed.): Human Capital
Creation in an Economic Perspective, Physica- Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany, 117-28.
Dale, Kristin, Frode Kristiansen og Kjelrun Espedal (1993): Næringsutvikling i regionalt perspektiv (Industrial
development in a regional perspective), SNF-rapport 10/93, Bergen.
Denny, Kevin and Stephen Machin (1991): The Role ofProfitability and Industrial Wages in Firm-level Wage
Determination, Fiscal Studies, 12, 2, 34-45.
Dickens, William T. and Lawrence F. Katz (1987): Inter-Industry Wage Differences, in K. Lang and l.S.
Leonard (eds.): Unemployment and the Structure ofLabor Markets, BlackweJl, New York, 48-89.
Doeringer, Peter B. and Michael J. Piore (1971): Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, Heath
Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts.
Edgeworth, F.Y.(1922): Equal Pay to Men and Women for Equal Work, EconomicJournal, 32, December, 431-
57.
Edin, P.-A. and J. Zetterberg (1992): Inter-industry Wage Differentials: Evidence from Sweden and a
Comparison with the United States, American Economic Review, 82, 5, December, 1341-9.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. (1993): Labor Demand, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
Hildreth, Andrew K. G. and Andrew 1. Oswald (1997): Rent-Sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and
Establishment Panels, Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 2, 318-37.
Johnson, Steve and David Storey (1993): Male and female entrepreneurs and their businesses - a comparative
study, in Sheila Allen and Carole Truman (eds.): Women in business, Routledge, London, 70-85.
Kaur, Davinder and Carol Hayden (1993): Not just for pin money: a case study of the West Midlands Clothing
Business Start-Up Project, in Sheila Allen and Carole Truman (eds.): Women in business, Routledge,
London,101-20.
107
Kolm, Ann-Sofie (2000): Labour Taxation in a Unionised Economy with Home Production, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 102,4,689-705.
Krueger, Alan B. and Lawrence H. Summers (1988): Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure,
Econometrica, 56,2,259-93.
Krueger, Alan B. and Lawrence H. Summers (1987): Reflections on the Inter-Industry Wage Structure, in K.
Lang and J.S. Leonard (eds.): Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets, Blackwell, New
York, 17-47.
Lang, Kevin, Jonathan S. Leonard, and David M. Lilien (1987): Labor Market Structure, Wages and
Unemployment, in K. Lang and J.S. Leonard (eds.): Unemployment and the Structure of Labor
Markets, Blackwell, New York, 1-16.
Lofstom, Åsa (1993): Ju fler kvinnor, desto lagre lon?, Umeå Economic Studies no.323, University of Umeå,
Umeå, Sweden.
Manning, Allan (1994): How Robust Is the Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union? Journal ofLabor
Economics, 12,3,430-59.
Michaelis, Jochen (1997): On the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing, Economics Letters, 57, 1, 113-18.
Mincer, Jacob (1974): Schooling, Experience and Earnings, NBER; Columbia Univ.Press, New York.
Nickell, S., J. Vainiomaki and S. Wadhwani (1994): Wages and Product Market Power, Economica, 61,
November, 457-73.
Oulton, Nicholas (1996): Workforce skills and export competitiveness, in A.L. Booth and D. J. Snower (eds.):
Acquiring skills, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 201-30.
Reid, Margaret G. (1934): Economics of Household Production, John Wiley, New York.
Statistics Norway (1997): Manufacturing Statistics 1995, Industrial Figures, Official Statistics of Norway, C417,
Oslo.
Tachibanaki, Toshiaki (1996): Wage Determination and Distribution in Japan, Cleardon Press, Oxford.
Taubman, Paul and Michael L. Wachter (1986): Segmented Labpr Markets, in Orley C. Ashenfelter and
Richard Layard (eds.): Handbook of Labor Economics, 2, 1183-217.
Tirole, Jean (1988): The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
108
4.8 Appendix: Derivation of the subgame-perfect equilibrium
The solution of stage 3:
fl; ==p(Q)q; -w;q; ==(l-Q)q; -wiqj
dIT.
-d ' ==(l - Q-i - q i ) - q i - W; ==O or
qi
1-Q-i - (2qj + w;) ==O
Multiplying this first-order condition with (-n) yields
-n+nQ_i +n(2qj +wi)==O
Byadding
I-Q_j -(2qj +w)==O
for all j 7= i to the left-hand side ofthis equation, we obtain
-n +(n -l) +(n + l)qj +nwj - W_j =0 I-nwj + W:_jqi = n+ l
The solution of stage 2:
W -w
== j o (l - nw. + W) since l,.= q,.n+ 1 ,-,
Multiplying this first-order condition with n+2 yields
(n+2)-(n+2)2nwj +(n+2)W:_; +(n+2)nwo ==0
Byadding
1- 2nwj +W; + nwo = O
for all j 7= i to the left-hand side ofthis equation, we obtain
(2n + l) - (2n + l)(n + I)w; +(2n + l)nwo = O
(2n + I)(nwo + 1)==(2n + l)(n + l)wj
nwo + lw· ==---
t n+ l
Calculation of profit excluding the sunk entry costs:
Since the stage 2 solution is symmetric, wj ==Wi for all j 7= i ,
109
nwo + 1
1-nwj +(n-1)wj 1-w. 1-~q - - --' - _--'-"--'-"-
j- n+1 - n+1 - n+1
n+1-nwo-1_n(1-wo)
(n + 1)2 - (n + 1)2
Hence, the stage 3 solution is also symmetric (q j = q i for all j *- i) and
(
~__ (n+1f-n2(1-wo)-(n+1)(nwo+1)_n(1-wo)p Q, Wi - 2 - 2
(n + 1) (n + l)
Therefore, the profit excluding the sunk entry costs is given by:
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ESSAYS
WAGE EMPLOYMENT VERSUS FAMILY-BASED
SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
by
Kristin Dale}
Abstract
Industry patterns differ between rural and urban areas. Shops, restaurants, inns, farms, and so
on, are often family-based businesses. This paper analyses the pattern ofwage employment
and family-based self-employment in rural and urban areas. The model has two sectors (wage
employment and family-based employment) and two regions (urban areas and rural areas,
with a cost disadvantage). The model predicts an increased prevalence of family-based
employment in rural areas when wages are regulated nation-wide and rural capital intensity is
maintained through capital subsidies. Empirical results from Norway support these results to
some extent.
l I would like to thank Otto Andersen, Geir B. Asheim, Rolf J. Brunstad, Erik Hernæs, Steinar Holden, Karl
Robertsen, Agnar Sandmo, Inge Thorsen, Stein Østbye and participants of the EALE Conference in Regensburg,
September 1999, for helpful comments.
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5.1 Introduction
Industry patterns differ between rural and urban areas. Agriculture and other primary
industries tend to locate in rural areas, as do small trade and tourism firms seem numerous in
rural areas. Shops, restaurants, inns, farms, and so on, are often families-based businesses
using household resources. Do rural areas 'lack' wage employment? Is family-based income
more important, in rural areas? These questions are the focus ofthis essay, which discusses
the importance of family-based employment in rural areas in the context of a model with two
geographical regions and two industry sectors. The two regions are urban and rural (the latter
is assumed to have a cost disadvantage). The first sector has ordinary wage employment
where the wage is regulated through economy-wide agreements, while the second sector
comprises family-based businesses. I assume that rural amenities and capital subsidies prevent
factor mobility between the two regions. Under the assumption that the wage in the first sector
(and in both regions) equals the urban equilibrium wage, I demonstrate the result that the
industry pattern in the rural region shifts towards the sector with family-based businesses.
Studies of regional economics approach production from various perspectives. The Export
Base theory (Paelinek and Nijkamp, 1975) provides regional income models. In this essay, I
use a different model to emphasise a particular aspect of ownership structure: family-based
employment. In wage employment, employees and owners are not the same individuals. In
family-based businesses, the family establishes a firm or other income-generating activity, and
supplies both capital and labour inputs. In Essay Four, I showed that household production
influences wages and profits in industries with substitute household production. Some ofthese
industries have a higher proportion of family-based firms. National regulation of wages in
some sectors, in addition to tax policies that treat family members and other employees
differently, may advance rural self-employment. Rural development measures that encourage
entrepreneurs will also promote self-employment. Do studies show that self-employment is
more important in rural areas? Is this due to self-employment in agriculture? If private
company employment is less frequent in rural areas, what roles do public employment and
self-employment play?
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Section 5.2 surveys some selected economic studies related to family-based firms. The
industry pattern in rural areas is analysed graphically in Section 5.3 by the economic model of
industry structure with two sectors and two regions. Section 5.4 presents some empirical
results from Norway - a country with significant regional policy measures. The relative
distribution of earnings from self-employment and wage work in Norway in 1996 partially
supports the results of the formal model. Finally, Section 5.5 contains concluding remarks.
Appendix A in section 5.7 is a mathematical analysis of the model, and Appendix B in section
5.8 presents some empirical information.
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5.2 Studies related to family-based firms
Both small family firms and self-employment violate the usual dichotomy in economics
between capitalists and workers. In this essay, the notion of a family-based firm is used to
characterise a situation where capitalists and workers are the same individuals or belong to the
same (extended) family. In the formal analyses ofSection 5.3, the family-based firm is a way
to avoid paying the regulated wage rate. Various studies consider other aspects of family-
based firms. The selected survey below points to some ofthese different approaches.
Manyauthors study the theory of the firm. Fallon and Verry (1988, p.98) discuss some
limitations of the profit maximisation assumption and outline a different model. 'Another case
in which afirm may maximise its objective without minimising costs is as thefirm (or more
realistically the firm 's manager) obtains satisfaction from employment per se. ' This point
stems from Scitovszky (1943) who emphasised that entrepreneurs maximise utility, not
income. This is a realistic model for grandparents/parents who want to see their family
members employed. When both profit and employment are arguments in the manager's utility
function, there is still a downward sloping labour demand curve. In addition to different
examples oftraditionallabourmanaged firms, Dreze (1989, p.3) writes: 'Labour management
is a useful paradigm to study economic decisions in at least three additional sets of
circumstances: .... (ii)Small business ventures owned and operated by members of afamily
(farms, vineyards, stores, fishing boats, garages an the like) also come close to the labour-
management model. ' In the overall conclusion Dreze (1989, p.1l4) states: 'In economies
operating with uncertainty and incomplete markets, it is natural tofind capital hiring labour,
because efficient labour contracts in capitalist firms are easier to draw and monitor than
efficient equity contracts for labour-managed firms .... Smaller firms with closely held equity
could be labour managed, if working conditions call for frequent and subtle adjustments, or
could practise profit-sharing and participatory decision-making. '
Coase (1937) discusses the size of the firm. The types oftransactions the entrepreneur will
keep within the firm are related to the costs ofusing external markets versus internal
production. According to the classification ofCoase (1937), the reasons for family-based
firms staying small are (i) the entrepreneur is better informed about family members, (ii)
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hiring costs of family members are smaller, or family members claim lower wages or create
lower non-wage labour costs. Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) review the Coase-inspired
literature on the market boundaries of the firm, and Gibbons (1998) surveys the literature on
the incentive problems stemming from the separation of owner and manager. The core of the
Coase-inspired literature comprises large firms and enterprises. Garen (1998) relates self-
employment to the theory of the firm by viewing self-employment as a pay system alongside
hourly pay and salary pay.
The social science literature on entrepreneurs is large. Many studies attempt to identify the
factors involved in entrepreneurial success. When studies are policy-oriented, conditions for
credit and the role of realistic advice to entrepreneurs are emphasised. Blanchflower and
Oswald (1998) survey literature on entrepreneurs and conclude that psychology is not a
crucial factor in deciding who becomes an entrepreneur, even though children anxious for
acceptance are slightly less likely to run their own businesses. Empirical results support the
two hypotheses that lack of financial capital constrains self-employment, and that the self-
employed are happier. For 33-year-old Britons questioned in 1991, the self-employed were
marginally more likely to have inherited their wealth, and the average amount inherited was
much higher than for employees. Most small businesses started with an individual's own
money or their family's, not with bank loans. Avery et al. (1998) find that unincorporated
firms are more likely to have loans with personal collateral and that personal commitments are
substitutes for business collateral. Firms with few assets available to pledge tend to be more
dependent on personal commitments.
Economists have studied the role oflabour and capital subsidies in promoting employment,
and the standard result is that labour subsidies are the most effective. According to Østbye
(1996) a certain set of assumptions modify this standard result. Furthermore, if second-hand
real capital markets function better in urban than in rural areas, the potentiallosses are, on
average, larger in rural areas, which implies fewer firm entries in rural areas, and fewer jobs.
The difficulty associated with raising collateral in rural areas leads to a reduced chance of
regular loans. All things being equal, the credit argument implies an inverse industry pattern.
In rural areas, wage employment by national and international firms should be relatively more
common, and self-employment less frequent. Lack of credit for rural development is one of
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the reasons why regional policies to promote rural employment contain public subsidies of
investment in real capital.
Blanchflower (1999) surveys the literature and raise several questions at individual- and
country-level about self-employment in the OECD countries. He points to the disagreement
over whether high unemployment discourages self-employment because of the lack of market
opportunities or, alternatively, encourages self-employment because of the lack of jobs.
Blanchflower (1999, p. 26) concludes that: 'For most countries there is a negative
relationship between the self-employment rate (variously defined) and the unemployment rate.
From the time series regressions there is evidence of positive effects only in Iceland and Italy.
The effects are more strongly negative in the agricultural sector. There is more evidence of
positive unemployment effects in the individuallevel equations. ' These results indicate that if
self-employment compensates for lack ofwage employment and reduces unemployment, it is
rather more of a short-term business-cycle effect than a structural effect. However,
Blanchflower does not consider the regional dimension within each country, where
institutions and policies are common to several regions. I focus upon regions within a country,
thereby controlling for differences in social security system and tax rules. I consider the
industry mix (i.e. the extent to which self-employment is a substitute for wage employment in
both the private and the public sector).
Oinas (1995) discusses the interdependence among types offirm and types ofcommunities.
He classifies enterprises and local relations according to mutual dependence. Family
ownership is classified as having high enterprise dependence and high locality dependence,
whereas ownership divorced from management is classified as low enterprise dependence and
low locality dependence. To formalise and narrow the types of firm and location, I use an
international trade model in Section 5.3 to capture aggregate regional and sectoral dimensions.
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5.3 A model of industry structure in urban and rural areas
My model is a Heckscher-Ohlin model in accord with the textbook presentation and figures
by Norman (1993, Chap.S), where Dixit and Norman (1980, ChapA) is the theoretical basis.
The model has two sectors (with different capital intensities) and two regions. Higher
transport costs for products are assumed for both sectors in the rural area. To simplify the
exposition, it is assumed that no firm has the power to influence the market prices of inputs or
outputs. Constant returns to scale in both sectors are also assumed. Further, workers are
homogeneous with respect to skills. Throughout, superscripts denote sectors and subscripts
denote regions. Appendix A in section 5.7 presents the formal model.
Figure 5.1 The urban region: a) Industry composition, b) Labour demand by two sectors
\\(P"::W',Wl
--~--
: '-
w w
r
Figure S.la illustrates the determination of the equilibrium wage rate and return on real capital
in the urban region with two sectors. Figure 5.1b illustrates, for the urban region, how the
demand for labour by the two sectors varies by wage rate, and the division of labour between
the two sectors at the equilibrium wage rate. Sector 1 consists of capital intensive, private
firms as analysed by the economics of production. In the real world this is the situation of
typical firms in many lines ofmanufacturing industry. In Figure S.la r'(p',w) denotes how the
return on real capital in sector l, ri, depends on the producer price in sector l, pl, and the wage
rate for workers in the region, w. The return curve for sector l reflects the functional income
distribution (i.e. how the producer price is divided between workers and owners). The return
curve is not a straight line because labour intensity varies in accordance with the factor prices
(the returns to labour and capital). Let r'(p,w) describe how the revenue per unit in sector 2 is
divided between workers and owners. The flatter shape ofthis curve indicates that sector 2 is
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less capital-intensive than sector 1. Sector 2 represents labour intensive industries that consists
offirms in the service sectors, indicated by the term tourism for sector 2. The shape of the
return curve for sector 2 reflects a different composition for sector 2 depending on the relative
prices of the production factors. For example, in the upper left corner ofFigure 5.la, where
wage rates are very high, the tourism sector consists of self-service apartments. In the lower
right corner, where wages are low, it consists of full-service hotels. A certain reduction in
wage rate increases the return on real capital more for sector 2 than sector l because sector 2
is the most labour intensive.
Figure 5.la shows that there exist an equilibrium wage rate, WI, and an equilibrium return to
real capital, ri, that make no worker or capitalist want to change sector. Figure 5.1b illustrates
the corresponding labour market equilibrium of the urban region. The horizontal axis
represents the total amount ofhomogeneous labour in the urban region. The number of
workers in sector 1 is measured from left to right. The vertical axis represents the wage rate.
The downward sloping curve in Figure 5.1b shows how the demand for workers in sector 1
varies with the wage rate. The curve that falls from right to left represents the demand,
depending on the wage rate, for workers in sector 2. The intersection between the two labour
demand curves represents the equilibrium where the sum of workers in demand is equal to the
supply ofworkers. The term W, represents the equilibrium wage rate in the urban region.
The assumption ofhigher transport costs for products in the rural area captures the
disadvantage associated with production in a rural region. In Figures 5.2 to 5.4 transport costs
are assumed to reduce the producer price by the same proportion in both sectors in the rural
region. This is a standard way ofmodelling transport costs. Samuelson (1954) illustrated
transport cost by the fraction of ice export that melted during transport and von Thiinen (1895)
by the fraction of grain eaten by the horse while bringing it to the market. I avoid discussing
the effects of different transport costs in different sectors while assuming equal proportional
reductions ofvalue added in both sectors in rural areas.
In Figure 5.2a, the state of the urban region is marked with the subscript I to denote the urban
equilibrium wage rate w" and the urban equilibrium return to capital r; The assumption that
all sectors in the rural region have higher transport costs create rural return curves that are
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located as equal inward shifts of the urban return curves in Figure 5.2a. Figure 5.2a shows the
rural equilibrium wage rate, w" and the rural equilibrium return to capital, r,. The assumption
that the transport costs in the rural region reduce producer prices by the same fraction for all
sectors locates the rural equilibrium on the line from origo to the urban equilibrium.
Figure 5.2 a) Equilibrium capital returns and wage rates in the urban and rural regions
Labour demand by both sectors in b) the urban or c) the rural region
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Compared to the urban region, the rural factor prices decrease proportionally. Figure 5.2
depicts an unstable situation. All else being equal, workers and capitalists would choose the
urban area to take advantage of the higher wage and higher return to capital.
However, some living costs may be lower in rural areas. Living in the breath of the country
may be valued above urban life, which implies that some workers choose the rural region.
Moreover, capitalists may receive rural investment subsidies to start firms in rural areas. In
addition, persons living rurally face a trade-off between various transaction costs, moving
costs and the higher wage rate of urban jobs. Finally, according to Figure 5.2, capitalists who
move production to urban areas may suffer a loss on rural real capital that counterbalances the
higher return to real capital in urban areas. To simplify the model, migration is not taken into
account. To use a comparative static analysis, I use the two following assumptions:
l) Rural people do not move to the city.
2) Rural sector-neutral capital subsidies make capitalists invest in the rural region so that the
overall capital-intensity is sufficiently equal in both regions to avoid full specialisation. Given
these assumptions, Figure 5.2 shows that the industry mix and return to private capital are
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equal in both regions, while both return to total capital and wages are lower in rural areas. It is
an unrealistic conclusion that the industry mix does not differ between urban and rural areas.
In all countries, primary industries are over-represented in rural areas, while manufacturing
and business services are over-represented in urban areas. Can these phenomena be explained
by the above model while maintaining the assumption that the overall regional capital
intensity is equal in both regions?
Registered unemployment is often higher in rural than urban areas, indicating that whatever
the wage formation process in rural areas might be, wages are not set according to the
equilibrium wage rate of the rural region in Figure 5.2. In many sectors a bargaining process
between the employer and the employee heavily influences the wage rate. Assume that the
wage rate of sector l (manufacturing) is nationally determined through union bargaining and
equal for the urban and the rural region. For simplicity, assume that the wage rate of sector l
is equal to the equilibrium wage rate of the urban region (thereby avoiding a full discussion
ofwhat happens in the urban area). Figure 5.3 shows the short-run equilibrium when the
national wage for sector 1has been introduced in both regions, whereas Figure 5.4 presents
the more important long-run equilibrium once real capital adjustments have taken place.
Figure 5.3 The short-run rural effects of national wages in sector 1 given rural capital
subsidies for a) industry mix, returns and wages, and for b) labour demand
2ws
w2
)'
- - - '7' -: I_I -
/ "/
/
/
w
/
/
I
r 2 T2
2T2 r
Given that the wage rate WO applies to sector l in both regions, sector 1 in rural areas will run
at a smaller scale and higher capital intensity than it would in a situation without national
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wage determination. Returns on real capital are reduced in sector 1. To reach a new
equilibrium in the rural labour market, sector 2 must demand the workers that are laid off
from sector 1. For sector 2 (tourism) to demand the workers that are laid offby sector 1
(manufacturing), the wage rate in tourism in the rural area, W's, must be very low. The
assumption that rural people do not move to the city is important to avoid migration to urban
areas in this case. The low wage rate creates a high return on investments in rural tourism
(shown in Figure 5.3).
The assumption of rural capital subsidies make capitalists invest in sector 2 in the rural region
since the difference in capital returns between sectors 1 and 2 in the rural region
( r', - r', >O) will start a process in rural areas where real capital is reduced in sector 1 and
increased in sector 2. Returning to the rural labour market, the demand curves for workers
depend on the real capital in each sector. The closing down of capacity in rural manufacturing
reduces labour demand as illustrated in Figure 5.4b by the movement of the sector 1 demand
curve to the left. Investments in rural tourism increase capacity. For example, building and
renovation of cabins and hotels, and increased tourism services move the rural labour demand
curve for tourism to the left in Figure 5.4b.
Figure 5.4 Long run rural effects from national wages in sector 1 and rural capital
subsidies for a) industry mix, returns and wages and b) labour demand
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Since sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2, a certain transfer of real capital reduces
sector l labour demand by a relatively small amount compared to the bigger rise in labour
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demand from the enlarged capacity in the labour intensive sector 2. This is reflected in the
sizes of the shifts in the labour demand curves of the two sectors in Figure SAb. When sector
1 has adjusted capacity to the nationally set wage level, sector 1 only demand ni,workers in
Figure SAb. To employ the rest of the rural workers in sector 2, the wage rate will have to be
W',., which is higher than the first best equilibrium rural wage rate, W,. Given that there are
sector-neutral rural subsidies, the overall return on capital will be equal in all rural sectors, as
shown in Figure SAa. If capital owners are compensated through rural investment subsidies,
returns for private investors will reach the return level of the urban region, r., while the returns
on total real capital in the rural region will equal r-
Given the assumptions in the model, Figure SA shows that wages in sector l are equal in both
regions, while wages in sector 2 and returns to total capital are lower in rural areas. In
addition, the industry mix differs between the two regions. The capital-intensive industries
that have agreed to pay high national wages are over-represented in urban areas. The model
shows that production and employment in rural areas (i) decrease in manufacturing with fixed
wage rates and (ii) increase in sectors where wage rates are unregulated and lower.
Iflabour costs, such as negotiated wage rates and payroll taxes, do not compensate regional
differences in the value added per worker, then the model with rural capital subsidies predicts
that industries with unregulated (lower) wages, will be relatively more important as a source
of earnings in rural areas than in urban. This is in line with arguments for a regional
differentiated minimum wage rate related to the cost ofliving. Krumm (1981) has pointed to
national minimum wages as representative of relatively stronger regulations in rural regions
with good climate and low cost ofliving compared to urban areas in the us. He argues that if
urban areas with a relatively high cost ofliving influence the national minimum wage to the
greatest extent, then employment opportunities become scanty in rural areas with low costs of
living.
However, wage rates differ among rural industries because (i) the wage rate in sector 2 is
subject to individual agreements or (ii) some businesses do not make regular wage payments
(for example, self-employment and small family firms where the same individual supplies
both capital and labour inputs). Blanchflower (1999) asserts that this is an important source of
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raising unpaid self-employment, especially in agriculture. In the real world, unregulated
wages are more common in small firms and service industries. By interpreting sector 2 firms
as family-based firms, the analysis illustrated in Figure 5.4 shows that self-employment may
be a sign of an absence of wage employment at the prevailing wage rate. A particular aspect
of the ownership structure is this self-employment where earnings are pooled, and separate
returns to capital and labour supply by family members is neither calculated nor paid.
Examples are family farms and lodgings where a family uses its real capital and family
members' supply hours with no formal wage payments. This essay has presented a model
suggesting a greater importance of such family based self-employment in rural areas. Is there
any empirical support for this finding?
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5.4 Empirical studies
Blanchflower (1999, pp. 30-31) reports that self-employment varied among the OECD
countries in 1996 as a percentage ofthe total labour force from 7.4 in Luxembourg to 53.6 in
Turkey. Self-employment was low inboth the US with 7.9 per cent and Norway with 8.2 per
cent. In all the OECD countries self-employment is a way to stay employed beyond 64 years
of age. One reason why the regional difference in self-employment and family-based
employment has not been studied is that data sources are scarce (see Blanchflower, 1999, for a
discussion).
Norway is a European country where regional policy has had an explicit and strong urban-
rural dimension since the Second World War. Mønnesland (1997) distinguishes between the
'broad' Norwegian regional policy, which includes public sector and agricultural policy, and
the 'narrow' regional policy, which includes, for example, rural, sector-neutral investment
subsidies and regionally differentiated payroll tax. IfNorwegian data indicates that family-
based employment is more important in rural areas, it should be more so in other countries
with higher self-employment shares. In the ease of Norway, employment may be classified by
industry, and divided into wage earners and self-employment. Some family-based
employment will inevitably be registered as wage-earning even though the employer is a
family member, and some unpaid employment by family members will escape measurement.
The social security tax of the self-employed is smaller than the sum of the taxes from the
employee and the employer's payroll tax. Self-employment is, therefore, the least expensive
form for a one-person business or a business run by a married couple. While regular wage
workers are counted and hours and wage rates are measured, industry statistics and wage
censuses omit very small establishments, typically family firms. The Employer-Employee
register in Norway contains only formal wage workers. Neither of these data sources indicates
whether or not owners and employees of a firm are relatives. Hence, the line of demarcation
between regular employment and family-based employment cannot be properly drawn.
5.4.1 Self-employment by industry
The size-distribution of firms in an industry depends on factors such as tradition, regulations,
entry costs of new firms, economies of scale, and so on. A person may do various types of
125
work during a certain period. Thus, Table 5.1 examines individuals according to their major
source of earnings. According to Table 5.1 column 2, the overall share of self-employment
was 8 per cent in Norway in 1996. The percentage self-employment of total employment
varies arnong industries. Offshore extraction of petroleum and natural gas, supplies of power-
and water and financial services, had zero per cent self-employment.
Table 5.1 Norwegian earners in 1996 by industry and type of employment
Industry code, Industry Self-em~l. Numberof Numberof Numberof
Empl.pers empl, pers. wage workers self-employed
Total 8% 1985545 1819413 166132
Unreported industry 85% 40347 6179 34168
O1-05 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 65% 90615 31853 58462
2 Extraction of crude petrol.and nat.gas 0% 23345 23343 2
3 Manufacturing and mining 2% 294069 287831 6238
4 Electricity and water supply 0% 19828 19821 7
5 Construction 16 % 119940 101215 18725
6 Wholesale, retail trade, restaur.,hotels 5% 356071 339252 16819
7 Transport and communication 5% 152466 144266 8200
8 Financing and insurance 0% 46125 46122 3
9 Real estate and business services 6% 150299 141924 8375
10 Public and other services 2% 692440 677607 14833
O1Agriculture and hunting 56% 52287 23122 29165
02 Forestry 48% 5084 2647 2437
05 Fishing, hunting and sea farming 44% 10925 6084 4841
Unspecified primary industry 100 % 22319 O 22319
17 Manufacture oftextiles 6% 5079 4789 290
18 Manufacture of apparel 12% 2924 2572 352
20 Manufacture of wood and wood prod. 5% 16219 15432 787
33 Manufacture of instruments 4% 5308 5104 204
36 Manufacture offumiture, other prod. 6% 14200 13414 786
52 Retail trade and repair services 6% 145720 136378 9342
60 Land transport and pipeline transport 15 % 53910 46092 7818
74 Other business services 7% 107564 99808 7756
93 Other personal services 33 % 18772 12583 6189
95 Domestic services 1% 1431 1410 21
Source: Statistics Norway.
The primary sector of agriculture, forestry and fishing, has 65 per cent self-employment. The
85 per cent self-employment among persons with no industry registered indicates,
presumably, that they find it hard to categorise their activities. The lower part of Table 5.1
contains examples of industries that deviate from the national average of 8 per cent self-
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employment. I find the l per cent self-employment in domestic services surprisingly low. In
alllikelihood, it is due to a 'black' labour market where income is neither reported nor taxed.
Some industries have relatively high self-employment, see Table 5.1. Apparel had 12 per cent
self-employment compared with 2 per cent for the entire manufacturing industry. Industries
stemming from crafts tend to have a higher share of self-employment. The 15 per cent self-
employment in land transport arises from 'a man and a car' businesses. Lastly, one in three is
self-employed in other personal services.
5.4.2 Self-employment by region
To account for the regional dimension ofwage work and self-employment, I had to strike a
balance between too few characteristics at the community level (430 municipalities) and fewer
regions and more characteristics at the county level (19 counties). Furthermore, a county is a
problematic heterogeneous unit that does not really separate urban and rural areas; when most
counties contain both urban administrative centres and remote areas. The capital Oslo is a
separate county. Akershus is the county bordering on Oslo with a great deal ofOslo-based
commuting. Table 5.2 presents employment information for persons categorised by county of
residence from the 'county-tables' of the 'tax return statistics' ofStatistics Norway for the
year 1996. It distinguishes between formal wage earnings and income from self-employment
(i.e. both labour and capital income). Self-employment earnings stem from industries such as
farming in the primary sector, businesses in other sectors, as well as income from real
property such as cabins. Deductions were made for reported losses in these trades. The ratio of
self-employment income to wage earnings was 10 per cent for Norway in 1996. At the county
level, this ratio ranges from 6 per cent in Akershus and 7 per cent in Oslo to 15 per cent in
Hedmark, Nord-Trøndelag, Møre- og Romsdal and Oppland, and 17per cent in Sogn og
Fjordane. The five latter counties are rural counties with no large urban agglomeration.
The 'take-home message' is that family based employment fills in for an absence of formal
wage employment. However, it might work in the opposite direction. Entrepreneurs might
create family-based employment with high income-levels, whereas individuals with less
initiative enter wage employment with low income-levels. If so, regions with a higher ratio of
self-employment to wage work, should have the higher income per person. This alternative
hypothesis is not in accordance with the model in Section 5.3.
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Table 5.2 Earnings ratio and average total income by county, Norway 1996
Earnings ratio of self-ernpl/wagew Average total income
County Self-emQlo:yed earnings Rank Average income NOK Rank
wage earnings
Norway 10% 183361
Østfold 11% 10 169218 10
Akershus 6% 1 218131 18
Oslo 7% 2 225234 19
Hedmark 15 % 15 158486 2
Oppland 15 % 18 158722 3
Buskerud 10% 6 183344 16
Vestfold 10% 7 179965 14
Telemark 9% 4 168483 8
Aust-Agder 11% 12 167719 6
Vest-Agder 11% 9 172 878 13
Rogaland 11% 8 193872 17
Hordaland 8% 3 182 122 15
Sogn og Fjordane 17% 19 168700 9
Møre og Romsdal 15 % 17 170461 11
Sør-Trøndelag 9% 5 171 777 12
Nord-Trøndelag 15 % 16 155262 1
Nordland 12 % 14 162220 4
Troms 12% 13 168040 7
Finnmark 11% 11 164589 5
. .Source: Statistics Norway, the county tables of the tax return statistics 1996.
Table 5.2 shows the total income per person, and by county, for Norway in 1996. The top
average income is found around the area of the capital, Oslo and Akershus. Oppland,
Hedmark and Nord-Trøndelag are in the bottom range. Furthermore, self-employment rises as
the level of average income lowers. This supports the view that self-employment partly fills
the earnings gap in areas with few employment opportunities. To analyse the relations
between different characteristics, a correlational analysis was performed using the SPSS 8.0
program. Due to the small number of regions, I have used bi-variate calculations. The
nonparametric rank correlation, Spearman's rho, between the rank of the ratio of self-
employment to wage earnings and the rank of the average total income, is -0.751 and
significant at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. This result makes me reject the hypothesis
above that regions with a higher ratio of self-employment to wage work, should have the
higher income per person. It supports the model in this essay: self-employment is relatively
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more frequent in areas with low average earnings. However, this does not preclude alternative
explanations.
5.4.3 The regional industry pattern
To study the industrial pattern by region, the correlation analysis was extended. In accordance
with Table 5.2, Table 5.3 shows that counties with a high average income have a lower ratio
of self-employment income to wage income. They co-inside with the densely populated areas,
an indication oftheir urbanisation. Counties with a low population density have lower
incomes and higher self-employment incomes relative to wage income. To some extent, these
results support the theoretical results of the formal modelofthis essay. They stem from
analyses of employment data from the Norwegian Employer-Employee Register for 1996. For
individuals who hold more than one job at a time, only the main job is counted.
Table 5.3 Pearson's correlation coefficients ofincome, population density and industry
mix indicators, 19 counties, Norway 1996 (Significance probabilities in brackets.)
Variable Average Self-em inc Inhabitants Jobs per p. Private jobs Public jobs Prim.sec.inc
income wageinc. Square km (16-74) pp (16-74) Private jobs Wage inc.
Gross income per 1,000 -0,735** 0,697** 0,774** 0,514* 0,165 0,165
income earner (17+) (,000) (,001) (,000) (,024) (,501) (,501)
Self-em~loyment inc -0,735** 1,000 -0,415 -0,511 * -0,316 0,072 0,815**
Wageincome (,000) (,078) (,025) (,187) (,770) (,000)
Inhabitants 0,697** -0,415 1,000 0,815** -0,129 0,319 -0,554*
Squarekm (,001) (,078) (,000) (,599) (,184) (,014)
Jobs per person age 0,774** -0,511 * 0,223 1,000 0,741 ** -0,334 -0,344
16-74 (,000) (,025) (,358) (,000) (,162) (,150)
Private jobs per pers. 0,514* -0,316 -0,129 0,741 ** 1,000 -0,877** -0,180
age 16-74 (,024) (,187) (,599) (,000) (,000) (,462)
Public jobs -0,165 0,072 0,319 -0,334 -0,877** 1,000 0,028
Private job (,501) (,710) (,184) (,162) (,000) (,909)
Prim!!!y sector inc. -0,631 ** 0,815** -0,554* -0,344 -0,180 0,028 1,000
Wageincome (,004) (,000) (,014) (,150) (,462) (,909)
...
Pearson s product moment correlation coefficients range from -1.0 to + 1.0. Significance probabilities of 2-talled
tests are reported (in brackets in Table 5.3). The ** indicates a significant estimate at the 1% level, while *
indicates significance at the 5% level.
Source: Variables reported by county, see Appendix B in section 5.8.
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By definition, a job encompasses part-time and full-time work. The average number of main
jobs in the age group 16-74 ranges from 0.54 in Nordland to 0.64 in Akershus. Employer
location is the basis for the county classification of jobs. However, total job frequency
correlates marginally with population density, which implies that the mere employment does
differentiate between rural and urban areas.
Is family-based self-employment only another phrase for self-employment in agriculture and
other primary industries? According to Blanchflower (1999, p. 32) agricultural self-
employment varies among OECD countries for 1995 from 8 per cent of total self-employment
in the UK to 74 per cent in Turkey. With regards to Norway, he reports agricultural self-
employment at 37 per cent of total self-employment, and non-agricultural ration of self-
employment to total employment at 5 per cent. Agricultural earnings within Norway are
highly correlated with total self-employment earnings and negatively correlated with
population density according to Table 5.3. While the average primary sector self-employment
income ranges from 2 per cent of wage earnings in Oslo to 7 per cent in Møre og Romsdal,
other kinds of self-employment provide 6 per cent of wage earnings in Oslo and 8 per cent in
Møre og RomsdaL Thus, regions with the highest self-employment in the primary sector have
higher self-employment in the other sectors as welL Hence, agriculture is part of the rural self-
employment picture.
What is the role of the public sector in the regional industry mix? The allocation of jobs
towards the private and public sectors was not ready-made in the data set. According to Table
5.3, the public sector contains the following industries: (80) public administration, (85)
education and (90) health and social work, all mainly public sector jobs in Norway. For this
reason, I marginally overestimate the number of public jobs in these sectors and underestimate
them in some other sectors. Private jobs are calculated as the difference between all jobs and
public jobs. The ratio of public jobs per private job ranges from 0.35 in Akershus to 0.81 in
Troms. The capital, Oslo, has a high value ofO.75 because of the government. The correlation
between public jobs and private jobs is significant, negative and strong - as expected for a
country where the Norwegian version of the 'Scandinavian welfare state' evens out both the
municipality tax revenue per inhabitant and the basic public services for schooling and health
care. Lots of public part-time jobs and a lower, regulated wage level in the public rather than
130
the private sector may explain the weak negative correlation between the ratio of public to
private jobs and the income level. Furthermore, a bias towards the localisation of government
jobs in urban areas may explain the small positive correlation between the ratio of public to
private jobs and population density.
The central tenet of the model in this essay is that self-employment fills deficit of well-paid
private jobs in rural areas. The frequency of private jobs in the age group 16-74 ranges from
0.31 percentage in Finnmark to 0.48 in Akershus. The frequency of private jobs correlates
negatively with self-employment and population density as expected, but these estimates are
neither strong nor significant. The frequency of private jobs correlates positivelyand strongly
with the total number of jobs and with the average income level. This indicates that private
jobs are better paid. Are urban wage rates higher? Studies of earnings functions often show
significant regional differences in wage rates. According to Dale (1994), who studied
Norwegian extracting and manufacturing industries in 1986, the highest wages were in the
urban Stavanger area. These were 3 per cent higher than in Oslo and about 15 per cent higher
than in rural areas of Sør-Trøndelag, Hedmark, Oppland, and Sogn og Fjordane. The regional
variation in labour costs may exceed that of wages because of a regionally differentiated
payroll tax in Norway. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) argue that the regional
unemployment rates influence wages. In Norway, rural areas have higher unemployment
rates, although this is not the case in all countries (Marston, 1985).
What makes family-based self-employment unattractive to family members? Where taxes are
progressive, as is the case in Norway, tax laws limit tax evasion by restricting the amount of
self-employment earnings that other family members may report. The lack of formal
registration ofworking hours by family members thereby deprives them of individual claims
on Social Security. This is a common situation for wives of farmers (Dale, 1995). Gender and
power relations within the household become complex, and, thus, become important for
individual costs and benefits with regard to money, income and social security claims (see
Agarwal, 1997, for a discussion of within household bargaining).
131
5.5 Concluding remarks
This essay analyses the mix ofwage employment and family self-employment in rural and
urban areas. Rural areas have an industry mix that differs in comparison with their urban
counterparts. Farms, shops, restaurants, inns, together with other firms that enjoy low entry
costs, are often family-based businesses. The formal model of this essay analyses the mix of
wage employment and family self-employment in rural and urban areas. It has two sectors
(one with wage employment, the other representing family self-employment) and two regions
(rural areas, which have cost disadvantages, and urban areas). The model predicts increased
importance of family self-employment in rural areas when wages are regulated nation-wide
and rural capital intensity is maintained through capital subsidies. In accordance with the
predictions of the model, empirical findings from Norway show that self-employment is
relatively more frequent in rural than urban areas and that self-employment increases as the
level of average income decreases.
This essay's model assumes that capital subsidies in rural areas encourage investment in real
capital. If capital subsidies are not available, one can expect family businesses to enter
industries associated with particularly low entry costs, such as those with substitute household
production (see Essay Four). A 'bed-and-breakfast' would be a typical example of a family
business with low entry costs when the family's real capital is utilised both for family
consumption and a family business site. Another interesting aspect of low entry costs is the
proportion ofwhich that may be described as 'sunk cost' - because an investment was
undertaken long ago to provide a family dwelling or develop agricultural production.
According to Stringer (1981, p.362) most bed-and-breakfast landladies start primarily for
economic reasons, and 'bed-and-breakfasts' enable them to live in a large house to which they
are attached, and work at home and have greatly-valued contact with other people.
In Essay Four, industries with substitute household production were characterised by both low
entry costs and employees with household skills. According to Stringer (1981, p.362), the job
of the bed-and-breakfast landlady require no labour market training or 'unusual' skills from
education. Solberg and Vestby (1987) maintain that children help in their parents' jobs.
Children spend most time helping when fathers are farmers, fishermen or run retail businesses
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and when mothers are farmers, cleaners or day-mothers. Youth work more hours in farming
and fishing communities than in urban areas. This indicates that the scope of in-the-home
training (discussed in Essay Two) is broader for children raised in small family businesses.
Therefore, it is reasonable for family-run businesses to employ family members with relevant
skills learnt though in-the-home-business training, even though they have no more educational
qualifications than others. The assumption in the model ofthis essay - that workers are
homogeneous with respect to skins - may seem satisfied when evaluated by the length of
education. However, if in-the-home-business training is also considered, this assumption is
presumably not fulfilled.
Family self-employment is seldom available to non-members of the family. Employment in
large private firms and the public sector are, in principle, open to any applicant who possesses
the formal skins required. Therefore, the availability of formal wage employment is attractive
to entrants in a locallabour market, whereas many family-runbusinesses are an impediment
to potential entrants with no tie to such a business in the local labour market. This is
illustrated by Kontogeorgopoulos (1998), who presents examples of differing behaviour
between small family-based firms and large firms in the context of the tourist development of
two islands in Thailand.
Family-based employment may have different short term and long term effects in rural areas.
In the short term it may be a cheap way to provide earnings for rural people. When
employment opportunities with regular firms and public employers are in short supply, the
family-member is the 'insider' in the family-based employment. In the short term, family real
capital discourages the owners from closure. The low, unregulated wages offamily members
win make them retain real capital as a basis for a family-based firm. Some may retain real
capital for pure dwelling or leisure purposes. In this way, new entrants in the agricultural and
tourism industries can have a hard time finding land for sale. Will new entrants have to
provide not only labour with relevant skills - wage work - but, in addition, the real capital for
self-employment or a firm? Do family businesses create a 'double-outsider' problem that
constrains emigration to rural areas in the long term? These are issues for future research.
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Regional policies that subsidise capital, together with policies that treat family-members and
other employees differently, may reinforce rural self-employment and reduce the demand for
regular employees. It is important to address the implications of the rural bias towards self-
employment (both in primary and other industries): a person may have to invest not only
human capital but also physical capital to acquire a rural job. In practice, the division between
the capitalist and the worker disappears. In order to have a job in a rural area with a shadow
price similar to the market wage, a person must be a capitalist and expect low profits.
Unemployment policies and rural development policies that encourage entrepreneurs may
reinforce the lack ofwage employment opportunities in rural areas in the long run.
Agriculture is a major employer in the rural areas of many countries, but tourism attracts
increased attention with regards to economic restructuring (Montanari and Williams, 1995).
Despite changes in the industry mix, family-based employment will probably playa major
role in rural areas. Regional policy faces challenges from the regional variation in
unemployment and industry patterns.
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5.7 Appendix A: The formal model
The purpose ofthis appendix is to formalise the graphical analysis of Section 5.3.
Throughout, superscripts refer to sectors and subscripts refer to regions. The production in
each sector is described by a production function, which is strictly increasing in each factor
and strictly quasi-concave, and which exhibits constant returns to scale:
Xl = FI(kl ,nI) = klfl(nl / kl) in sector l,
x2 = F2(e ,n2) = ef2(n2 / e) in sector 2, which is more labour intensive.
Ifj=1,2, let aj(w/ p) bedefined implicitlyby dF(aj(w/ p»/ da = w/ p, i.e.,
aj (w/ p) is the labour/capital ratio that makes the value of the marginal product of labour
equal to the wage rate in sectorj. The capital return in region i in sectorj is given by:
rj (p, w) = pfj(aj(~)) - wat~~)
It follows from Hotelling's lemma and the convexity of the profit function that
a-j~W) =-aj(~)=-nj /kj
02r/(p, w)
cM? >0
It is assumed that there is a proportional cost disadvantage in the rural region (region 2),
which is formally associated with lower producer prices in the rural area and is due to higher
transport costs.
p; = (1- t)p~
pi =(l-t)p~
The initiallong run equilibrium is characterised by the following equations in each region,
where ki and ni, i=1,2, refer to the fixed amount of capital and labour available in region i
(see also Figure 5.2).
Region 1: Region 2:
1j =rl(p~,wI)=r2(p~,wI)
_ a.1(p~,wI) _ l/klow -nI I
_ ty2 (p~ ,WI) = 2 / eow nI I
k:+k~=kl
r2=rl(p~,w2)=r2(p;,w2)
_ ty I(p~,w2) _ I / kl
OW -n2 2
_ ty2 (pi, w2) _ 2 / k2
OW - n2 2
k~ +k; =k2
Not full specialisation in the urban region:
tyl(p~,WI) nI ty2(p~,WI)_ <_ < __ -'.O_-'-'-~
ow kl ow
Not full specialisation in the rural region:
tyl(p~,W2) n2 ty2(pi,w2)- < - < - -~-"--'---__;.:_
ow k2 ow
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Due to the assumption of a proportional cost disadvantage in the rural region (region 2), it
follows that r2= (1- t)rl and W2 = (1- t)wI , and, given that there is not full specialisation,
n~ / k; = n; / k: and ni / k; = nl2 / kl2 •
The short run equilibrium
When the wage in sector 1 is set at wO=WJ>Wl,the equilibrium in the urban region is
unchanged. In the short run equilibrium in the rural region (region 2), WS1, nsJ and ns1 are
determined by (see Figure 5.3)
It follows that n; <n~ since - (jri/Ow2 <O. Hence, n; = n2 - n; > n2 - n; = n; .
Since -iJr2 / Ow2 < 0, this means that w; < w2• We can conclude that
W; < w2 <wo
r2(p;,w;»r2 >rl(p~,wo)
n; < n~ and n; > ni
The new long run equilibrium (see Figure 5.4)
The short run situation, which has different returns, will lead to a transfer ofreal capital from
sector 1 in the rural region. The assumption of no capital mobility between the regions implies
that the real capital is not transferred to the urban region, but to sector 2 in the rural region.
The new long run equilibrium in the rural region (region 2) is characterised by:
ri =rl(p~,wo)=r2(p;,w;)
a-I(pi,wo) _ n;
Ow - e
I
a-2 (pi, wi) _ n;
Ow - ki
k: +ki =k ,
n: +ni = n2
Not full specialisation if
a-I(pi,wo) n2 a-
2(pi,w;)
- <-<Ow k2 Ow
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This implies that re < r2 because sector 1 must pay a higher wage. The fact that sector 2 is
more labour intensive means that w: < Wo , while w: > W2 since re < r2 •
Because wages are higher in both sectors, it follows that both sectors have a higher capital
intensity as illustrated by the following Figure 5.5. Figure 5.5 shows that full utilisation of
both factors means that k; < k~and k; > k;.
Figure 5.5 The Edgeworth box for the rural region
We can conclude that
Wo >wi > w2
1 1ne n2-<-k: ki
k; < k~ and
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:- 2 -
Why do husbands spend so much time working outside the
home, and wives spend so much time on housework? The
aim of this paper is to study how an individuals allocation
of time between work, homeproduction and leisure depends
on the composition of the household and the existence
of markets for commodities produced in the household.
The work by Reuben Gronau has inspired this paper, and
I draw heavily on several of his models. Gronau (1973)
models a two person household where market goods
and home goods are different goods in the household utility
function. However, the household production function
includes market inputs as well as home work and calls for
the combination of inputs in fixed proportions. The
model in Gronau (1977) starts with a single person household
where home goods are perfect substitutes for market goods.
Extending the model to the two person household, he discusses
specialization within the family. If both persons participate
in the labour force and there is no ~ommodity or service which
is supplied solely through home production, marriage does
not yield any gains of trade. Discussing the supply
of labour of married women, three important economic
factors are mentioned; income, wage rate and education.
The importance of market substitutes for home production
for the supply of labour is not discussed, therefore this
is the main point in my paper.
This approach to household decision-making assumes that
the two persons who have formed the household, maximize
a neoclassical household utility function subject to the
household total income constraint and the two time constraints.
Let us consider a household consisting of two members:
wife and husband. Assume that the preference ordering
of this household can be represented by a household utility
function (U):
(l) u
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XM denotes the amount of market goods enjoyed by the
household, XH the amount of home goods enjoyed by the
household, Ll the amount of leisure enjoyed by the husband,
L2 the amount of the wife's leisure.
This formulation assumes implicitly that the household
is indifferent to the distribution of work between work
at home and work in the narket. The intrafamily distribution
of goods is not discussed. Using the household utility
function is not trivial. Strong assumptions must be
met. If the members of the household agree upon the
spesification of the household utility function, or if
the head of the household dictates its form, using the
household utility function pose no problem.
It would be possible to avoid .the problem of a single
household utility function using bargaining theory.
This theory allows for different individual utility functions
and provides a means by which the differences are reconciled.
Bargaining theory can help solving the allocation of
consumption problem, see Manser and Brown (1979). Ashenfelter
(1979) states that it is unclear whether there are any
positive predictions whatever from a household bargaining
framework. The conventional models are useful because
of their strong implications which can be tested empirically.
I therefore use the household utility function approach
here.
Home goods are produced at home by the wife or by the
husband:
fi denotes person i's production function for home goods, i
Hi denotes person i's work at home, i = 1,2.
For simplicity market goods that enter into the production
of home goods are ignored here. We also assume that the
production of home goods by either person can be represented
by a common production function (f), except for the productivity
1,2.
coefficient (ai). Home goods production is subject to
decreasing marginal productivity (f'>O, f"<O).
- 4 -
Home goods produced by the wife: f2(H2) = a2f(H2)
Home goods produced by the husband: fl(Hl) = alf(Hl)
Total production of home goods thus becomes:
(2) XH = a2f(H2) + alf (Hl)
The household pools its pecuniary resources. Adopting a
one-period model, the budget constraint (3) states that
the expenditure on market goods cannot exceed the household
income:
where p denotes the price of the rrarket goods,
w. denotes the wage rate of member i, i = 1,2.
l
A. denotes the amount of time member i spends working
l
in the market, i = 1,2; and V denotes unearned income.
The household faces two separate time constraints.
The amount of time spent by any person on work in the
market, work at horne, and leisure cannot exceed the total
amount of time available (T).
(4)
(5)
Al + Hl + LI
A2 + H2 + L2
T
T
Incorporating both time constraints into the budget constraint,
we have the full income constraint (6). Full income
is the income the household could have earned had it
devoted all its time to work in the market.
The maximization of the utility function (l) subject to
the full income constraint (6), yields the household's
optimal allocation of time. Assumingan interior solution
the Laqrangian function, K, thus becomes:
- 5 -
The first order conditions for an interior solution to
the optimization problem are (6) and:
(a) aK au - Ap OaXM aXM
dK au(bl· aHI = aXH alf'(HI) - AWl O
(c) aK au a2f' (H2) - AW2 OaH2 aXH
(d) åK = l.!L - AWl OaLl aLl
(e) dK = 2.Q_ AW2 O-aL2 dL2
Which yields:
au au
aLl = wI dL2 w2
au p au p
aXM aXM
au au
aLl
alf' (Hl)
aL2 a2f' (H2)au au
aXH aXH
au
aLl wI
au w23L2
This shows that:
au wI w2
aXH p p
au alf' (Hl) a2f' (H2)aXM
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The marginal rate of substitution between each persons
leisure and market goods equals the persons own real
wage rate. The marginal rate of substitution between
each persons leisure and home goods equals his/her marginal
productivity in horre production. The marginal rate of
substitution between leisure of the two person equals
the ratio of their wage rates. The marginal rate of substitution
between home goods and market goods equals the ratio between
the real wage rate and the marginal productivity in home
production for each person. When the household utility
function is maximized,we also see that the ratio of the
marginal productivity in home production of the two persons
equals the ratio of their real wage rates.
From this we see that the optimal allocation of time for
each person between leisure, home production and market
work depends on the real wage rates and the productivities
in home production for all persons in the household.
Especially, the supply of home work from any person
in a two person household depends not only on the persons
own real wage rate and productivity in home production,
but also on the spouses real wage rate and productivity
in home production. Living in a two person household
implies some degree of mutually beneficial specialization.
For the household as a whole,consumption of market goods
is determined by money income,and consumption of home
goods by time devoted to home work. Because the household
is an arena of exchange of goods, consumption is not
fixed by production on an individual basis. The division
of work in the market and work in the home is now determined
by their comparative advantages.
In this model we see that the husband has a comparative
advantage in work in the market and the wife in homework
when
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When the wife has a comparative advantage in home production,
it follows from this model that she spends more time
in home production than her husband does. That is: H2 > Hi'
When the husband has a comparative advantage in market
work, it does not follow from this model that he spends
more time in market work than does his wife. The amount
of time each person spend on market work also depends
on the household preferences for leisure for each of them.
If the household utility function is symmetric in the
two variables husband's leisure and wife's leisure, we
can draw rroreconclusionsfrom this rrodel. In this case,
if the husband has an absolute advantage in market
work then the husband spends more time in market work
than does his wife. That is: Ai > A2•
We now turn to the case where market goods and home goods
are perfect substitutes. Apart from this we use the
same household model as before. Suppose that the preferance
ordering of the two person household can be represented
by the household utility function (7).
(7) u
The household can either buy the goods
in the market or produce the goods at
home. The utility of the household is
independent of the mix of market and home
produced goods.
In the same way as before the household ma~imize its
utility function (7) subject to the budget constraint
(3) and the time constraints of the two persons (4 and 5).
The first order conditions for maximum utility are almost
unchanged (see page 5).
Since market goods and home goods are now perfect substitutes,
we have
au
'ax
H
l
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Suppose we have an interior solution to the optimization
problem and that market goods and home goods are perfect
substitutes.
When a person spends time on market work and home work,
the real wage rate equals the marginal productivity in
home production for each person. The optimal allocation
of working time for each person between home production
and market work depends on the person's own real wage
rate and productivity in home production when market goods
and home goods are perfect substitutes. Especially, the
supply of home work from any person in a two person household
depends only on this person's own real wage rate and
productivity in home production, independent of those
of the spouse.
How does choice of spouse affect the predictions of the
model for a person. Let us illustrate this in the case
of a wife. If her husband dictates the spesification
of the household utility function, this naturally has
obvious implications for her. Apart from this influence
on the household utility frunction, how do his productivity
coefficient and real wage rate influence the optimal
allocation of time for his wife? If the husband's productivity
coefficient in home production increases, the husband
will change his production pattern spending more time
in home work, substituting work time from market work
to home work. There will also be an income effect of
this productivity increase. The family can consume more
goods or increase the l:eisure of any person. If the
husband's real wage rate increases, we have a similar
situation where the husband's time in home production
decreases. The income effect on AI' LI' L2 and A2 is
undetermined, but H2 is unchanged.
In this model of perfect substitutes the productivity of
the husband influences the wife's optimal allocation
of time in the same way as unearned income. When market
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goods and home goods are perfect substitutes, the wife's
allocation of work time between the market and the home
is independent of productivity charateristics of her husband.
The argument for this goes as follows. When goods either
can be bought or produced at home, the decision of goods
consumption and the decision of goods production can be
separated because the utility obtained only depends on the
amount of leisure time and the total amount of goods
consumed, independent of whether goods are ',boughtor
produced at home.
Why do we see that marriage and giving birth to children
make wives withdraw from market work while mens labour
force participation remain more or less unchanged ?
The model indicates that lack of market substitutes for
horne goods is a possible explanation of why one of
them shift from market work to hornework. The reason
why this is the woman must be that she is the one with
comparative advantage in horne production.
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